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California Supreme Court Survey
December 1984-February 1985
The California Supreme Court Survey is a brief synopsis of recent decisions
by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inforn the reader of the
issues that have been addressed by the supreme court, as well as to serve as a
starting point for researching any of the topical areas. The decisions are ana-
lyzed in accordance with the importance of the court's holding and the extent
to which the court expands or changes existing law. Attorney discipline and
judicial misconduct cases have been omitted from the survey.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW .................................. 1146
When reviewing standards adopted by the Air
Resources Board, the court need only inquire
whether the Board's decision was unsupported or
whether it was made outside the scope of
authority. Economic cost of compliance need not
be taken into consideration; rather, local boards
may grant variances to remedy harsh economic
consequences: Western Oil & Gas v. Air Resources
B oard .............................................. 1146
II. ATTORNEY'S FEES ...................................... 1152
Attorney's fees are a recoverable element of
damages where an insurer breached the implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing by tortiously
withholding benefits: Brandt v. Superior Court ..... 1152
III. CIVIL PROCEDURE ...................................... 1153
A. The Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)
venue provisions create an exception to the
general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure
and will control in cases involving non-FEHA and
FEHA claims: Brown v. Superior Court ............ 1153
B. The granting of a summary judgment in medical
malpractice case held to be improper: Mann v.
Cracchiolo .......................................... 1154
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A. Proof of an intent to kill is an essential element
of a felony-murder special circumstance finding:
People v. Anderson ................................. 1155
B. New sentence enhancement statute for "serious
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felonies" held to apply to second degree burglary,
and not to be violative of the double base term
statute: People v. Jackson .......................... 1156
C. Prior conviction of first degree burglary is, as a
matter of law, a burglary of a residence and
results in a five year sentence enhancement:
People v. O'Bryan .................................. 1159
V. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ................................. 1160
A. Court upholds Truth-in-Evidence provision of
Proposition 8; abrogates California's vicarious
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v. Armendariz ....................................... 1174
C. It is reversible error where a trial court
improperly fails to exercise its discretion to
appoint advisory counsel at the request of a
defendant who is acting as pro se counsel: People
v. Bigelow .......................................... 1176
D. Defendant's sixth amendment rights are violated
when preliminary hearing testimony is admitted
into evidence and defense counsel has not had a
meaningful right to cross-examine: People v.
Brock .............................................. 1183
E. Trial court's refusal to grant continuance in order
to allow defendant to obtain retained counsel held
to be abuse of discretion: People v. Courts ......... 1184
F. It is proper for a court to consider the effect of
delay on the memory of all witnesses, including
those to be produced by the prosecution, in ruling
on a motion alleging the denial of a speedy trial:
People v. H ill ....................................... 1184
G. A request by a defendant to have his preliminary
hearing closed pursuant to Penal Code section 868
must be granted upon a showing of a reasonable
likelihood of substantial prejudice: Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court ..................... 1186
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A. A plaintiff in an intentional infliction of
emotional distress action need not disclose
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information allegedly exchanged between herself
and her attorney regarding the health effects of
chemical exposure: Mitchell v. Superior Court ..... 1191
B. A defendant in a criminal action arising from an
automobile accident has a "proper purpose"
within the meaning of Vehicle Code sections 20012
and 20014 to discover reports of accidents at the
same location: State ex rel. Department of
Transportation v. Superior Court ..................... 1192
VII. ELECTION LAW ......................................... 1193
Political parties are not prohibited by article II,
section 6 of the constitution from endorsing,
supporting or opposing candidates for
nonpartisan offices: Unger v. Superior Court ...... 1193
VIII. EVIDENCE .............................................. 1204
Trial court erred in admitting letters written by
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erred in allowing experts who had viewed the
letters to be questioned concerning their contents:
People v. Coleman .................................. 1204
IX . FAMILY LAW ........................................... 1205
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reimbursement for funds expended in the
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X. JUVENILE LAW ......................................... 1206
Statements made in juvenile fitness hearing are
inadmissible at trial: Ramona R. v. Superior Court
.............................. ..................... 1206
XI. LABOR LAW ............................................ 1210
A. Court upholds finding that grape growers
committed unfair labor practices through
surveillance, interrogation, and discharge of
employees involved with a union: Karahadian
Ranches v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board ....... 1210
B. It was error for a court of appeal to dismiss a
timely filed labor petition because of clerical
1143
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Agricultural Labor Relations Board .................. 1211
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City's newly enacted growth control ordinance did
not violate the provisions of a consent judgment
entered into between the parties which insured a
right to develop the property in accordance with
its master plan: Pardee Construction Co. v.
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XIII. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ................................ 1213
A. The constitutionality of Civil Code sections 3333.1,
modifying the collateral source rule, and 3333.2,
imposing a maximum limit on the recovery of
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice
cases, was upheld against due process and equal
protection claims: Fein v. Permanente Medical
G roup .............................................. 1213
B. Limitation of plaintiffs attorney's fees in medical
malpractice actions upheld. Roa v. Lodi Medical
G roup .............................................. 1229
C. A minor with a medical malpractice claim has
three years from the date of the wrongful act
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when the minor reaches the age of majority or
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XIV. PUBLIC ASSISTANCE .................................... 1235
Court preliminarily enjoins county assistance
program which requires single, employable
welfare recipients to reside in a poorhouse:
Robbins v. Superior Court ........................... 1235
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Amendment of Public Utilities Code rendered
utility's challenge to participation costs moot:
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XVII. TAXATION .............................................. 1251
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v. M artin ........................................... 1251
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B. The "valuation rollback" provision of Proposition
13 does not apply to unit taxation of a public
utility: ITT World Communications v. City and
County of San Francisco ............................ 1252
X VIII. TORTS .................................................. 1253
A. Common law damages may be awarded to heirs of
victims of an airplane crash even though the FAA
exclusively regulates civil aviation. A negligence
per se instruction which allows the jury to
consider whether FAA regulations were complied
with is proper: Elsworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp .... 1253
B. Foreseeability of criminal acts by third parties
can be established by evidence other than prior
similar events: Issacs v. Huntington Memorial
H ospital ............................................ 1260
C. One who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to
an unintoxicated minor is immune from civil
liability for injuries to third persons resulting
from the minor's subsequent intoxication: Strang
v. Cabrol ........................................... 1263
XIX. WORKERS' COMPENSATION ........................... 1271
A. The "going and coming rule," which normally
bars an award of workers' compensation benefits
to an employee injured enroute to or from his
place of employment, should not be construed to
preclude such an award where the employee has
arrived at his place of employment and, while
awaiting its opening, is injured. Price v. Workers'
Compensation Appeals Board ........................ 1271
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I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
When reviewing standards adopted by the Air
Resources Board, the court need only inquire whether
the Board's decision was unsupported or whether it was
made outside the scope of authority. Economic cost of
compliance need not be taken into consideration;
rather, local boards may grant variances to remedy
harsh economic consequences: Western Oil & Gas v. Air
Resources Board.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Western Oil & Gas Association v. Air Resources Board,' the
court assessed the validity of standards established by the Air Re-
sources Board (Board) which set the acceptable levels of sulphates
and sulphur dioxide for the state's air basins. The plaintiff's conten-
tions were that the Board did not comply with statutory require-
ments, fully consider all relevant effects of the adopted standards,
and did not afford fair administrative procedure in the adoption
process.
II. FACTS
As Health and Safety Code section 39606(b) required,2 recommen-
dations were received from the health department on the question of
what the acceptable levels of sulphur and sulphur dioxide in the
state's air basins should be. The health department, on two separate
occasions, recommended standards. In 1976, twenty-five micrograms
per cubic meter of air during a twenty-four hour period for sulphates
was recommended. In 1977, .04 to .10 parts per meter of air during a
twenty-four hour period in the presence of excessive levels of oxi-
dants or particulates was recommended as reasonable. 3 In arriving at
these recommendations, the health department conceded that the
levels recommended were merely approximations of safe levels.4
Moreover, the report noted that certain sulphates and sulphur diox-
1. 37 Cal. 3d 502, 691 P.2d 606, 208 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1984). Opinion by Grodin, J.,
with Bird, C.J., and Mosk, Kaus, and Reynoso, JJ., concurring. Separate concurring
and dissenting opinion by Broussard, J.
2. The statute provides in pertinent part: "Standards relating to health effects
shall be based upon the recommendations of the State Department of Health Serv-
ices." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39606(b) (West 1979).
3. The term "excessive level" was to be determined by already existing state
standards which went unchallenged in this action.
4. The method of arriving at the recommended requirements was one of per-
forming toxicological studies on healthy persons over a 24-hour day, and then extrapo-
lating long term exposure to determine hazardous level; and then an adjustment was
made to protect more sensitive persons. See 37 Cal. 3d at 512-13, 691 P.2d at 611-12, 208
Cal. Rptr. at 855-56.
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ide are relatively harmless when other oxidant or particulate pollu-
tion is not present;5 however, some sulphates are very dangerous to
humans, and long term exposure to sulphur dioxide at levels of .10
parts per million averaged over twenty-four hours when photochemi-
cal oxidants are present was associated with chronic respiratory con-
ditions.6 With regard to sulphur dioxide, the report stated that there
is "no scientific basis for establishing a particular margin of safety be-
low the level of the .10 standard, and that the margin of safety was a
value judgment or policy matter for the Board."7 However, of critical
importance was the statement made in the report that "the present
air quality standard of .04 ppm sulphur dioxide for 24 hours average,
is reasonable in light of what is known about human health effects
and with a margin of safety as determined by the Air Resources
Board."8
The Board subsequently adopted a standard of twenty-five micro-
grams per cubic meter of air during a twenty-four hour period (the
exact standard recommended by the health department), and a stan-
dard for ambient air of .05 ppm. of air for a twenty-four hour period
in the presence of an excessive level of oxidants or particulates for
sulphur dioxide (a standard more favorable to plaintiffs than was
previously in force). 9
For both the sulphate and sulphur dioxide hearings, notice of the
hearings was given, and interested parties were invited to attend.
Moreover, detailed reports were mailed or made available to inter-
ested parties.'0
The plaintiffs, nine oil companies and two of their trade associa-
tions, contended that the standards as adopted by the Board were in-
valid on the following grounds: first, that the adopted regulations
were not based on the recommendations of the health department as
statutorily required;" second, that the regulations lacked evidentiary
support; third, that the economic effects of the regulations were not
5. Id. at 515-16, 691 P.2d at 613, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 857 (emphasis added).
6. Id. at 513, 691 P.2d at 612, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 856. Of particular note is the fact
that more precise scientific data regarding which sulphates are the most hazardous
would not be available for 15 months.
7. Id. at 515, 691 P.2d at 613, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
8. Id. at 515-16, 691 P.2d at 613, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
9. See supra text accompanying note 7.
10. 37 Cal. 3d at 525-26, 691 P.2d at 620-21, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 864-65. See infra notes
28-32 and accompanying text.
11. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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considered; and fourth, that the plaintiffs were denied fair treatment
due to the manner in which the regulations were adopted.
The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and granted the re-
quested relief of writs of mandate commanding the Board to rescind
its resolutions adopting the standards.12 The Board consequently ap-
pealed and the trial court was reversed.
III. MAJORITY OPINION
This case was one of first impression for the court as it was asked
to determine the legislature's intent under the Mulford-Carrell Air
Resources Act.13 The act established and directed the Board to adopt
standards of ambient air quality "for each air basin in consideration
of the public health, safety, and welfare, including, but not limited to,
health, illness, irritation to the senses, aesthetic value, interference
with visibility, and effects on the economy." 14
Any and all decisions made by the Board are given only a limited
review by the judiciary due to the quasi-legislative nature and the
presumed expertise of the Board.15 The threshold inquiry by a re-
viewing court encompasses only determinations of whether the
Board acted within the scope of its authority and whether the Board
acted in an arbitrary, capricious or unsupported manner in adopting a
challenged standard.16
Because the court uses this standard in reviewing Board decisions,
the plaintiffs' arguments, and the rulings of the trial court, were dis-
posed of with relative ease.
The claims that the regulations were not based on the health de-
partment recommendations and lacked evidentiary support were lev-
eled at both the sulphate and sulphur dioxide standards. The
plaintiffs contended that although the twenty-five microgram stan-
dard adopted for sulphates was the exact recommended standard, the
health department intended the standard to be applicable only "in
the presence of elevated oxidant pollution" and that sulfuric acid, not
sulphates, was measured by the health department. 17
The court rejected this argument, stating that "the health depart-
ment's recommended standard of 25 micrograms per cubic meter can-
12. Retired Judge Eugene E. Sax heard oral argument and the writs were issued
in December, 1980.
13. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 39000-39103 (West 1979).
14. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39660(b) (West 1979).
15. Id.
16. Industrial Welfare Comm'n v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 690, 702, 613 P.2d 579,
584, 166 Cal. Rptr. 331, 336, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1029 (1980). In addition, the review-
ing court is not to substitute its own policy judgments for the Board's; and the Board
need not prepare findings in support of its decision unless otherwise required by stat-
ute to do so. 37 Cal. 3d at 509-10, 691 P.2d at 609, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 853.
17. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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not be impeached. The health danger from sulphates was clearly
established."' 8 The court's level of review was clearly indicated by
the statement "[t]he trial court's criticisms, at most, reflect the fact
that different conclusions can be drawn from the available data. Ac-
cordingly, we must accept the health department's determination
that a single standard is appropriate for sulfates and that the data
warrants a 25-microgram standard."'19
The plaintiffs also claimed that the Board was overstepping its stat-
utory bounds in adopting the .05 ppm sulphur dioxide standard in
that a safety factor influenced the decision. 20 This safety factor was a
policy matter for the Board, but the health department considered
such a requirement reasonable. 21
In overruling the trial court and upholding the Board's actions, the
court determined that "[t]he Board's duty includes the protection of
the health of the citizens of the state (Sec. 39000, 39001), not merely
the correction of unhealthy conditions. The Board therefore should
not be required to wait until substantial adverse health effects are
scientifically verified before adopting appropriate standards." 22 From
an evidentiary standpoint, in addition to the health department's
comments, doctors and federal agencies urged a safety factor;23 and
the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to justify the
safety factor adopted.
The plaintiffs vigorously opposed the safety factor because the cost
of compliance with the .05 ppm standard was estimated at between
$38.1 billion and $44.6 billion for the period from 1977 to 2000.
Although these estimates were said to be "limited, self-serving and
unreliable,"24 the plaintiffs' point was clear--economic factors on
business should be considered .in establishing standards. The court
did not disagree with the plaintiffs on this issue; certainly economic
consequences must be considered. However, when deciding when
and how they should be considered the court was ready with an alter-
native. The legislature intended, said the court, "local and regional
authorities, rather than the Board, to consider the economic conse-
18. 37 Cal. 3d at 513, 691 P.2d at 612, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
19. Id. at 514, 691 P.2d at 613, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
20. Id. at 515-16, 691 P.2d at 613-14, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 857-58. The trial court ruled
that the Board did not have authority to impose a safety factor because the legislature
did not mention any such power.
21. Id. at 516, 691 P.2d at 614, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id at 517, 691 P.2d at 614, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
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quences of compliance with the air quality standards."25 The court
recognized the formidable task the plaintiffs would have imposed
upon the Board and therefore construed section 39606 to focus the
Board's attention on pollution and safety rather than economics.26
The task of avoiding an unduly harsh economic impact was dele-
gated by the legislature to the local authorities, who had wide discre-
tion in granting variances by "weighing the equities involved and the
advantages and disadvantages to the residents of the district and to
any lawful business."27 Thus, the plaintiffs must present their cases
to local boards in hopes of acquiring a variance if they have any
hopes of avoiding the economic costs of full compliance.
The plaintiffs also alleged that the hearings conducted by the
Board were unfair. As the questioned proceeding was an administra-
tive one, no due process violation was presented; rather, a possible vi-
olation of the Administrative Procedure Act was at issue.28 The
court overruled the trial court's determination that four working
days was an unreasonable amount of time for the plaintiffs to be ex-
pected to be prepared for the sulphate hearing. Four days was the
amount of time between distribution of the Board's complex report
and the hearing. The court stated that "while the report may have
been complex, the prospective witnesses would be familiar with such
complexities, and the four-day period to study and comment was not
unreasonable."29
Two procedural issues were raised with regard to the sulphur diox-
ide hearing. First, the plaintiffs claimed that the Board violated ad-
ministrative procedure by broadly stating the purpose of the hearing
in the notices.3 0 In rejecting this claim, the court broadly construed
the statutory requirement stating that "the regulation adopted need
25. Id. at 517, 691 P.2d at 615, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
26. The phraseology of section 39606, "the objective of ambient air quality stan-
dards is to provide a basis for preventing or abating the effects of air pollution, includ-
ing effects on health, esthetics and economy," was interpreted by the court to mean
the economic effects of pollution on the economy rather than the cost of compliance.
The court stated that this construction is apparent from the language, as well as the
structure and history of the statute, and federal court interpretation of the similar
Clear Air Act. Id. at 518-19, 691 P.2d at 615-16, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 859-60.
27. Id. at 520-21, 691 P.2d at 617, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 861. Although section 39313 re-
quires that the local boards "shall comply with all the standards" of the Board, the
majority nevertheless contended that "the Mulford-Carrell Act . . . indicate[s] a con-
tinued legislative commitment to the discretionary enforcement powers of local and
regional authorities." Id. at 521, 691 P.2d at 618, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
28. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39601 (West 1979); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11340-
446 (West 1980 & Supp. 1985).
29. 37 Cal. 3d at 526, 691 P.2d at 620, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
30. This violation was alleged under former Government Code section 11424(c),
which required that the notice include either "the express terms or an informative
study of the proposed action." The notices stated that the Board would review all rele-
vant evidence, and that the Board would also consider a standard for sulphur dioxide
in combination with other air pollution.
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not be the same as that proposed as long as it deals with the same
subject or issue dealt with by the notice," 31 a requirement easily ful-
filled by the Board. Second, the plaintiffs contended that the Board
improperly refused to reopen the hearing after new evidence was
submitted.3 2 The court, relying on California Optometric Associa-
tion v. Lackner,3 3 concluded that "posthearing information may be
considered without violating a fair hearing requirement. '3 4
IV. CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Broussard filed a concurring and dissenting opinion in
which he agreed that a margin of safety was proper, but that the
Board must be required to consider the economic consequences of the
adopted standards and not rely on local boards for variances.35 The
rationale behind this portion of the dissent was essentially that the
plain language of section 39606 was being limited by the majority.
Under a broad construction, argued the dissent, "welfare" should in-
clude economic consequences as should "effects on the economy."
3 6
In addition, said Justice Broussard, the majority's reliance on vari-
ances was not the intent of the statutory scheme.3 7 The local board,
it was argued, was to merely "promulgate and implement rules and
regulations reasonably assuring achievement and maintenance of the
state standard," not to make important policy decisions that could ul-
timately effect the health and safety of local citizens.
38
V. CONCLUSION
The court has signaled to those wishing to challenge a Board deci-
sion in the judicial arena that they must be prepared with evidence of
31. 37 Cal. 3d at 526-27, 691 P.2d at 621, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
32. The new evidence consisted of reports from the Japanese Environmental Pro-
tection Agency which were written in Japanese. The plaintiffs contended their inabil-
ity to reopen the hearing denied them the right of cross-examination. Id. at 527, 691
P.2d at 621, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
33. 60 Cal. App. 3d 500, 131 Cal. Rptr. 744 (1976).
34. 37 Cal. 3d at 528-29, 691 P.2d at 622, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 866. See Building Code
Action v. Energy Resources Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 102 Cal. App. 3d 577, 162
Cal. Rptr. 734 (1980).
35. See 37 Cal. 3d at 530, 691 P.2d at 623, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
36. Id. at 529, 691 P.2d at 623, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 867. Justice Broussard contended
that "the majority's rule of construction appears inappropriate when we are consider-
ing a statute which grants broad quasi-legislative power to adopt standards." Id. at 532,
691 P.2d at 625, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 869 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
37. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 40000-02 (West 1979).
38. 37 Cal. 3d at 537, 691 P.2d at 628, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
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no less than arbitrary, capricious, and uninformed decisions. The
conclusions reached by the majority that the Board may not flatly re-
ject health department recommendations but may consider other fac-
tors, even though those other factors need not include economic
effect, showed the wide latitude given to the Board. As for notice re-
quirements, since the case went to litigation there have been some
changes in statutory requirements;3 9 nevertheless, the Board's ac-
tions, even providing important reports in Japanese, were deemed ac-
ceptable. The dissent argued that in accommodating and giving
deference to the Board, the majority erroneously construed legisla-
tive intent and statutory requirements.
II. ATTORNEY'S FEES
Attorney's fees are a recoverable element of damages
where an insurer breached the implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing by tortiously withholding
benefits: Brandt v. Superior Court.
The supreme court in Brandt v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 813, 696
P.2d 792, 210 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1985), held that attorney's fees are recov-
erable as damages when expended in compelling payment of tor-
tiously withheld insurance benefits. The case arose when the
disabled plaintiff was unreasonably refused benefits by his em-
ployer's insurer, Standard Insurance Company, the real party in in-
terest. In addition to damages for breach of contract, breach of
implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing, and statutory viola-
tions, the plaintiff sought attorney's fees as damages proximately
caused by the defendant's wrongful breach. This economic loss had
to be distinguished from fees incurred in the action itself-"attor-
ney's fees qua attorney's fees."
Section 1021 of the Code of Civil Procedure generally requires each
individual party to bear its own legal costs. However, the court dis-
missed the defendant's plea that section 1021 would preclude an
award of attorney's fees in this case, even though the fees requested
were a result of the same action as the recovery sought.
The court, in settling a conflict among the courts of appeal, see
Austero v. Washington National Insurance Co., 132 Cal. App. 3d 408,
182 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1982); Mustachio v. Ohio Farmers Insurance Co.,
44 Cal. App. 3d 358, 118 Cal. Rptr. 581 (1975), set down a test to deter-
mine when attorney's fees should be awarded in this type of case. In-
itially, there must be a breach of the implied duty of good faith and
fair dealing by the insurer. Furthermore, as a result of this breach,
39. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11346.5, 11346.7 (West 1979).
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the plaintiff must retain legal representation' in order to collect the
insurance benefits due him.
III. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. The Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) venue
provisions create an exception to the general provisions
of the Code of Civil Procedure and will control in cases
involving non-FEHA and FEHA claims: Brown v.
Superior Court.
In Brown v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 477, 691 P.2d 272, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 724 (1984), the supreme court was asked to determine whether
the special venue provisions of the California Fair Employment and
Housing Act (FEHA), controlled in an action involving both FEHA
and non-FEHA claims. It held that the FEHA provisions prevail in
such cases when the causes of action all arise out of the same factual
allegations.
The petitioners in Brown alleged intentional infliction of emotional
distress, wrongful discharge, a violation of their civil rights, and a vio-
lation of the FEHA based on racial discrimination by their employ-
ers, the real parties in interest. The suit was brought in Alameda
County where the alleged discrimination took place, but was vacated
to Sacramento County upon motion by the employers, respondents
on appeal. A conflict thus arose between the special venue provisions
of the FEHA and section 395(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The
Act provides in relevant part that an FEHA action may be brought
"in any county in the state in which the unlawful practice is alleged
to have been committed." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12965(b) (West Supp.
1985). Section 395(a) provides in relevant part:
"[E]xcept as otherwise provided by law ... the county in which the defend-
ants or some of them reside .. .is the proper county for the trial of the ac-
tion. If the action is for injury to person or personal property ... either the
county where the injury occurs... or the county in which the defendants, or
some of them reside... shall be a proper county for the trial of the action.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 395(a) (West Supp. 1985).
In construing the FEHA provisions, the court used the fundamen-
tal rule of statutory construction-that is, ascertaining the legislative
intent so as to properly effectuate the purpose of the law. The public
policy supporting the FEHA recognizes the need to safeguard the
rights and opportunities of people to seek and gain employment with-
out discrimination. The express purpose of the Act is "to provide ef-
fective remedies which will eliminate such discriminatory practices."
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The proper construction of the FEHA must reflect its policy and pur-
pose by affording aggrieved persons the opportunity to bring suit in
the most appropriate and convenient forum with respect to their
claims. Rather than restrict a plaintiff's choice of venue by applying
the provision of the Civil Procedure Code, the court found that
strong public policy favored application of FEHA venue provisions,
despite the presence of non-FEHA claims.
The conclusion in Brown that the FEHA special rules prevail is ap-
plicable only when the causes of action alleged in the pleadings arise
out of the same set of facts. Thus, in any case involving an FEHA
claim, the FEHA venue provisions will determine the propriety of
the plaintiff's choice of venue, regardless of any other causes of ac-
tion, so long as the claims arise out of the same factual allegations.
B. The granting of a summary judgment in medical
malpractice case held to be improper: Mann v.
Cracchiolo.
In Mann v. Cracchiolo, 38 Cal. 3d 18, 694 P.2d 1134, 210 Cal. Rptr.
762 (1985), the supreme court had to determine whether a summary
judgment was valid where the nonmoving party had filed an un-
timely opposition to the motion. The court held that the trial court
erred in refusing to accept the opposition to the motion for summary
judgment.
The action arose when the husband and three sons of a deceased
patient brought a medical malpractice and wrongful death suit
against the UCLA Medical Center and several of its staff. The dece-
dent initially was an outpatient of the UCLA Medical Center to ob-
tain x-rays in preparation for surgery on her arthritic toe. While
undergoing the x-rays she allegedly fell, breaking her neck and ulti-
mately dying from the injury.
The plaintiffs unsuccessfully attempted to remove the trial judge
for bias. During an appeal of that decision, the plaintiffs obtained a
stay from the court of appeal. The defendants moved for summary
judgment while the stay was pending. Soon after the stay was termi-
nated, the hearing on the defendant's motion was held. The plain-
tiffs' opposition to the motion was not filed three days before the
hearing as required by local court rules and so was ignored by the
judge. The judge also stated that even if timely filed, the doctor's
declaration contained in the opposition was insufficient to raise a tri-
able issue of negligence. Summary judgment was granted in the de-
fendants' favor.
Initially, the court determined that lower courts are free to adopt
local court rules limiting the time to file summary judgment plead-
ings when the legislature is silent on the matter. Although the
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supreme court upheld the local rule, it also held that the potential
delays from disobedience of the rule were outweighed by the need to
hear cases on their merits. Thus, the court held that the trial court
had abused its discretion in granting the summary judgment without
considering the plaintiff's opposition to the motion.
The court also reversed the lower court's refusal to consider the
opinions of a Dr. Fox. His declaration, contained in the plaintiff's op-
position, indicated that the UCLA radiologists were negligent in not
identifying the decedent's fracture. Along with deciding that the doc-
tor was qualified to testify concerning the standard of care required,
the court dismissed the defendants' claim that Fox should be barred
because he was not among experts listed in discovery. Finally, the
court ruled that, although conclusory at times, the doctor's declara-
tion raised triable issues of fact.
The court refused, however, to extend the reversal of summary
judgment to the matter of punitive damages, as no evidence of an in-
tentional conspiracy to conceal the injury of Mrs. Mann was shown.
Furthermore, the summary judgment was affirmed as to two doctors
who had little contact with the patient.
IV. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Proof of an intent to kill is an essential element of a
felony-murder special circumstance finding: People v.
Anderson.
In People v. Anderson, 38 Cal. 3d 58, 694 P.2d 1149, 210 Cal. Rptr.
777 (1985), the defendant admitted in his confession to watching a
house for several days, and finally breaking in with an intent to steal.
Once inside, he began checking each of the rooms. As he entered the
victim's bedroom, he saw "a shadow" coming at him and fired one
shot, killing the victim. He then ransacked the house, took some
money and ate some food. When apprehended red-handed, he stated
that he had no intention to shoot anyone and that he fired out of fear
and confusion. The defendant was convicted of burglary and murder
while engaged in burglary. A special circumstance was found, and
the penalty phase of the trial yielded a verdict of death.
The defendant made three claims of error bearing on the guilt
phase. Each of these claims was dealt with quickly by the court.
First, an exclusion for cause of a venireman who was unalterably op-
posed to the death penalty was not error. The court had rejected this
argument previously in People v. Fields, 35 Cal. 3d 329, 673 P.2d 680,
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197 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 267 (1984). Second,
the exclusion for cause of the same venireman did not deny the de-
fendant a neutral jury on the issue of guilt. The court reiterated the
fact that such a challenge cannot be sustained "until further research
is done which makes it possible to draw reliable conclusions about
the non-neutrality of 'California death-qualified' juries in California."
Third, the felony-murder rule did not deny due process of law to the
defendant because it raised a conclusive presumption of malice.
The court did find error in the instructions on the special circum-
stance allegation. More specifically, in Carlos v. Superior Court, 35
Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983), the 1978 death pen-
alty law was construed to require proof of an intent to kill to find a
felony-murder special circumstance. No instruction to this effect was
given to the jury, thus necessitating reversal. In addition, the court
rejected the argument that callous conduct (such as eating in the vic-
tim's kitchen after the killing) is conclusive of a specific intent to
kill. The question of specific intent is for the jury; therefore, the
judgment as to penalty was reversed.
B. New sentence enhancement statute for "serious
felonies" held to apply to second degree burglary, and
not to be violative of the double base term statute:
People v. Jackson.
I. INTRODUCTION
The passage of Proposition 8's sentence enhancement statute1 left
several ambiguities, which the supreme court recently clarified in
People v. Jackson.2 Initially, the court determined that second de-
gree burglary can be a "serious felony" for the statute's purposes,
even though entry into a residence, as required by the statute, is not
a prerequisite to burglary.3 Furthermore, the court held that the en-
hancement statute's five year penalty did not violate a statute which
had prohibited imprisonment over twice the base term.4
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West Supp. 1985). Section 667(a) provides in part:
[a]ny person convicted of a serious felony who previously has been convicted
of a serious felony in this state or of any offense committed in another juris-
diction which includes all of the elements of any serious felony, shall receive,
in addition to the sentence imposed by the court for the present offense, a five
year enhancement for each such prior conviction ....
Id. § 667(a).
2. 37 Cal. 3d 826, 694 P.2d 736, 210 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1985). The majority opinion
was authored by Justice Broussard with Justices Kaus, Reynoso, and Grodin concur-
ring. Chief Justice Bird and Justice Mosk only concurred in the judgment. A separate
concurring opinion was filed by Justice Lucas.
3. Id. at 831-34, 694 P.2d at 739-41, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 626-28. See CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 460 (West Supp. 1985).
4. 37 Cal. 3d at 837, 694 P.2d at 742-43, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 629-30. See CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1170.1(g) (West Supp. 1985).
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The defendant was charged with burglary in August' of 1982.5 In
addition, three prior, residential burglaries were alleged for purposes
of sentence enhancement. Under newly enacted Penal Code section
667,6 a consecutive five year term may be added to the sentence of
convicted defendants who were "repeat offenders."7
Pursuant to a plea bargain, Jackson pled guilty to the burglary,
while giving an admission that the burglary and the third prior bur-
glary were residential.8 In turn, the prosecution dropped the other
burglary charges and agreed to request only a two year prison term
on the count the defendant pled guilty to. The defendant was sen-
tenced to the two year term plus the five year enhancement term of
section 667. An integral part of the plea bargain was that the defend-
ant could challenge the validity of the enhancement statute, and if
successful would receive only a one year enhancement.9
III. COURT'S ANALYSIS
Initially, the court had to determine whether second degree bur-
glary could be interpreted as a "burglary of a residence,"o thereby
being a "serious felony" for purposes of the enhancement statute.ii
The defendant argued that burglary did not necessitate entry into a
"residence," and therefore, section 667 did not apply.12 The court, in
rejecting the defendant's plea, emphasized that the enumerated "seri-
ous felonies"13 were not all specific statutory crimes.1 4 The purpose
of the statute was to deter criminal conduct; hence, repeated felo-
5. 37 Cal. 3d at 830, 694 P.2d at 737, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 624.
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West Supp. 1985). See supra note 1 for pertinent
parts of the text.
7. Section 667(d) refers to Penal Code section 1192.7(c) to determine what crimes
can be used for enhancement purposes. Section 1192.7(c) lists "burglary of a resi-
dence" as one of these "serious felonies." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c) (West 1982).
8. 37 Cal. 3d at 830-31, 694 P.2d at 737-38, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 624-25. This is impor-
tant because Jackson would now be open to the enhancement statute's penalty, as
"burglary of a residence" is required. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c)(18) (West
1982).
9. 37 Cal. 3d at 831, 694 P.2d at 738, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
10. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c)(18) (West 1982).
11. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West Supp. 1985) incorporates section 1192.7 for pur-
poses of determining crimes which are "serious felonies."
12. 37 Cal. 3d at 831, 694 P.2d at 738, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 625. See also CAL. PENAL
CODE § 460 (West Supp. 1985) (burglary must only be of inhabited building).
13. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c) (West 1982).
14. 37 Cal. 3d at 831, 694 P.2d at 738, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
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nies' 5 and nonviolent crimes16 were included in its coverage.
The defendant also claimed that his previous admitted burglary,
being antecedent to the passage of Proposition 8, was not admissible
for enhancement purposes. The court rejected this argument, point-
ing to Penal Code section 1192.7's inclusion of repeated offenses.17
The court refused to accept the defendant's construction of section
1192.7, which restricted "burglary of a residence" to first degree bur-
glary.' 8 The court next had to determine whether the prior convic-
tion of burglary was of a residence. Since the conviction record of
the second degree burglary did not reveal whether it was residential,
the court held it would be double jeopardy to "go behind the record"
and relitigate the previous offense. 19 However, this problem was
held to be academic, as the defendant had previously taken advantage
of plea bargaining2O and admitted that the earlier burglary was resi-
dential in nature.21 Therefore, the defendant was held to be subject
to the enhancement statute.
Finally, the defendant contended that any enhancement was lim-
ited by Penal Code section 1170.1(g), 22 which provides that a "term of
imprisonment shall not exceed twice the number of years imposed by
the trial court as the base term."23 Hence, the defendant argued that
his enhancement could only be two years; that is, four years alto-
gether or twice the base term. The court summarily rejected this
contention, as any such base term limitation would restrict the appli-
cation of the enhancement term in burglaries to only first degee ag-
gravated terms.24 Finally, the defendant cited section 1170.95 which
15. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c)(10), (12) (West 1982) (assault with intent to com-
mit robbery and life prisoner's assault on noninmate respectively).
16. Id. § 1192.7(c)(18)-(24) (West 1982) (nonviolent crimes).
17. Id. 37 Cal. 3d at 833, 694 P.2d at 739, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 626. See CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1192.7(c)(10), (12) (West 1982). The court stated: "The basic purpose of the
section-the deterrence of recidivism-would be frustrated by a construction which
did not take account of prior criminal conduct." 37 Cal. 3d at 833, 694 P.2d at 739, 210
Cal. Rptr. at 626.
18. 37 Cal. 3d at 835 n.11, 694 P.2d at 741 n.11, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 628 n.11. The court
also stated that had the burglary section been amended to include daytime residential
burglaries before the passage of Proposition 8's section 667, this determination might
have been otherwise. Id. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 460 (West Supp. 1985).
19. 37 Cal. 3d at 836, 694 P.2d at 742, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 629. See People v. Crowson,
33 Cal. 3d 623, 660 P.2d 389, 190 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1983) (second degree burglary convic-
tion does not prove residential entry).
20. 37 Cal. 3d at 836, 694 P.2d at 742, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 629. The court stated: "if, as
part of a bargain, [the defendant] . .. finds it advantageous to admit an enhancement
which the prosecution may be unable to prove, Crowson does not prevent the court
from giving effect to the admission." Id. See also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,
756-58 (1970).
21. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
22. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1(g) (West Supp. 1985).
23. Id.
24. 37 Cal. 3d at 837-38, 694 P.2d at 742-43, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 629-30. The court
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came into effect after Proposition 8.25 This section clearly negates
the application of the base term rule to residential burglaries.26 The
defendant argued this section's later enactment was proof that the
base term rule was in effect during the interim between Proposition
8's enactment and the enactment of section 1170.95. However, the
court rejected this contention, as section 1170.95 had earlier been
passed by the Assembly before the adoption of Proposition 8.27 Thus,
Jackson's enhanced sentence was affirmed.
Justice Lucas, in a separate concurring opinion, called for a reeval-
uation of People v. Crowson,28 which held the state cannot "go behind
the record" of prior convictions to determine if they are "serious felo-
nies."29 However, he also admitted the present case was not a "suita-
ble vehicle" for this purpose.30
IV. CONCLUSION
In clarifying Proposition 8's section 667, the court held that, under
certain circumstances, second degree burglary can be found to be a
"serious felony" for enhancement purposes. In the face of the Crow-
son rule, however, these circumstances will be very limited. The
court also determined that the base term rule did not limit applica-
tion of the enhancement statute to burglaries. However, this is aca-
demic in light of section 1170.95, which expressly excludes residential
burglaries from the base term rule.
C. Prior conviction of first degree burglary is, as a matter
of law, a burglary of a residence and results in a five
year sentence enhancement: People v. O'Bryaa.
The sole issue raised in People v. O'Bryan, 37 Cal. 3d 841, 694 P.2d
135, 210 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1985), was whether the defendant's prior bur-
glary conviction constituted a serious felony calling for an enhanced
sentence. In answering this question in the affirmative, the court
stated: "section 667 was intended to impose an enhancement unlimited by the double
base term rule." Id.
25. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.95 (West Supp. 1985).
26. Id. It provides: "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section 1170.1, the term of
imprisonment may exceed twice the number of years imposed by the trial court as the
base term .... " Id.
27. 37 Cal. 3d at 838, 694 P.2d at 743, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 630.
28. 33 Cal. 3d 623, 660 P.2d 389, 190 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1983).
29. Id. at 634, 660 P.2d at 396, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
30. 37 Cal. 3d at 840, 694 P.2d at 744, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 631 (Lucas, J., concurring).
That was because the defendant had admitted that the burglaries were residential.
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held that a prior first degree burglary conviction was within the
scope of the enhancement statute. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West
Supp. 1985).
The case arose when the defendant was charged with two burgla-
ries. The information also alleged a prior burglary conviction. In
pleading nolo contendere to the first count, and admitting the prior
conviction, the defendant signed a form which acknowledged that his
plea and the prior burglary conviction could result in a maximum
eight year prison sentence, consisting of the maximum sentence for
second degree burglary of three years plus the enhancement statute's
five year penalty. The trial court found the defendant guilty of sec-
ond degree burglary and sentenced him to seven years-two years for
the burglary plus the five year enhancement penalty of section 667.
The remaining burglary count was dismissed.
The defendant argued on appeal that neither of his convictions
could be considered a burglary of a residence, and thus a "serious fel-
ony," for purposes of the enhancement statute. If a defendant has
been previously convicted of a "serious felony," section 667 provides
for a five year term in addition to the present conviction's term. The
court emphasized that section 667 derived its definition of "serious
felony" from Penal Code section 1192.7, which holds "burglary of a
residence" to be a "serious felony."
The court summarily dismissed the defendant's argument that his
conviction was not for the burglary of a residence. The defendant's
plea of nolo contendere to residential burglary and his written ac-
knowledgement were determinative. The court also dismissed the
defendant's contention that his original burglary conviction did not
concern a residence, holding that first degree burglary was, as a mat-
ter of law, a burglary of a residence and therefore also a "serious
felony."
V. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Court upholds Truth-in-Evidence provision of
Proposition 8; abrogates California's vicarious
exclusionary rule: In re Lance W.
In In re Lance W.,1 the supreme court was asked to interpret arti-
cle I, section 28(d) of the California Constitution, which was adopted
as part of Proposition 8 in 1982. The specific issue addressed was
whether section 28(d) abrogated either the vicarious exclusionary
1. 37 Cal. 3d 873, 694 P.2d 744, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1985). Opinion by Grodin, J.,
with Kaus, Broussard, and Lucas, JJ., concurring. Separate dissenting opinion by
Mosk, J., with Bird, C.J., and Reynoso, J., concurring. This case is treated in greater
detail in Proposition 8: California Law after In re Lance W. and People v. Castro,
which appears elsewhere in this issue.
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rule or article I, section 13 of the state constitution as a basis for ex-
clusion of evidence at a criminal trial. The majority concluded that
Proposition 8 abrogated both the vicarious exclusionary rule and a
defendant's right to object to and suppress evidence seized in viola-
tion of the California, but not the federal, Constitution.
I. FACTS
Lance W., a juvenile, was seen instigating what appeared to plain-
clothes police officers to be a drug sale. After being asked by the of-
ficers about a possible sale, Lance was observed dropping a baggie
into a nearby pick-up truck. The officers opened the door to the
truck and found the baggie, which contained marijuana. Two people
were in the truck, neither of which gave the officers permission to
open the truck door or to remove the baggie. Lance was arrested and
the officers found a second baggie of marijuana on his person.
At the juvenile hearing which followed, Lance made a motion to
suppress the evidence as being the product of a warrantless search
undertaken without probable cause. The trial court held that the ex-
change which the police officers witnessed did not establish probable
cause to search the truck or to arrest Lance. The evidence had to be
suppressed, therefore, unless section 28(d) abrogated the grounds on
which Lance had standing to object to the illegal search of the pick-
up truck. The trial court concluded that the independent state
ground for suppression had been eliminated by section 28(d) and
therefore Lance lacked standing to object.2
At the disposition hearing, custody was removed from his parents
and Lance was ordered to continue as a ward of the state. Confine-
ment time was fixed at a maximum of three years in a camp-commu-
nity program with further confinement for thirty days in juvenile
hall upon his release from camp.3
II. THE VICARIOUS EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND SECTION 28(D): THE
MAJORITY OPINION
A. Standing to Seek Suppression of Evidence
Both the United States and California Constitutions provide pro-
2. See id. at 880, 694 P.2d at 748, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
3. Id. at 881, 694 P.2d at 748, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 635. The appellant contended that
the trial court erred first in its conclusion that section 28(d) abrogated the vicarious
exclusionary rule and second in its imposition of the thirty day juvenile hall time. Id.
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tection against unreasonable searches and seizures.4 The United
States Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule, under which
both federal and state courts must exclude evidence seized in viola-
tion of the fourth and fourteenth amendments.5 Although originally
perceived as an incident of one's rights, the exclusionary rule has re-
cently been characterized by the Supreme Court as "a judicially cre-
ated remedy" for fourth amendment violations.6 Thus, state courts
must apply the rule in criminal trials to uphold the guarantees of the
fourth amendment, but the United States Supreme Court determines
when it shall be applied in order to deter unlawful police conduct. 7
The Supreme Court has stated that the deterrent purpose of the
exclusionary rule is not served by allowing a defendant to object to
evidence when his own rights have not been violated. "Thus, stand-
ing to invoke the exclusionary rule has been confined to situations
where the government seeks to use such evidence to incriminate the
victim of the unlawful search."8 The policy reasons for such a hold-
ing were given in Rakas v. Illinois:9 "Each time the exclusionary rule
is applied it exacts a substantial social cost for the vindication of
Fourth Amendment rights. Relevant and reliable evidence is kept
from the trier of fact and the search for truth at trial is deflected."1o
In California, a broader application of the exclusionary rule has
been deemed necessary."1 The California Supreme Court applied the
exclusionary rule as a rule of evidence even before the United States
4. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Article I, section 13 of the California Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated; and a
warrant may not issue except on probable cause, supported by oath or affir-
mation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons and
things to be seized.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
5. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1960).
6. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3412 (1984) (quoting United States v. Ca-
landra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)) (good faith exception to the exclusionary rule for
searches conducted pursuant to defective warrants established).
7. 37 Cal. 3d at 882, 694 P.2d at 749, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
8. Id. (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348). See also Brown v. United States, 411
U.S. 223 (1973) (defendants could not vicariously assert the personal fourth amend-
ment right of the store owner in contesting admission of seized goods).
9. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137 (1978).
10. Id.
11. 37 Cal. 3d at 883, 694 P.2d at 750, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 637. The expansion was
thought necessary to "both deter unlawful police conduct and to preserve the integrity
of the judicial process." Id.
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Supreme Court extended the rule to the states.12 The court went
further and, within the same year, applied the rule to exclude evi-
dence whenever it was unconstitutionally seized, even if the particu-
lar defendant's own rights had not been violated.13 This judicially
created rule of evidence was thereafter used to exclude evidence ob-
tained in violation of the fourth amendment or article I, section 13 of
the California Constitution.14
B. The Effect of Section 28(d)
Section 28(d) was adopted as part of Proposition 8 which set out to
establish a "victim's bill of rights." Subsection (d) is itself entitled
"Right to Truth-in-Evidence" and declares that no relevant evidence
shall be excluded in any criminal proceeding. 15
The appellant argued that because section 28(d) did not repeal
either article I, section 13 or article I, section 24, section 13 remains a
valid independent state ground for exclusion of the evidence. 16 The
People argued that section 28(d) abrogated all independent state
grounds for exclusion and permits exclusion only if mandated by the
12. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955). The court adopted the
exclusionary rule as a rule of evidence because other remedies failed to curtail police
misconduct, resulting in the court's condoning, under the old rule, the illegal activities.
Id. at 445, 282 P.2d at 911-12.
The exclusionary rule was extended to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1960).
13. People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 761, 290 P.2d 855, 857 (1955). The same ration-
ale, police deterrence and judicial integrity, were cited by the court in support of the
vicarious exclusionary rule. To disallow exclusion of illegally obtained evidence on the
ground that a third person's rights were violated rather than those of the defendant
invites police officers to violate the rights of third parties. Id, at 760, 290 P.2d at 857.
14. 37 Cal. 3d at 884, 694 P.2d at 750, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 637. See also People v.
Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975) (states may, on in-
dependent state grounds, adopt higher constitutional standards than the minimum re-
quired by the United States Constitution or United States Supreme Court cases); CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 24 ("Rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those
guaranteed by the United States Constitution").
15. Section 28(d) states in full:
Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of the
membership of each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be
excluded in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction
motions and hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal
offense, whether heard in juvenile or adult court. Nothing in this section
shall affect any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or
hearsay, or Evidence Code, Sections 352, 782 or 1103. Nothing in this section
shall affect any existing statutory or constitutional right of the press.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d).
16. 37 Cal. 3d at 884, 694 P.2d at 751, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
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fourth amendment exclusionary rule.17 Appellant further contended
that the result sought by the prosecution was not intended by the
voters in their adoption of Proposition 8. He argued that the rule of
vicarious exclusion in People v. Martin is a rule of procedure for ad-
mission of evidence and is unaffected by section 28(d).18
The court began its analysis with a determination of the meaning
of section 28(d) as it relates to evidence obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment and article I, section 13. The appellant urged that
the voters never intended to eliminate the vicarious standing rule be-
cause the ballot pamphlet and the measure itself failed to indicate
any impact on that rule or on state search and seizure law at all. The
court found the express language of the provision to be dispositive
rather than the omission pointed to by the appellant.19
The language of section 28(d) is a clearly stated command:
"[R]elevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceed-
ing . . -.20 This statement, said the court, has only one apparent
meaning, and that meaning does not provide for exclusion of evi-
dence seized in violation of article I, section 13, as appellant and
amici curiae contended.21 As a matter of statutory construction,
when the language is clear and unambiguous, as here, there is no
need for construction and courts should not indulge in it.22
Appellant sought to invoke another rule of construction by arguing
that section 28(d) in effect repeals article I, sections 13 and 24 by
mandating the admission of evidence seized in violation of those sec-
tions. The rule of construction raised by this argument creates a pre-
sumption against such an implied repeal and obliges the courts to
settle conflicts so as to avoid having a later enacted provision repeal
an existing provision.23
17. Id.
18. Id. Further arguments were made by amici curiae for the defense. The State
Public Defender argued that the section is unconstitutional because it requires admis-
sion of evidence which the fourth amendment requires to be excluded. Id at 885, 694
P.2d at 751, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 638. It was also argued that the section is a constitutional
revision, rather than an amendment, and is therefore impermissible. Id See infra
notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice sought to have section 28(d) invalidated on
the basis of a denial of equal protection to criminal defendants who are unable to seek
suppression of illegally obtained evidence on the same basis as civil litigants. Id See
also infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. This organization also argued that the
reenactment of Penal Code section 1538.5 after the people adopted section 28(d) serves
to reinstate the vicarious exclusionary rule as a statutory rule of evidence, unaffected
by section 28(d). Id. See infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
19. 37 Cal. 3d at 885-86, 694 P.2d at 751-52, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 638-39.
20. See supra note 15.
21. 37 Cal. 3d at 886, 694 P.2d at 752, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
22. Id. See also Solberg v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 182, 561 P.2d 1148, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 460 (1977); In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys., 25 Cal. 3d 339, 599
P.2d 656, 158 Cal. Rptr.'350 (1979).
23. 37 Cal. 3d at 886, 694 P.2d at 752, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 639. See In re Thierry S., 19
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The court responded by stating that Proposition 8 does not affect
the substantive scope of either provision. What would have consti-
tuted an illegal search prior to passage of Proposition 8 would still be
illegal today. "What Proposition 8 does is to eliminate a judicially
created remedy for violations of the search and seizure provisions of
the federal or state Constitutions, through the exclusion of evidence
so obtained, except to the extent that exclusion remains federally
compelled."24 The exclusionary rule and the vicarious standing rule
have both been imposed as effective means to deter police miscon-
duct. However, both rules were judicially created and work as reme-
dies rather than forming the basis of substantive rights under the
constitution. Through the Proposition 8 initiative measure, the peo-
ple of California have apparently decided that exclusion is no longer
an acceptable means by which to vindicate those rights, except as
mandated by the United States Constitution.25
The court pointed to another aspect of the presumption which re-
quires courts to maintain the integrity of both enactments when
resolving a conflict, if they may stand together.26 Furthermore, a
court may assume that a new enactment is intended to change ex-
isting law.27 No interpretation of section 28(d) is offered which can
reasonably be said to avoid the import of its language. The court con-
cluded that the language of the section, the accepted principles of
statutory construction, and the available legislative history all con-
firm the intent of the electorate to require admission of all relevant
evidence, even if illegally seized, to the extent admission is consistent
with the United States Constitution.28
The court elaborated by pointing to the ballot pamphlet for the
June, 1982 Primary Election and to the statements made by the Leg-
islative Analyst as evidence of the voting public's intent.29 The Legis-
Cal. 3d 727, 744, 566 P.2d 610, 619, 139 Cal. Rptr. 708, 717 (1977) (presumption against
operation of doctrine of implied repeal).
24. 37 Cal. 3d at 886-87, 694 P.2d at 752, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 639 (emphasis in
original).
25. Id. at 887, 694 P.2d at 752, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 639. The court felt that its task was
not to determine whether this decision by the people was wise or not, but rather it was
to implement the intent of the people, as expressed in the measure. Id.
26. See Warne v. Harkness, 60 Cal. 2d 579, 587-88, 387 P.2d 377, 382, 35 Cal. Rptr.
601, 606 (1963).
27. See Union League Club v. Johnson, 18 Cal. 2d 275, 278, 115 P.2d 425, 426 (1941).
28. 37 Cal. 3d at 887-88, 694 P.2d at 753, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
29. Id. at 888, 694 P.2d at 753, 210 Cal. Rptr at 640. According to Legislature v.
Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 673 n.14, 669 P.2d 17, 25 n.14, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781, 789 n.14
(1983), and Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
22 Cal. 3d 208, 246, 583 P.2d 1281, 1300, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 258 (1978), ballot summaries
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lative Analyst advised that, under current law, some evidence is not
permitted and this measure would generally allow most evidence to
be presented at trial.3 0 This language, coupled with the explicit lan-
guage of section 28(d) itself, including limited, enumerated excep-
tions,31 supported the conclusion that without express statutory
authority courts may not exclude illegally seized evidence unless ex-
clusion is compelled by the United States Constitution.32 The
enumeration of a limited number of exceptions to the operation of
section 28(d) further evidenced the intent of the people to enforce
the provision literally. The court invoked the maxim expressio unius
est exclusio alterius33 meaning, "where exceptions to a general rule
are specified by statute, other exceptions are not to be implied or
presumed."34
Thus, a limitation is imposed on the court, restricting it from in-
cluding as a statutory exception the power to exclude evidence. Im-
pliedly, a further limitation is imposed preventing the court from
creating nonstatutory rules of exclusion.35 In construing the provi-
sion itself, the utmost consideration must be given to the intent of
the enacting body, whether it be the legislature or the people in an
initiative measure.3 6 The court recognized the express purpose of
section 28(d) to be the admission of all relevant evidence in a crimi-
nal trial. If the judiciary is allowed to adopt exclusionary rules not
authorized by statute or by the constitution, the purpose of section
28(d) will be thwarted.
The court rejected another of appellant's arguments by invoking
the presumption, referred to above, that enactment of a new provi-
sion is intended to change an existing provision.37 The appellant re-
lied on Kaplan v. Superior Court, 3 8 where the court held that section
and arguments are considered valid sources from which voter intent and understand-
ing can be determined in initiative measures. 37 Cal. 3d at 888 n.8, 694 P.2d at 753 n.8,
210 Cal. Rptr. at 640 n.8.
30. 37 Cal. 3d at 888, 694 P.2d at 753, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
31. See supra note 15.
32. 37 Cal. 3d at 888, 694 P.2d at 753, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
33. A maxim of statutory interpretation meaning that the expression of one
thing is the exclusion of another .... Under this maxim, if statute specifies
one exception to a general rule or assumes to specify the effects of a certain
provision, other exceptions or effects are excluded.
BLAcK's LAW DIcrIONARY 521 (5th ed. 1979).
34. 37 Cal. 3d at 888, 694 P.2d at 753, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 640 (quoting Wildlife Alive
v. Chickering, 18 Cal. 3d 190, 195, 553 P.2d 537, 539, 132 Cal. Rptr. 377, 379 (1976)).
35. 37 Cal. 3d at 888-90, 694 P.2d at 753-54, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 640-41. This limitation
applies equally to attempts to create procedural, evidentiary, or substantive rules, if
those rules provide a criminal defendant with greater protection than provided by the
fourth amendment. Id.
36. IM at 890, 694 P.2d at 754, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 641. See also CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE
§ 1859 (West 1983).
37. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
38. 6 Cal. 3d 150, 491 P.2d 1, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1971).
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351, newly added to the Evidence Code, was not intended to repeal or
replace the vicarious exclusionary rule.39 The appellant attempted to
analogize this case to Kaplan due to the similarity of language used
in both provisions. The court found sufficient evidence here, how-
ever, to support the conclusion that the voters intended to create a
change in the law by adopting section 28(d).40
The court refrained from addressing the issue involving a possible
conflict with the United States Constitution at length because it
reached its conclusion by finding exclusion of evidence to be required
if the federal constitution so mandates.41 The court added that even
if there were a conflict, invalidation of section 28(d) would not be the
appropriate remedy because of the electorate's express intent for the
section to be applied whenever constitutionally permissible.42
C Constitutional Amendment versus Revision
The court previously addressed the issue of whether Proposition 8,
in its entirety, constituted an amendment or a revision in Brosnahan
v. Brown.43 It held that the measure was a proper amendment and
did not constitute a revision, which could only be proposed by dele-
gates to a constitutional convention.44 The decision in Brosnahan nec-
essarily includes the conclusion that section 28(d) was properly
adopted through the amendment process.45 The restrictions imposed
by the section on the judiciary's power to fashion nonstatutory rules
of procedure or of evidence do not amount to a constitutional revision
because the effect of the section is not that far-reaching.46
The people of this state have the power to prescribe rules of proce-
dure and of evidence to be applied by the courts. This the people can
do by statutory initiative or by the initiation and adoption of constitu-
39. Id. at 160-61, 491 P.2d at 7-8, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 655-56. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 351
(West 1966) ("[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, all relevant evidence is
admissible").
40. 37 Cal. 3d at 890, 694 P.2d at 755, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 642. See also supra notes 28-
32 and accompanying text.
41. Id. at 890, 694 P.2d at 755, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 642.
42. Id. See also section 10 of Proposition 8, quoted at 37 Cal. 3d at 890 n.12, 694
P.2d at 755 n.12, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 642 n.12, which provides that any invalid provision of
the measure should be severed, leaving the remainder in full force and effect.
43. 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982).
44. Id. at 260, 651 P.2d at 288-89, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 44-45. See also CAL. CONST. art.
XVIII, § 2.
45. 37 Cal. 3d at 891, 694 P.2d at 755, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 642.
46. Id.
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tional amendments. 47 The legislature also has the power to regulate
court rules by statute, as long as the power of the court is not consti-
tutionally impaired.48 This regulation may be through rules of evi-
dence as well, and this would not impair the authority of the courts.49
The adoption of section 28(d) does not substantially affect the con-
stitutional bounds of the authority of the judicial branch. It merely
eliminates a judicially created remedy. Nor does it create such a
sweeping change in the distribution of powers as to be considered a
constitutional revision.50
D. Equal Protection
The court found no merit in the argument by amici that criminal
defendants are denied equal protection of the laws because they may
not seek exclusion of evidence while civil litigants may.51 This argu-
ment assumes that the exclusionary rule is applicable to civil pro-
ceedings, an assumption for which there is no precedent in this state.
To date, the exclusionary rule has only been applied in so-called
"quasi-criminal" actions which are so closely identified with the aims
of criminal prosecution that the purposes of the exclusionary rule re-
quired its application.52
Even if certain civil proceedings presented circumstances which
warranted application of the exclusionary rule, criminal defendants
are not thereby denied equal protection.53 "It is constitutionally per-
missible for the electorate to determine that the public stake in crim-
inal proceedings, and in assuring that all evidence relevant to the
guilt of the accused be presented to the trier of fact, justifies the ad-
mission of evidence that would be excluded in other proceedings. ''54
E. Reenactment of Penal Code Section 1538.5
Amici contended that the 1982 amendment of section 1538.5 of the
47. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8 (electors have the power to propose statutes and
amendments to the constitution and to adopt or reject them through an initiative).
48. See Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. 414,
238 P. 687 (1925).
49. 37 Cal. 3d at 891, 694 P.2d at 756, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 643. See also People v. John-
son, 68 Cal. 2d 646, 657, 441 P.2d 111, 119, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599, 607 (1968) (the power to
restrict the courts is limited by the state and federal constitutions).
50. 37 Cal. 3d at 892, 694 P.2d at 756, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 643.
51. Id.
52. Id. See, e.g., People v. Moore, 69 Cal. 2d 674, 682, 446 P.2d 800, 805, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 800, 805 (1968) (narcotic addict proceedings call for application of exclusionary
rule); People v. One 1960 Cadillac Coupe, 62 Cal. 2d 92, 96-97, 296 P.2d 706, 709, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 290, 293 (1964) (the purpose of forfeiture is deterrent in nature and closely re-
lated to the aims of criminal law enforcement).
53. 37 Cal. 3d at 893, 694 P.2d at 756-57, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 643-44.
54. Id. at 893, 694 P.2d at 757, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 644.
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Penal Code 55 reestablished a violation of article I, section 13 as a ba-
sis for exclusion of evidence because it was enacted subsequent to the
adoption of Proposition 8. Amici argued, in effect, for the virtual re-
peal of section 28(d). The court dismissed this argument, however, by
recognizing that it cannot be assumed that the legislature intended
such broad results when it enacted 1538.5 anew. The amendment was
unanimously adopted as a "clean-up" measure. The far-reaching con-
sequences suggested by amici for appellant could not have been con-
templated in an amendment which was so casually adopted without
opposition.5 6
As further evidence to rebut appellant's contention, the court
brought attention to another amendment of section 1538.5 which was
considered an urgency measure. 57 This provision explained that the
amendment of 1538.5 was procedural only and did not create any new
grounds for exclusion of evidence.5 8 The urgency clause itself stated
that urgency was necessary to render motions to suppress more uni-
form in result.5 9
In sum, section 1538.5, as amended, is not intended to revive the
exclusionary rules eliminated by Proposition 8. It does continue to
provide the procedure by which a defendant may attempt to suppress
evidence illegally seized. A court, however, may exclude evidence on
that basis only if compelled by the federal exclusionary rule under
the fourth amendment. 60
F. The Disposition Objection
The majority further addressed the appellant's contentions that the
trial court erred in imposing the juvenile hall time in addition to
55. 1982 Cal. Stat. ch. 1505, § 6, p. 5843. Subdivision (a) of section 1538.5 states,
Grounds. A defendant may move for the return of property or to suppress as
evidence any tangible or intangible thing obtained as a result of a search or
seizure on either of the following grounds:
(1)The search or seizure without a warrant was unreasonable.
(2)The search or seizure with a warrant was unreasonable because (i) the
warrant is insufficient on its face; (ii) the property or evidence obtained is not
that described in the warrant; (iii) there was not probable cause for the issu-
ance of the warrant; (iv) the method of execution of the warrant violated fed-
eral or state constitutional standards; (v) there was any other violation of
federal or state constitutional standards.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5(a) (West 1982).
56. 37 Cal. 3d at 894, 694 P.2d at 757, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 644.
57. 1982 Cal. Stat. ch. 625, §§ 2-3, p. 2627.
58. Id. §2.
59. Id. § 3.
60. 37 Cal. 3d at 896, 694 P.2d at 759, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 646.
1169
camp placement time.61 Allegedly this amounted to an unauthorized
"dual disposition" since commitment to juvenile hall may only be
used as an alternative to removal of a ward from the custody of his
parents.62
The court held that the order was proper and the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in imposing the hall time.63 The court relied
on In re Ricardo M.64 to support its conclusion. The appellate court
there held that Welfare and Institutions Code section 730 authorizes
a juvenile court to impose confinement in a juvenile hall as a condi-
tion of probation. Legislative enactments subsequent to Ricardo M.
demonstrate an awareness and approval of that holding.65
Here the appellant had been under a grant of probation in the cus-
tody of his parents. The order contemplated that upon release from
camp he would be returned to his parents and again placed on proba-
tion. There is no evidence of an intent by the legislature to prohibit a
stayed Ricardo M. order as a condition of probation when the disposi-
tion of the case calls first for institutional placement. 66
The trial court's order was further supported by the pattern of de-
linquency in the appellant's past history. The order was appropriate
to serve the purpose of juvenile law by deterring future violations
and encouraging rehabilitation. 67 The threat of further confinement
upon his release to his parents would serve as a deterrent. The judg-
ment of the trial court was therefore affirmed.
III. THE DISSENT
The dissent viewed the major issue as whether the voters intended
to allow illegalities, such as the arrest based upon a search without
probable cause here, to go undeterred by the vicarious exclusionary
rule.68 Based on considerations of the long history of the rule and of
the vague, imprecise and inconclusive language of section 28(d), the
dissent found no such intent on the part of the voters.
61. Id. The dissent did not address this question in its opinion.
62. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 730, 777 (West 1984).
63. 37 Cal. 3d at 897, 694 P.2d at 760, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 647.
64. 52 Cal. App. 3d 744, 749, 125 Cal. Rptr. 291, 295 (1975).
65. Section 777 was amended to include a subsection which provided for hall con-
finement for violation of probation as well. This confinement, however, was limited to
two fifteen-day periods. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 777 (West 1984). This time of con-
finement has come to be called "Ricardo M. time." 37 Cal. 3d at 897, 694 P.2d at 760,
210 Cal. Rptr. at 647.
66. 37 Cal. 3d at 899, 694 P.2d at 761, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 648.
67. Id.
68. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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A. History of the Vicarious Exclusionary Rule
In People v. Cahan,69 the court instituted the exclusionary rule to
prevent evidence obtained in violation of the state or federal constitu-
tion from being used at trial. The rule was adopted to serve the pur-
poses of deterrence of police misconduct and to maintain the
integrity of the judicial branch and of the government as a whole.
Even in the face of arguments claiming the exclusionary rule serves
to obstruct the ascertainment of truth at trial, the court saw it as the
only effective means of deterring unlawful conduct by the police.70
The vicarious exclusionary rule was thereafter adopted by the
court in Martin.71 The court found that the same reasons supporting
the exclusionary rule compelled the exclusion of any evidence ille-
gally obtained, whether or not in direct violation of the defendant's
rights.7 2 The court believed that to hold otherwise would nullify the
deterrent effect of exclusion7 3 The federal exclusionary rule, to the
contrary, does not provide for vicarious standing to object.7 4
B. The Construction of Section 28(d)
In construing section 28(d), the dissent made use of several rules of
statutory construction. To begin with, constitutional amendments
are to be construed in the same manner as statutes. 75 An amendment
should be given a liberal construction according to the ordinary
meaning of its words.7 6 When a potential conflict arises with other
law, there is a presumption against implied repeal, 77 and the literal
69. 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955). See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
70. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d at 447, 282 P.2d at 911-12. See also Kaplan, 6 Cal. 3d 150, 491
P.2d 1, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1971); Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
71. See supra notes 13 and 70 and accompanying text.
72. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d at 761, 290 P.2d at 857.
73. Id.
74. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 134. The dissent criticized the federal rule as leading to
flagrant abuses by the government. 37 Cal. 3d at 902 n.1, 694 P.2d at 763 n.1, 210 Cal.
Rptr. at 650 n.1. See also United States v. Paynor, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (IRS search pro-
duced evidence illegally obtained but not suppressed due to probative value and unnec-
essary penalty on society).
75. 37 Cal. 3d at 902, 694 P.2d at 763, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 650 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
See also Amador Valley, 22 Cal. 3d at 245, 583 P.2d at 1300, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 257.
76. Amador Valley, 22 Cal. 3d at 245, 583 P.2d at 1300, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 257; In re
Quinn, 35 Cal. App. 3d 473, 482, 110 Cal. Rptr. 881, 887 (1973).
77. In re Thierry S., 19 Cal. 3d at 744, 566 P.2d at 619, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 717; Warne
v. Harness, 60 Cal. 2d at 587-88, 387 P.2d at 383, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 606. In addition, when
language in the amendment being construed has been previously construed, it is pre-
sumed to be used in the same sense. Marina Point v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 734, 640
P.2d 115, 123, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496, 504 (1982).
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meaning of language used may be disregarded to avoid absurd re-
sults.78 The dissent criticized the majority's construction of section
28(d) because it "results in an implied repeal of a fundamental aspect
of article I, section 24, of the constitution, ignores judical precedent
construing the language used by the drafters of section 28(d), and
produces 'absurd results' in light of the avowed purposes of Proposi-
tion 8."79
1. The Presumption Against Implied Repeal
Although the voters may repeal constitutional provisions by initia-
tive or legislative proposal, the power must be exercised unambigu-
ously.8 0 Of course, the presumption against implied repeal of an
earlier provision arises with .potential conflict. The courts are there-
fore obliged to maintain the integrity of both if they are not irrecon-
cilable and clearly repugnant to each other.8 1 The dissent contended
that, under the interpretation of section 28(d) given by the majority,
sections 13 and 24 of article I are repealed.
In order to reconcile the Proposition 8 section with the previously
existing constitutional provisions, the dissent looked at the history
and meaning of the latter. It is a basic premise of constitutional law
that the states may provide their citizens with greater protection
than that afforded by the United States Constitution. California has
done this, particularly in section 13 which provides rights separate
and distinct from those of the fourth amendment,8 2 and in section 24
which was enacted to codify the principle itself.83 The exclusionary
rule, and vicarious standing to invoke the rule, are fundamental and
long-standing aspects of California constitutional law.
The dissent found no intent by the voters in their adoption of sec-
tion 28(d), vaguely worded and nonspecific, to overrule the firmly es-
tablished and fundamental exclusionary rule. Other sections of
Proposition 8 expressly repealed constitutional provisidns, yet section
28(d) does not mention article I, sections 13 and 24, neither in the
vague and general language of 28(d) nor in the ballot information ex-
plaining it.84 Even the majority noted the statement that section
78. Amador Valley, 22 Cal. 3d at 245, 583 P.2d at 1300, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
79. 37 Cal. 3d at 903, 694 P.2d at 764, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 651 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
80. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1, 3.
81. 37 Cal. 3d at 903, 694 P.2d at 764, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 651 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
82. Id. See also Brisendine, 11 Cal. 3d 528, 549-50, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 315, 329 (1975); supra note 14 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 14.
84. 37 Cal. 3d at 905, 694 P.2d at 765, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 652. Section 2 of Proposition
8 deleted article I, section 12 of the constitution, which involved the right of accused
persons to be released on bail. Id.
The dissent also rejected the majority's reference to language in the ballot pamphlet
as determinative of an intent to eliminate sections 13 and 24 as bases for exclusion of
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28(d) is the "most ambiguous and least understood section" of Propo-
sition 8.85 Under this line of reasoning, the nonspecificity of section
28(d) simply does not repeal the clear mandate of section 24 and the
exclusionary rules embodied therein.
2. The Controlling Authority of Prior Judicial Construction
According to this rule of construction, it must be presumed that
the drafters of section 28(d) were aware of and intended a construc-
tion consistent with prior judicial holdings construing the language
used in the section. The Kaplan case, distinguished by the majority,
involved the issue of whether Evidence Code section 351 repealed the
Martin vicarious exclusion rule. It was held that it did not, based on
the fundamental nature of the exclusionary rule and the vagueness
of the Evidence Code provision.
The drafters of Proposition 8 chose to use virtually the same lan-
guage as that in section 351, and presumably had knowledge of the
Kaplan decision.86 The dissent concluded, therefore, that they did
not intend to abrogate vicarious standing for the 'exclusion of
evidence.8 7
3. Voter Intent and Avoidance of Absurd Results
The avowed purpose of Proposition 8 was to provide a bill of rights
for victims of crime by providing safeguards for victims and by deal-
ing more harshly with violent criminals.8 8 The dissent urged that the
majority's interpretation of section 28(d) would lead to absurd re-
sults, counter to this stated purpose of the provision, by removing
safeguards that state law has provided victims.
8 9
evidence. "[T]o say 'most' evidence generally would be allowed to be presented is
hardly a clear mandate that all California exclusionary rules are to be abrogated." Id.
85. See 37 Cal. 3d at 906 n.6, 694 P.2d at 766 n.6, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 653 n.6.
86. 37 Cal. 3d at 907-08, 694 P.2d at 767, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 654. See supra notes 38-40
and accompanying text.
87. Id. at 908, 694 P.2d at 768, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 655.
88. See id. and CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(a).
89. 37 Cal. 3d at 909, 694 P.2d at 768, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 655. The dissent provided
examples of how such removal of safeguards would occur. Evidence Code, section
352.1, preventing the introduction of a rape victim's address and telephone number,
would be repealed, as would section 789, which prevents a victim's religious beliefs to
be introduced. Section 786 would also be eliminated, allowing general attacks on the
character of a victim-witness; elimination of section 787 would allow attacks on the
character of victims, police officers, and witnesses with regard to prior acts of miscon-
duct. Id.
The reason for the repeal of these sections is the broad interpretation by the major-
ity of section 28(d) which will abrogate all state grounds for exclusion of relevant evi-
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The majority reached its conclusion in reliance on the ballot infor-
mation distributed to voters. The dissent found nothing in that mate-
rial which suggested an intent to abrogate all state grounds for
exclusion. Additionally, the complexity of this particular initiative
and the nature of the political battle surrounding it, make adherence
to the ballot information as evidence of intent unreliable. 90 "Given
the complexity and length of Proposition 8 and the vagueness of the
language of section 28(d), it is impossible to discern a 'clear intent' of
the electorate to abrogate independent state grounds for the exclu-
sion of evidence." 91
The dissent concluded by stating that the trial court erred in ad-
mitting the evidence seized in this case. Both parties conceded the
search was unreasonable and, under the dissent's construction of sec-
tion 28(d), the appellant had vicarious standing to object; the judg-
ment should have been reversed.92
B. A trial court may reopen jury selection and allow
counsel to exercise unused peremptory challenges;
counsel is entitled to use his remaining challenges after
the regular jury is sworn in, as long as the alternate
jurors to be assigned have not yet been sworn, and upon
a showing of good cause: People v. Armendariz.
People v. Armendariz, 37 Cal. 3d 573, 693 P.2d 243, 209 Cal. Rptr.
664 (1984), was before the supreme court on an automatic appeal
from a judgment imposing the death penalty against the appellant,
Armendariz. Two issues were addressed on appeal: an erroneous
jury instruction and the denial of defense counsel's request to reopen
jury selection. The court further addressed an evidentiary question
for the purpose of guiding the court below in the event of a retrial.
The trial court failed to instruct the jury that intent was a neces-
sary element of a felony-murder special circumstance allegation. The
court held this failure to constitute reversible error under Carlos v.
Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983).
It was held there that before a special circumstance allegation, such
as the felony-murder allegation here, can be sustained, the jury must
find the intent to kill. Because the Armendariz case fit none of the
exceptions to the per se reversal rule, the felony-murder special cir-
cumstance finding, rendered without proper instruction, required
reversal.
dence. The introduction of evidence previously prohibited by the above sections is, of
course, dependent on the court's finding of relevancy.
90. Id. See also Note, The California Initiative Process: A Suggestion for Reform,
48 S. CAL. L. REV. 922, 934-36 (1975).
91. 37 Cal. 3d at 910, 694 P.2d at 769, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 656 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
92. Id.
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The court next considered the appellant's claim that his exercise of
peremptory challenges was erroneously restricted due to the trial
court's refusal to reopen jury selection. If the offense charged is pun-
ishable by death, both the defense and the prosecution are entitled to
twenty-six peremptory challenges. In the selection of alternate ju-
rors, each side is additionally entitled to as many peremptory chal-
lenges as alternates are called. In this case, defense counsel used
four of the twenty-six and all of the challenges allocated for alter-
nates. Counsel's request to reopen jury selection and to be allowed to
exercise his unused challenges was denied. The trial court felt it
lacked authority to grant such a request.
The supreme court found this denial also to constitute reversible
error. It based it decision on In re Mendes, 23 Cal. 3d 847, 592 P.2d
318, 153 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1979). The general rule is that when a court
has indicated that alternate jurors will be used, jury selection is not
complete until those alternates are selected and sworn. Under sec-
tion 1089 of the Penal Code, alternates are treated in the same man-
ner and are entitled to hear all testimony as the regular jurors are.
Therefore, the jury itself is not able to function until impanelment is
truly completed.
The code section relating to challenges to alternates provides that
such challenges must be taken when the juror appears, but may for
cause be taken after the juror is sworn and before the jury is com-
plete. Thus section 1068 provided the trial court with the power to
reopen jury selection.
The jury here was not complete because all the alternates had not
yet been sworn. There was also good cause here for the court to al-
low defense counsel to exercise his remaining peremptory challenges
because two jurors were to be replaced by alternates.
Relying again on Mendes, the court stated that to disallow unused
challenges, even as to regular jurors already sworn, at a point where
there is less than a full jury is to infringe on the party's right to com-
pare and choose jurors. Because the appellant was charged with a
capital crime, his right to exercise peremptory challenges was essen-
tial to a fair trial and should be safeguarded. The denial of appel-
lant's right required reversal of the judgment.
Finally, the court provided guidelines for retrial concerning an evi-
dentiary issue presented here. The appellant contended that testi-
mony by the victim's brother referring to incidents which occurred
seventeen months earlier should have been excluded. The court
agreed. It stated that not only were the statements objectionable as
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irrelevant hearsay, but the trial court erroneously failed to make an
on-the-record determination that the probative value of the evidence
substantially outweighed the risk of undue prejudice. The state-
ments should not have been admitted.
In sum, the court held that the trial court's denial of the appel-
lant's right to exercise peremptory challenges to which he was enti-
tled was reversible error. In the event of a retrial, the jury was to be
instructed in accordance with Carlos that it may not uphold special
felony-murder allegations without first finding the intent to kill.
Further, in any retrial, the statements made by the victim's brother
must be excluded.
C. It is reversible error where a trial court improperly
fails to exercise its discretion to appoint advisory
counsel at the request of a defendant who is acting as
pro se counsel: People v. Bigelow.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Bigelow,' the court had to decide whether a trial
court's refusal to appoint advisory counsel to assist a defendant who
was defending himself was reversible error per se. The court, in
holding this denial to be prejudicial error, laid down a rule of per se
reversal in such circumstances. 2
The court considered several ancillary issues as well, including: the
admissibility of evidence of uncharged crimes;3 jury instruction;4 and
the application of special circumstances in the imposition of capital
punishment.5
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The defendant, Jerry Bigelow, was convicted of first degree mur-
der, robbery, and kidnapping, and thereafter sentenced to death.6
The tale begins with the escape of the defendant and Michael Ra-
1. 37 Cal. 3d 731, 691 P.2d 994, 209 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1984). The majority opinion
was delivered by Justice Broussard, with Justices Mosk, Reynoso, and Grodin concur-
ring. Justice Lucas concurred in the judgment only. Justice Kaus filed a concurring
opinion, while Chief Justice Bird filed a separate opinion, concurring and dissenting in
part.
2. Id. at 744, 691 P.2d at 1001, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 335.
3. See infra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 35-50 and accompanying text.
6. The jury found four special circumstances upon which to impose the death
penalty. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West Supp. 1985). These included: (1) inten-
tional murder for financial gain, id. § 190.2(a)(1); (2) murder to avoid arrest or perfect
escape, id. § 190.2(a)(5); (3) murder while defendant was engaged in a robbery, idi
§ 190.2(a)(17)(i); and (4) murder while engaged in a kidnapping, id. § 190.2(a)(17)(ii).
37 Cal. 3d at 738, 691 P.2d at 997, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 331.
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mandonovic from Calgary Correctional Institution, a Canadian
prison. The escapees, aided by two women they had met, then made
their way to Sacramento, California, robbing and burglarizing various
victims along the way.7
On August 24, 1980, the escapees, posing as hitchhikers, were
picked up by John Cherry in his automobile. At gunpoint, Cherry
was forced to drive the men to Los Angeles. However, Bigelow and
Ramandonovic had Cherry pull the car over near Merced, and there
in an abandoned cornfield one of the men shot Cherry to death in an
execution style killing.8
After being apprehended, Bigelow and Ramandonovic were
charged with the robbery, kidnapping and murder of Cherry.9 Bige-
low, unsatisfied with his appointed counsel, unsuccessfully requested
new counsel be appointed on several occasions. 10 Since Bigelow was
unable to obtain new counsel, he decided to defend himself." Upon a
request for advisory counsel to assist him, the court replied that this
is "not permitted under California law."12 Throughout the trial, Big-
elow presented an ineffectual defense, calling only three witnesses on
his behalf.13 The jury found him guilty of murder in the first degree
and sentenced him to death.14
7. In Sacramento, Ramandonovic burglarized the apartment of Robert Goodwin
where he stole the .38 caliber revolver that was eventually used in the murder of John
Cherry. Earlier, Ramandonovic had been arrested for attempting to use a stolen credit
card, but he was freed on bail, enabling him to continue his crime spree. 37 Cal. 3d at
738-39, 691 P.2d at 997-98, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 331-32.
8. Although Bigelow was eventually found guilty of the murder, there was con-
tradictory testimony over whether he or Ramandonovic pulled the trigger. Following
the shooting both men were separately apprehended. Bigelow was arrested after at-
tempting a grocery store holdup and Ramandonovic was apprehended for speeding. Id.
at 739-40, 691 P.2d at 998-99, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 332-33.
9. Id. at 740, 691 P.2d at 998, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 332.
10. Bigelow complained of his counsel's competency on December 5, 1980 and
March 20, 1981. After continued requests for the appointment of new counsel were de-
nied, Bigelow, on March 23, 1981, asked to represent himself. Id.
11. Of course, Bigelow had a constitutional right to represent himself under
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). See also People v. Mattson, 51 Cal. 2d 777,
336 P.2d 937 (1959).
12. 37 Cal. 3d at 740-41, 691 P.2d at 998, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 332.
13. These included, in the guilt phase, the detective who had taken his confession,
and, in the penalty phase, his sister and brother. Id. at 741, 691 P.2d at 999, 209 Cal.
Rptr. at 333.
14. Id. See supra note 6.
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III. COURT'S ANALYSIS
A. Advisory Counsel
Even the state had to concede that the trial judge's decision, that
California law does not provide for the appointment of advisory coun-
sel, was erroneous.15 The supreme court pointed to Californiala and
federal 17 authority which holds that a judge in his discretion should
appoint advisory counsel to an indigent defendant proceeding pro se
where the orderly administration of justice would be served. The
court concluded that Bigelow was not competent to defend a capital
case alone. Therefore, the trial court erred in not exercising its dis-
cretion to appoint advisory counsel1 s
The court then addressed the question of whether it was reversible
error per se for the trial court not to appoint advisory counsel. The
court, ignoring the state's plea that the trial judge advised Bigelow
throughout the trial, held that it was reversible error.19 The court
bottomed this "rule of per se reversal" upon the "impossibility of as-
sessing the effect of the absence of counsel upon the presentation of
the case." 20 Hence, the holding was based on the inability of the
court to speculate on how the case would have been tried had advi-
sory counsel been appointed. 21
15. 37 Cal. 3d at 742, 691 P.2d at 999, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 333. The court quoted Peo-
ple v. Mattson, 51 Cal. 2d 777, 336 P.2d 937 (1959), which states that a court,
upon, what it may determine to be good cause shown, . . . [may] permit a de-
fendant who appears in propria persona to employ an attorney to sit by him
and advise him during the presentation of the case in court, or even appoint
an attorney (with the latter's consent) to render such advisory services to an
indigent defendant who wishes to represent himself ....
Id. at 797, 336 P.2d at 951.
16. See People v. Linden, 52 Cal. 2d 1, 338 P.2d 397 (1959); Ligda v. Superior Court,
5 Cal. App. 3d 811, 85 Cal. Rptr. 744 (1970).
17. See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (court may appoint "standby
counsel" to aid accused at his request); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 467
(1971) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (trial judge well advised to appoint "standby counsel"
where defendant represents himself).
18. The court pointed to Bigelow's ninth grade education, his unfamiliarity with
the United States court system, and the complexities of a capital case. 37 Cal. 3d at
743-44, 691 P.2d at 1000-01, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 335-36.
19. Id. at 744, 691 P.2d at 1001, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 335.
20. Id. at 745, 691 P.2d at 1001, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 335. See People v. Joseph, 34 Cal.
3d 936, 671 P.2d 843, 196 Cal. Rptr. 339 (1983) (analogy that denial of self-representa-
tion prejudicial per se).
The court initially dismissed the fundamental character of the right to counsel as
calling for a "rule of per se reversal." Its rationale for rejecting this theory was that a
defendant has no absolute right to advisory counsel. See People v. Mattson, 51 Cal. 2d
777, 795-96, 336 P.2d 937, 951 (1959).
21. The court stated, "[a] rule of per se reversal is the only way to protect the
right of a defendant to a conscientious exercise of judicial direction on the appoint-
ment of advisory counsel, and to vindicate the state's independent interest in the fair-
ness and accuracy of a capital proceeding." 37 Cal. 3d at 746, 691 P.2d at 1002, 209 Cal.
Rptr. at 336.
1178
[Vol. 12: 1141, 1985] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
B. Evidence of Uncharged Crimes
The court, in dictum, 2 2 next discussed the inadmissibility of evi-
dence concerning uncharged crimes committed by Bigelow. 23 Nor-
mally, evidence of uncharged crimes is inadmissible to prove the
conduct of a defendant. 24 However, under Evidence Code section
1101(b), relevant evidence as to motive, intent or plan may be admis-
sible in certain circumstances.
25
The court refused to accept the prosecution's theories of relevance,
which included: that these uncharged crimes were committed in a
concerted attempt to perfect an escape;2 6 and that they proved Bige-
low's motive in robbing, kidnapping and murdering Cherry.27 Fur-
thermore, the court refused admission of the crimes in order to prove
identity by modus operandi.28 That is, the court believed the lack of
similarity between previous robberies and the robbery-murder was
such that the uncharged crimes were no help in identifying the guilty
party.2
9
22. Since the court reversed the conviction on other grounds, it held that the de-
fendant's failure to object to certain evidence of uncharged crimes need not be consid-
ered. Its reason for discussing the admissibility of the evidence was to emphasize the
injustices suffered by the defendant. Id. at 746-47, 691 P.2d at 1002-03, 209 Cal. Rptr. at
336-37.
23. The various crimes included: escape from a Canadian prison; burglaries in Al-
berta; burglaries, auto theft, and credit card theft on the way to California; burglary of
Goodwin's residence; credit card theft; a dry cleaning store robbery; burglaries in Ari-
zona; and the grocery store robbery. Id. at 746, 691 P.2d at 1002-03, 209 Cal. Rptr. at
336-37.
24. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(a) (West 1966). It provides that "evidence of a per-
son's character or a trait of his character ... is inadmissible when offered to prove his
conduct on a specified occasion." Id.
25. Id. § 1101(b). This section provides: "Nothing in this section prohibits the ad-
mission of evidence that a person committed a crime ... when relevant to prove some
fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or ab-
sence of mistake or accident) other than his disposition to commit such acts." Id.
26. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(5) (West Supp. 1985). The court, in dismissing
this theory, held that even if it was allowed to be introduced, there should be a jury
instruction to limit its use. 37 Cal. 3d at 747-48, 691 P.2d at 1003, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
27. The court dismissed this contention, holding it would be highly prejudicial to
prove Bigelow's motive while only minimally relevant to a question of fact not con-
tested (which was, whether whoever killed Cherry did it to steal his car). 37 Cal. 3d at
748, 691 P.2d at 1004, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
28. The main reason for dismissing this contention was that the question was not
whether Bigelow "was one of the perpetrators but whether he was the triggerman."
Id. at 749, 691 P.2d at 1004-05, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 338-39.
29. The Attorney General pointed to two robberies-a dry cleaners in Sacramento
and a grocery store in Seligman-to prove that Bigelow was the actual triggerman.
The only "common marks to identify these robberies with the Cherry murder were
Bigelow's ordering of all the victim's to lie down." The court concluded this common-
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C Jury Instructions
The court summarily disposed of two erroneous jury instructions
that had been delivered by the trial court. Initially, the court disap-
proved the usage of a jury instruction which dealt with aiders and
abettors.3 0 The instruction read: "A person aids and abets the com-
mission of a crime if, with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the
perpetrator of the crime, he aids, promotes, encourages or instigates
by act or advice the commission of such crime." 31 The court held the
instruction to be invalid because it neglected to require the aider or
abettor to have some type of intent or knowledge of the perpetrator's
purpose.3 2
Secondly, the court held that the lower court had incorrectly in-
structed the jury that kidnapping in connection with a murder consti-
tuted first degree murder under the felony-murder statute.33 In
reality, kidnapping was not enumerated among the various crimes of
Penal Code section 189, the felony-murder statute.3 4
D. Special Circumstances
Finally, the court dealt with several special circumstances of the
murder which supported the imposition of the death penalty.35 Ini-
tially, the court held erroneous the trial court's instructions concern-
ing the murder for hire provision of the special circumstances
statute.3 6 The court's fear was that this vague statutory language 37-
"[t]he murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain" 3 8-
would allow an overlap of special circumstances and felony-murder,
ality was not sufficient to allow admissibility of the uncharged crimes. Id. at 749, 691
P.2d at 1004, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
30. CALJIC (4th ed.) No. 3.01 (1979).
31. Id.
32. The court held that the jury should have been instructed in accordance with
People v. Beeman, 35 Cal. 3d 547, 674 P.2d 1318, 199 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1984), which held
that the aider or abettor must act "with an intent or purpose either of committing, or
of encouraging or facilitating commission of, the offense." Id. at 560, 674 P.2d at 1325,
199 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
33. 37 Cal. 3d at 750, 691 P.2d at 1005, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 339. See CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 189 (West Supp. 1985).
34. Penal Code section 189 provides that a killing "committed in the perpetration
of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, mayhem, or any act pun-
ishable under section 288, is murder of the first degree." Id.
35. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West Supp. 1985). See also supra note 6.
36. The Attorney General's contention was that section 190.2, which is actually a
murder for hire provision, should apply to robberies. In other words, the killing of
Cherry was to steal his property. Therefore, special circumstances apply raising the
penalty to death. 37 Cal. 3d at 750-51, 691 P.2d at 1005-06, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 339-40.
37. The 1977 version of section 190.2(a) defined this special circumstance in spe-
cific terms: "The murder was intentional and was carried out pursuant to agreement
by the person who committed the murder to accept a valuable consideration for the act
of murder from any person other than the victim. ... 1977 Cal. Stat. ch. 316, § 9.
38. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(1) (West Supp. 1985).
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thereby prejudicing a defendant39 The court, in holding this section
to be inapplicable to a murder in connection with a robbery, stressed
that the "financial gain special circumstance applies only when the
victim's death is the consideration for, or an essential prerequisite to
the financial gain sought by the defendant."40
Similarly, the court held application of the special circumstance of
killing to avoid arrest or to perfect an escape to be erroneous. 41 The
court summarily dismissed the prosecution's first contention that
Cherry had been killed to allow Bigelow and Ramandonovic to avoid
being taken into custody, as the threatened arrest was not suffi-
ciently "imminent."42 Furthermore, it was held that the murder was
not committed to enable the men to perfect an escape.43 Instead of
applying the Attorney General's theory of "once an escapee, always
an escapee," the court held that "the killing must not only be moti-
vated by the goal of escaping custody, but must take place before the
defendant has departed the confines of the prison facility and
reached a place of temporary safety outside the confines of the
prison." 44
Still another special circumstance, felony-murder based on rob-
bery, was remanded to the trial court. The court ruled that it was
error for the trial court to fail to instruct the jury that some proof of
intent to kill was required under the felony-murder special
circumstance.45
39. The court stated that "[s]uch a limiting construction will not prejudice the
prosecution, since there will remain at least one special circumstance-either financial
gain or felony murder-applicable in virtually all cases in which the defendant killed
to obtain money or other property." 37 Cal. 3d at 752, 691 P.2d at 1006, 209 Cal. Rptr.
at 340.
40. Id.
41. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(5) (West Supp. 1985). This special circum-
stance is implied where the murder is committed "for the purpose of avoiding or
preventing a lawful arrest or to perfect, or attempt to perfect an escape from lawful
custody." Id.
42. 37 Cal. 3d at 752, 691 P.2d at 1006, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 340. The court considered
speculative the Attorney General's argument that Cherry had been killed to prevent
his reporting of the two fleeing felons. Id.
43. Id. The court stated: "the verdict finding the murder was committed for the
purpose of avoiding arrest or perfecting an escape is not supported by substantial evi-
dence." Id. at 754, 691 P.2d at 1008, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 342.
44. Id. at 753-54, 691 P.2d at 1007-08, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 341-42. The court, in borrow-
ing from the felony-murder rule's logic, held that an escape was perfected when the
escapee had reached a place of temporary safety. Id. Therefore, Bigelow and Ra-
mandonovic were no longer in the process of escape, and this special circumstance
would not apply.
45. Id. at 754, 691 P.2d at 1008, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 342. This decision was based on
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The court also determined that the felony-murder circumstance
based on kidnapping should be remanded for lack of any instruction
on the intent to kill.46 Bigelow also contended that the felony-mur-
der special circumstance statute's language-"[k]idnapping in viola-
tion of sections 207 and 209"47-required proof of simple
kidnapping48 and kidnapping to commit robbery.49 However, the
court held that the intent of the statute was to find special circum-
stances where there is a murder in connection with either simple kid-
napping or kidnapping to commit robbery.5 0
IV. SEPARATE OPINIONS
Justice Kaus filed a concurring opinion which criticized the major-
ity's decision that the denial of advisory counsel was reversible error
per se. His rationale was that advisory counsel was not constitution-
ally guaranteed, and that such counsel only plays a "subordinate"
role in an accused's defense.5 '
Chief Justice Bird, both concurring and dissenting, also filed a sep-
arate opinion. She found fault in the majority's allowance of inad-
missible evidence in the guilt phase to prove special circumstances.5 2
She contended that a jury instruction limiting its use would not erase
the prejudicial matter from a juror's mind.53 Chief Justice Bird ar-
gued that instead of a limiting instruction, there should be a bifurca-
tion of guilt and special circumstance phases of the trial5 4 Also
attacked was the majority's interpretation of Penal Code section
190.2(a)(17)(ii) which specifies felony-murder special circumstances
during a kidnapping.55 Instead of applying felony-murder in cases of
Carlos v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983), which
held that intent was requisite to a finding of felony-murder special circumstances.
46. Id. at 754, 691 P.2d at 1008, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
47. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(17)(ii) (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
48. Simple kidnapping under section 207 is merely transporting a person into an-
other area of the county, or into another county, state or country. See CAL. PENAL
CODE § 207 (West Supp. 1985).
49. Kidnapping to commit robbery, CAL. PENAL CODE § 209(b) (West Supp. 1985),
or for ransom, reward, or extortion, id. § 209(a), requires additional proof beyond sim-
ple kidnapping.
50. 37 Cal. 3d at 755-56, 691 P.2d at 1009, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
51. Id. at 756, 691 P.2d at 1009, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 343 (Kaus, J., concurring). Justice
Kaus contested that "it is at least theoretically possible that a defendant who chooses
to represent himself will conduct a faultless defense." Id.
52. Id. at 757, 691 P.2d at 1010, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 344 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
53. Chief Justice Bird quoted Justice Jackson concurring in Krulewitch v. United
States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949), where he said, "[t]he naive assumption that prejudicial ef-
fects can be overcome by instructions to the jury. . . all practicing lawyers know to be
unmitigated fiction." Id. at 453 (Jackson, J., concurring).
54. The Chief Justice pointed to Penal Code section 190.1(a) which states that "the
defendant's guilt shall be first determined," as allowing for a bifurcation procedure
whereby the guilt and special circumstances phases are separated.
55. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(17)(ii) (West Supp. 1984).
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either simple kidnapping or kidnapping to commit a robbery, she ar-
gued that the legislature's language should be given its literal
effect.56
D. Defendant's sixth amendment rights are violated when
preliminary hearing testimony is admitted into
evidence and defense counsel has not had a meaningful
right to cross-examine: People v. Brock.
In People v. Brock, 38 Cal. 3d 180, 695 P.2d 209, 211 Cal. Rptr. 122
(1985), part of the prosecution's case consisted of statements and tes-
timony by Mrs. Mary Williams. In her testimony and statements, she
stated she saw the defendant inject the deceased, who was in the hos-
pital with Mrs. Williams, with what was later determined to be
methamphetamines. The drugs caused the victim's death. Mrs. Wil-
liams was herself terminally ill and under heavy medication when
she testified at the preliminary hearing. The defendant was con-
victed of second degree murder and unlawful administration of
methamphetamine. The issue before the court was whether the de-
fendant was given a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine Mrs.
Williams since at the time of the preliminary hearing she was inco-
herent. Because of Mrs. Williams' condition, defense counsel was de-
nied the opportunity to object to prosecution questions and was
permitted to ask only three questions of his own.
The defendant, by virtue of the sixth amendment, was guaranteed
meaningful cross-examination of witnesses as a fundamental right.
Though Mrs. Williams was deceased at the time of trial, her prior
statements and testimony from the preliminary hearing were intro-
duced into evidence. The sixth amendment requirement of cross-ex-
amination and confrontation of witnesses may be satisfied if there
was adequate opportunity for cross-examination at an earlier pro-
ceeding. The defendant's opportunity must be "complete and ade-
quate." Because the defendant had the opportunity to ask Mrs.
Williams only three questions on cross-examination and did not re-
ceive coherent answers, his rights under the sixth amendment were
violated, as was California Evidence Code section 1237. The error of
56. See Loew's Inc. v. Byram, 11 Cal. 2d 746, 82 P.2d 1 (1938). The 1977 provision
read "[k]idnapping in violation of section 207 or 209" (former Penal Code section
1190.2(c)(3)(ii)) while the 1978 version was amended to specify "[k]idnapping in viola-
tion of sections 207 and 209." CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(17)(ii) (West Supp. 1985)
(emphasis added).
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admitting Mrs. Williams' preliminary hearing testimony at trial re-
quired reversal.
E. Trial court's refusal to grant continuance in order to
allow defendant to obtain retained counsel held to be
abuse of discretion: People v. Courts.
A trial court's denial of a request for a continuance to allow a de-
fendant to obtain retained counsel was held to be reversible error in
People v. Courts, 37 Cal. 3d 784, 693 P.2d 778, 210 Cal. Rptr. 193
(1985). The case arose when the defendant, Philip Courts, was
charged with murder. Approximately eight days before trial, the de-
fendant, represented by a public defender, requested a continuance
so that he could have time to retain a private attorney he had con-
tacted. The court deemed the request untimely, but the defendant
subsequently paid the private attorney a retainer. When the trial
judge was disqualified from the case, a similar plea to the new trial
judge proved ineffective as well. The defendant was tried and con-
victed of voluntary manslaughter.
The supreme court, in reversing the lower tribunal, held that the
defendant had made "a good faith, diligent effort to obtain the substi-
tution of counsel before the scheduled trial date." Therefore, it was
an abuse of discretion to deny the continuance, as the defense coun-
sel should be allowed a reasonable amount of time for preparation.
Thus, the court determined that a defendant could invoke the funda-
mental right to choose retained counsel as late as a week before trial.
Finally, the court held that a denial of counsel of the defendant's
choice necessitated reversal, regardless of whether he received a fair
trial.
F. It is proper for a court to consider the effect of delay on
the memory of all witnesses, including those to be
produced by the prosecution, in ruling on a motion
alleging the denial of a speedy trial: People v. Hill.
In People v. Hill, 37 Cal. 3d 491, 691 P.2d 989, 209 Cal. Rptr. 323
(1984), the supreme court considered an appeal taken from an order
by the Santa Clara Superior Court dismissing a number of felony
counts against the defendant, Hill. The charges were dismissed on
the grounds of a denial of the defendant's federal and state constitu-
tional rights to a speedy trial.
The defendant had been convicted of charges in San Mateo County
and, while in prison, wrote the Santa Clara district attorney to de-
mand a trial on charges against him in that county. Due to negligent
error by the state, the ninety-day period provided by statute had
elapsed before the defendant was brought to trial. According to sec-
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tion 1381 of the Penal Code, such a violation results in dismissal of
the action upon a motion by the defendant.
The right to a speedy trial is afforded to criminal defendants by the
sixth amendment to the federal Constitution and by article I, section
15 of the California Constitution. To determine whether either right
has been violated, courts must address the issue of whether the de-
fendant was prejudiced by the delay in bringing him to trial. Preju-
dice is a relevant consideration under both federal and state analysis.
It has been deemed more important under the state determination
because the test employed by the court weighs the prejudicial effect
of the delay against any justification for it.
Prejudice is a factual question which is reviewed on appeal by ex-
amining the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the trial court re-
lied in its decision. The evidence here disclosed an unexcused delay
of more than six months between the defendant's first letter of de-
mand and the date the charges were refiled. More importantly, how-
ever, the record revealed prejudice to the defendant.
The prosecution's case consisted primarily of the eyewitness testi-
mony of the victims. The witnesses' memories had admittedly deteri-
orated over the course of the delay. The prosecution contended, and
Justice Lucas agreed in his dissenting opinion, that the defendant
was not prejudiced by the faded memories, but instead received a
benefit. The dissent viewed this as a "huge advantage" to the defend-
ant because he was faced with a trial in which the victims positively
identified him, and he is now faced with a trial in which the victims
are uncertain.
The majority rebutted the contention of a benefit to the defendant
by invoking the presumption of the defendant's innocence. "[T]o con-
tend that a faded memory aids the defendant is to assume defend-
ant's guilt; if he is innocent, obviously he would prefer witnesses who
can forthrightly so testify." The court found no reason to distinguish
witnesses for the prosecution from witnesses for the defense, with re-
spect to the effect of a prolonged delay on their memory. The faded
memory of the prosecution witnesses made a fair trial impossible
here. The court noted this was particularly true where, as here, the
only evidence against the defendant is the testimony of the witnesses
whose memory has been affected by the delay.
The court concluded that it was proper to consider the effect of a
delay on the memory of all witnesses, including those to be produced
by the prosecution, when ruling on a motion alleging the denial of a
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defendant's right to a speedy trial. The decision by the court below
to dismiss the action was affirmed.
G. A request by a defendant to have his preliminary
hearing closed pursuant to Penal Code section 868 must
be granted upon a showing of a reasonable likelihood of
substantial prejudice: Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court,' the real party in inter-
est, Diaz, was charged with the murder of twelve hospital patients.
Defendant Diaz, at the preliminary hearing, made a motion pursuant
to California Penal Code section 868 to close the proceeding to the
public and the press. The motion was granted and the transcripts
were sealed.2 Petitioner, a newspaper, sought access to the tran-
scripts in superior court. The court ordered the transcripts to remain
sealed.8 The petitioner then commenced a mandamus proceeding.
The supreme court was asked to determine the standard to be ap-
plied by a magistrate in deciding when the public's right of access to
preliminary hearings must give way to the defendant's right to a fair
trial.
II. THE ASSERTED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ACCESS
Prior to amendment in 1982, section 868 of the Penal Code pro-
vided the defendant with an absolute right to closure of his prelimi-
nary hearing upon request.4 The statute was challenged in San Jose
Mercury-News v. Municipal Court5 as violating state and federal con-
stitutional rights. The court there acknowledged the United States
1. 37 Cal. 3d 772, 691 P.2d 1026, 209 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1984). Opinion by Broussard,
J., with Bird, C.J., and Mosk, Kaus and Reynoso, JJ., concurring. Separate opinions by
Grodin, J., concurring, and Lucas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
2. The trial had been completed, rendering the case technically moot. The court
found, however, that the case presented "an important question affecting the public
interest, and review [was] appropriate." Id& at 774 n.2, 691 P.2d at 1027 n.2, 209 Cal.
Rptr. at 361 n.2.
3. The superior court judge based his ruling on a finding of a reasonable likeli-
hood that opening the transcript to the public would prejudice the defendant's right to
a fair and impartial trial. Id& at 774, 691 P.2d at 1027, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 361. The "rea-
sonable likelihood" test applied by the lower court was based on language found in
Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 397-403 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring). The
supreme court ultimately couched its own test in similar language, but felt that the
superior court had improperly applied the test. 37 Cal. 3d at 778-79, 691 P.2d at 1030,
209 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 868 (West 1970). Prior to amendment the section read, in
pertinent part: "The magistrate must also, upon the request of the defendant, exclude
from the examination every person except [certain enumerated officials]." Id.
5. 30 Cal. 3d 498, 638 P.2d 655, 179 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1982).
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Supreme Court's recognition of a qualified right of access to trials
and to pretrial proceedings, such as suppression hearings.6 It based
its decision, however, on perceived distinctions between a prelimi-
nary hearing and a trial.7 The court held that no right of access to
preliminary hearings arose out of the first amendment to the United
States Constitution.8
The petitioner urged the court to repudiate its conclusion in San
Jose Mercury-News that the first amendment does not provide a right
of access to a preliminary hearing. The newspaper relied on two re-
cent United States Supreme Court cases, Globe Newspaper Co. v. Su-
perior Court9 and Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court,1o to
support its argument.
The Court in Globe held that before a state may deny access it
must show that the denial is necessary to serve a compelling govern-
mental interest and is narrowly tailored for that purpose." The stat-
ute involved in Globe, requiring mandatory closure, was not narrowly
tailored and the Court found that a case-by-case determination of the
necessity of closure would adequately protect the state's interests. In
Press-Enterprise, the Court held that the preference for openness
will be overcome by a finding that closure is "essential to preserve
higher values."12
The cases relied on by the petitioner were distinguishable, how-
ever. They involved the right of access to trials, rather than to pre-
liminary hearings. The main concern in those cases was with the
6. Id. at 503-06, 638 P.2d at 657-60, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 774-77. The qualified right of
access developed out of a long history of openness. Id at 506, 638 P.2d at 559-60, 179
Cal. Rptr. at 776-77. This traditional openness "guards against persecution or favorit-
ism, increases public awareness of the judicial process, inspires confidence in the crimi-
nal justice system, and serves the cathartic needs of the community." Id at 505, 638
P.2d at 659, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 776. See also Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 412-15 (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
7. 30 Cal. 3d at 505, 638 P.2d at 569, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 776 ("preliminary hearings,
unlike trials, were traditionally private at common law.").
8. Id. at 506, 638 P.2d at 660, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 777.
9. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (Massachusetts
statute mandating closure during testimony of minor sex victims found to be too
broad).
10. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 104 S. Ct. 819 (1984) (voir dire closure
invalid due to trial judge's failure to consider alternative measures).
11. Globe, 457 U.S. at 603-07. It was noted that the state interest supporting the
restriction was determinative; not the historic openness of the type of proceeding. Id.
at 605 n.13.
12. Press-Enterprise, 104 S. Ct. at 824. The Court also relied on the "compelling
interest" test stated in Globe to support its finding. Id.
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public interest;' 3 the concern in this case was with prejudice to the
defendant. Neither case, therefore, warranted reversal of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's decision in San Jose Mercury-News that the
first amendment's right of access does not extend to preliminary
hearings.
Petitioner's additional claim of conflict with the California Consti-
tution was rejected as well, based on the legislature's authority to
favor some rights over others. The legislature reasonably intended
section 868 to give a defendant's fair trial rights precedence over the
public's access rights; particularly in cases where the danger of preju-
dice to the defendant is strong.
Thus, section 868 survived both federal and state constitutional
challenges, and the court chose to reaffirm its decision in San Jose
Mercury-News.
III. THE STATUTORY RIGHT OF ACCESS
Section 868 was amended in 1982 to limit the defendant's right to
closure.' 4 The amended section now requires a finding by the magis-
trate that closure is necessary to protect the defendant's right to a
fair trial. Thus, the court was required to determine the appropriate
standard to be applied in deciding when exclusion of the public is
"'necessary."
The petitioner urged the court to require the defendant to show
that closure is strictly and inescapably necessary to protect the de-
fendant's fair trial rights. 15 The defendant suggested the proper test
should be a finding of reasonable likelihood of substantial prejudice
which would impinge on the defendant's right to a fair trial.16
13. The interests at stake were the physical and psychological well-being of minor
sex victims in Globe, and the privacy of prospective jurors in Press-Enterprise.
14. The amended portion reads:
The examination shall be open and public. However, upon the request of the
defendant and a finding by the magistrate that exclusion of the public is nec-
essary in order to protect the defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial,
the magistrate shall exclude from the examination every person except [cer-
tain enumerated officials].
CAL. PENAL CODE § 868 (West Supp. 1985).
15. The test urged by the petitioner derives from the standard found in United
States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1982). Under that test, the defendant may
satisfy his burden by showing:
(1) "a substantial probability that irreparable damage to his fair-trial right
will result from conducting the proceeding in public;" (2) "a substantial
probability that alternatives to closure will not protect adequately his right to
a fair trial;" and (3) "a substantial probability that closure will be effective in
protecting against the perceived harm."
Id. at 1167 (quoting Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 440-42 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)).
16. See supra note 3. Justice Powell rejected Justice Blackmun's test, supra note
15, on the grounds that it was "inflexible and could prejudice defendant's right and dis-
serve society's interest in the fair and prompt disposition of criminal trials." 37 Cal. 3d
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A. Legislative History
As introduced, Assembly Bill Number 277 established the require-
ment that necessity be shown before closure of a preliminary hear-
ing. The bill as adopted, however, provides no definition of the word
"necessary." In the court's view, this lack of definition evidenced a
legislative intent to allow the courts to determine the appropriate
standard to be applied in balancing the public's right of access against
the fair trial rights of a defendant. 17
B. Policy Pros and Cons
In San Jose Mercury-News, the court discussed policy factors favor-
ing open preliminary hearings. Societal interests, such as exposure of
government activities to public view, are best served by granting the
public and the press access to court proceedings.1s Preliminary hear-
ings are an important step in the accusatorial process and are similar
to trials in many ways. 19 In fact, these hearings are often the only ju-
dicial proceeding to take place during a criminal prosecution. The
public's right of access to preliminary hearings should not, therefore,
be casually denied. Factors supporting the defendant's right to clo-
sure were also expressed in San Jose Mercury-News. These factors
influenced the selection of the appropriate standard.20
The court rejected the view that a magistrate must find that an
at 778-79, 691 P.2d at 1030, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 364 (discussing Justice Powell's concurring
opinion in De Pasquale).
17. The court reviewed the original, amended, and final versions of the bill to
reach this conclusion. Id at 779-80, 691 P.2d at 1030-31, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 364-65. "Clear
and present danger" language was originally used. The bill was amended in committee
to require a "preponderant probability" of clear and present danger. At the time of
final approval, however, such language had been deleted, leaving the word "necessary"
undefined. Id.
18. See supra note 6. Preliminary hearings further serve as a forum for raising
issues of police misconduct or the exclusion of evidence, issues not otherwise exposed
to the public eye.
19. Preliminary hearings resemble trials in several ways: the calling of witnesses;
the use of cross-examination; and each side's incentive to prevail. Apparently, the
court felt the similarities supported opening preliminary hearings to the public, in ac-
cordance with recognized legislative intent. The right of access is not absolute, how-
ever. 37 Cal. 3d at 782, 691 P.2d at 1032, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
20. The fact that preliminary hearings are often one-sided, with evidence intro-
duced only by the prosecution, can be misleading to public observers. Evidence may be
exposed to the media which will be inadmissible at trial. There is an additional con-
cern of prejudicing the public with publicity adverse to the defendant to the extent
that an impartial jury would be difficult to select. 37 Cal. 3d at 780-81, 691 P.2d at 1031,
209 Cal. Rptr. at 365. See also San Jose Mercury-News, 30 Cal. 3d at 512, 638 P.2d at
663-64, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 780-81.
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open hearing will actually deny the defendant a fair trial.2 1 The stan-
dards contemplated by the legislature prior to the actual amendment
of section 868 indicated that a lesser standard than a finding of actual
prejudice was intended.22 Yet, the court recognized a legislative in-
tent to make open preliminary hearings the rule rather than the ex-
ception.23 Accordingly, the court adopted a test which requires the
defendant to make a substantial showing of possible prejudice.
The court based its conclusion on its consideration of the language
of section 868 as finally amended, the statute's legislative history, and
the policy factors involved.24 In order to close a preliminary hearing,
the magistrate must find a reasonable likelihood of substantial preju-
dice which would impinge on the defendant's right to a fair trial.25
When such a situation occurs, the defendant's right to a fair trial
takes precedence over the public's right of access.
IV. SEPARATE OPINIONS
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Grodin stated that the
only question for the court was "whether the First Amendment re-
quires a greater right of access than the Legislature has seen fit to
establish by statute."26 Believing that it did not, Justice Grodin
agreed with the majority's establishment of a substantial showing re-
quirement. He found it consistent with the mandates of the first
amendment.
Justice Lucas, in another separate opinion, concurred in the judg-
ment but dissented against the majority's analysis. He argued that a
showing of reasonable likelihood is the equivalent to a showing of ne-
21. Because apreliminary hearing takes place at an early stage in the prosecution,
the defendant may not have the information or knowledge to make a showing that
prejudice will in fact result if the hearing is left open to the public. The magistrate is
asked to speculate as to the extent of possible prejudice. 37 Cal. 3d at 781, 691 P.2d at
1032, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
22. I& See also supra note 17 and accompanying text.
23. Id. The combined use of the terms "necessary," "clear and present danger"
and "preponderant probability" indicated that a requirement of a substantial showing
was contemplated by the legislature. Thus, the burden is placed on the defendant to
make an affirmative demonstration of the potential adverse affect of a public hearing.
If no showing is made, public access cannot be denied.
24. Id.
25. The burden is on the defendant to make such a showing. The prosecution or
the media may, however, overcome the defendant's showing by demonstrating, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that there is no reasonable likelihood of prejudice. If
the prosecution fails to overcome the defendant's showing, it would be error for the
magistrate to deny closure. Id. at 782, 691 P.2d at 1032, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 366. Thus, the
court granted the defendant an absolute right to closure, but only when a reasonable
likelihood of substantial prejudice is established.
26. Id. at 782-83, 691 P.2d at 1033, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 367 (Grodin, J., concurring)
(emphasis in original). It was Justice Grodin's opinion that the majority unnecessarily
reached the conclusion that no right of access to preliminary hearings arises out of the
first amendment.
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cessity, as required by section 868. The defendant should be required
to show at least a substantial probability of prejudice in order to pre-
vail.27 Justice Lucas found no such showing here, but concurred in
the judgment because the trial was complete and the case therefore
moot.
VI. DISCOVERY
A. A plaintiff in an intentional infliction of emotional
distress action need not disclose information allegedly
exchanged between herself and her attorney regarding
the health effects of chemical exposure: Mitchell v.
Superior Court.
In Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 591, 691 P.2d 642, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 886 (1984), the real parties in interest [defendants] contended
that information sought in discovery was not privileged, or, in the al-
ternative, that any privilege that existed had been waived. The plain-
tiff claimed in her complaint, inter alia, that the makers of a
pesticide, DBCP, contaminated the water supply and caused "consid-
erable emotional pain, anguish and distress, since they [real parties in
interest] are aware that DBCP and the other chemicals are highly
toxic and carcinogenic and can produce sterility and genetic damage."
Interrogatories propounded to the plaintiff revealed evidence that
information regarding possible effects of DBCP had been discussed
between the plaintiff and her attorney. The plaintiff, at a deposition,
also stated that the information she had acquired from all sources
about the possible effects of DBCP had contributed to her emotional
distress. Upon the plaintiff's refusal to answer questions regarding
her conversations with her attorney, a motion to compel answers was
granted. The plaintiff appealed that decision.
The court found the communications to lie within the attorney-cli-
ent privilege as defined in Evidence Code section 952. As there is no
distinction in the Code between factual information and legal advice,
there was no question that the communications were privileged.
No waiver of privilege was found by the plaintiff's mere acknowl-
edgment that the communications took place with her attorney.
Though defendant contended that a significant part of the communi-
cation had been disclosed by the plaintiff's statements, the court cited
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 3d 436, 191
27. Id. (Lucas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Cal. Rptr. 871 (1983), which held that answers in the discovery pro-
cess must be "wide enough in scope and deep enough in substance" to
be significant enough to waive the privilege. As the plaintiff did not
reveal any of the sought-after information in discovery, there was no
waiver of the attorney-client privilege.
The defendants also contended that there should be an implied
waiver of the attorney-client privilege due to the intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress claim. The defendants cited authority
which indicated that the attorney-client communications should be
disclosed to determine the genuineness and reasonableness of the
plaintiff's claim.
The court rejected this implied waiver theory. As only the plain-
tiff's state of mind was at issue, no waiver of the privilege was per-
mitted. The court emphasized that "[p]rivileged communications do
not become discoverable because they are related to issues raised in
the litigation . . . . If tendering the issue of damages. . . waived the
privilege, there would be no privilege, and Evidence Code section 954
would be meaningless."
The court concluded that the issue of damages in an intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress action "can be properly litigated without
such a broad invasion of the attorney-client privilege." Much of the
plaintiff's investigative efforts and trial strategy would become dis-
coverable if such an implied waiver existed. Moreoever, the focus of
the intentional infliction cause of action is the defendant's conduct;
the genuineness of the plaintiff's claims stems from these facts
(which the plaintiff must prove) and "objective scientific and expert
evidence, as opposed to any confidential communications" should be
the focus of the litigation. Therefore, the court held the communica-
tions in question privileged with no waiver, express or implied, of the
attorney-client privilege.
B. A defendant in a criminal action arising from an
automobile accident has a "proper purpose" within the
meaning of Vehicle Code sections 20012 and 20014 to
discover reports of accidents at the same location: State
ex rel. Department of Transportation v. Superior Court.
In State ex rel. Department of Transportation v. Superior Court, 37
Cal. 3d 847, 693 P.2d 804, 210 Cal. Rptr. 219 (1985), Phyllis Hall was
charged with five counts of murder, five counts of vehicular man-
slaughter, and one count of drunk driving after an automobile acci-
dent in which she was a driver. A subpoena duces tecum was served
on the California Department of Transportation requesting accident
reports made during the years 1980 through 1983 concerning acci-
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dents at the same location. The Department only furnished Ms. Hall
with a report of her own accident.
Ms. Hall contended that she had a "proper purpose" for the reports
as Vehicle Code section 20012 requires. Section 20012 provides that
the contents of all reports, including the names and addresses of per-
sons involved in, or witnesses to an accident shall be disclosed to any
person who may have a proper interest therein. Moreover, Ms. Hall
was willing to accept the reports in question with the names of par-
ties and other identifying data deleted, subject to a later request for
this information accompanied by a showing of particularized need.
Because the liberal policy of discovery is not endless in its scope,
the court noted two requirements that must be satisfied to allow dis-
covery of the requested reports. First, the plaintiff must show that
the requested information will facilitate the ascertainment of the
facts and a fair trial. There must be more than a desire to benefit
from the state's investightion of a crime. Second, the information
sought must be described with a "sufficient degree of specificity."
More than a mere fishing expedition is essential to satisfy this re-
quirement. In this case, the reports could lead to relevant and admis-
sible evidence, and the reports were described with sufficient
particularity. Therefore, the court held that the plaintiff showed a
proper purpose under the Vehicle Code and was entitled to receive
the reports.
VII. ELECTION LAW
Political parties are not prohibited by article II, section
6 of the constitution from endorsing, supporting or
opposing candidates for nonpartisan offices: Unger v.
Superior Court.
In Unger v. Superior Court,' the supreme court was asked to de-
cide whether a political party and its governing body are prohibited
by article II, section 6 of the California Constitution2 from endorsing
a campaign not to confirm justices of the supreme court at a general
election. The question arose after the dismissal by the superior court
1. 37 Cal. 3d 612, 692 P.2d 238, 209 Cal. Rptr. 474 (1984). Opinion by Mosk, J.,
with Files and Janes, JJ., concurring. Separate concurring opinions by Grodin, Acting
C.J., and Lucas, J. Separate dissenting opinion by Sims, J., with Potter, J. Justices
Files, Janes, Sims and Potter are retired Associate Justices of the Court of Appeal sit-
ting under assignment by the Acting Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
2. Article II, section 6 states that, "[j]udicial, school, county, and city offices shall
be nonpartisan." CAL. CONST. art. II, § 6 [hereinafter referred to as section 6].
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of a petition for a writ of mandate, filed by two registered voters,
seeking to restrain the Republican Party from endorsing a campaign
not to confirm justices. The supreme court denied the writ and held
that political parties were not prohibited from endorsing or otherwise
supporting such campaigns.
I. BACKGROUND
The petitioners filed their petition alleging that the Republican
Party, the real party in interest on appeal, violated article II, section
6 of the state constitution and sections 9276 and 9440 of the Elections
Code, which set out the guidelines for party campaigns.3 The Code
provides for campaigns on behalf of candidates of the Republican
Party. Because the candidates in this case were judicial nominees
and thus nonpartisan, the petitioners alleged that the use of party as-
sets in a campaign for nonconfirmation of these justices was
improper.
The trial court entered an order of dismissal. The petitioners
sought a writ of mandate vacating the order, claiming that an appeal
from it would be an inadequate remedy due to the impending elec-
tion. The election was held prior to the court's decision, rendering
the relief sought by petitioners unavailable. Although technically
moot, the court addressed the issues presented due to the general
public interest in the question and because of the likelihood of simi-
lar situations recurring in future elections.4
II. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The majority began its analysis by noting that article II, section 6
sets out the general principle that judicial offices, among others, are
nonpartisan in nature; the section does not purport to restrict or pro-
hibit specific conduct by a political party. The court viewed its task
as determining whether or not the conduct of the Republican Party
which the petitioners sought to enjoin violated this principle of non-
partisanship. In its consideration of the question, the court looked at
the legislative intent and purpose behind section 6 and at the histori-
cal role of political parties in nonpartisan elections.
3. Section 9276 states, "[The Republican Party State Central Committee] shall
conduct party campaigns for this party and in behalf of the candidates of this party. It
shall appoint committees and appoint and employ campaign directors and perfect
whatever campaign organizations it deems suitable or desirable and for the best inter-
est of the party." CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9276 (West 1977).
Section 9440 states, "A committee shall have charge of the party campaign under
general direction of the state central committee or of the executive committee selected
by the state central committee." CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9440 (West 1977).
4. 37 Cal. 3d at 614, 692 P.2d at 239, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 475. The confirmation of the
justices was unsuccessfully opposed by the Party. Id.
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A. Legislative Intent and Purpose
The court narrowed its inquiry further by focusing its analysis, not
on whether a political party has legislative authority to support or
oppose candidates for nonpartisan office, but on whether or not there
are any restraints against such conduct.5 Only two restrictions were
identified by the court as legislative promotion of the nonpartisan-
ship principle. The form of elections for nonpartisan office is regu-
lated in various respects, 6 and the only restraint imposed on the
conduct of a political party is that it may not nominate a candidate
for a nonpartisan office.7 Because no other limitation exists, the
court inferred a legislative intent that no additional restriction be
applied.8
As further support for this conclusion, factors were identified to
defeat the restrictions asserted by the petitioners. The court recog-
nized that broad discretion has been granted by the legislature to the
governing bodies to act on behalf of the party.9 It has also been the
custom of the governing bodies to endorse or assist candidates for
nonpartisan offices.10 Furthermore, the legislature had ample oppor-
5. I& at 615, 692 P.2d at 240, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 476. The court narrowed its focus
in this manner after examining legislative treatment of political parties in the past.
Originally, parties were considered private associations, free from legislative con-
straint in their selection of candidates for office. See, e.g., Britton v. Board of Election
Comm'rs, 129 Cal. 337, 61 P. 1115 (1900); People v. Cavanaugh, 112 Cal. 674, 44 P. 1057
(1896). Custom and usage prevailed and nominations were made by party conventions.
In 1907, the state's power to regulate political parties emerged. "[Tihe state has seen
fit to declare that political parties shall be as to their mode of holding conventions and
nominating candidates for public office, regarded as public bodies whose methods are
to be controlled by the state." Katz v. Fitzgerald, 152 Cal. 433, 435, 93 P. 112, 113
(1907). Today, the Code has provisions regulating the organization and obligations of
political parties and of their governing bodies. See CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 8100-9956
(West 1977).
6. Declarations of candidacy and other nomination papers may not refer to party
affiliation, CAL. ELEC. CODE § 6401.5 (West 1977), nor may the name of the party to
which a nonpartisan candidate belongs appear on the ballot. Id § 10200.5. Addition-
ally, partisan and nonpartisan offices are to be listed separately on the ballot. Id
§ 10207.
7. The Elections Code defines "nonpartisan office" as "an office for which no
party may nominate a candidate." CAL. ELEC. CODE § 37 (West 1977). The section
thereafter lists "[j]udicial, school [sic] county, and municipal offices" as nonpartisan po-
sitions. Id A partisan office is defined as one "for which a party may nominate a can-
didate." Id § 36.
8. 37 Cal. 3d at 616, 692 P.2d at 240-41, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 476-77.
9. Supporting candidates whose views are consistent with party beliefs is seen by
the court as enhancing party interests. Presumably the court would agree that en-
dorsement of the nonconfirmation of certain officers is an action which also may prop-
erly be done on behalf of the party.
10. See Unger v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. App. 3d 681, 684 & n.4, 162 Cal. Rptr.
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tunity to restrict such activities of the parties had it so desired. In
fact, the court refers to the 1963 adoption of section 11702 of the Elec-
tions Code, which prohibits endorsement of any party candidate for
partisan office in the primaries."1 There is no comparable prohibi-
tion for nonpartisan office, which raises the inference that the legis-
lature never intended for such a limitation to apply.
The court concluded that the legislature has not prohibited the
practice and custom of endorsing, supporting or opposing candidates
for nonpartisan office by political parties. This conclusion would
stand, unless section 6 expressed a contrary intent.
B. The History of Section 6
In 1926, article II, section 2 3/4 was added to the California Consti-
tution. It represented the first constitutional provision relating to
nonpartisan office.12 The term "nonpartisan office" was undefined
then, as it is now. However, prior to the adoption of section 2 3/4,
there were a number of provisions, similar to present day code re-
quirements,13 which promoted the nonpartisan character of elections.
The court surmised that the undefined term was intended to refer to
"an office filled by an election nonpartisan in form, and for which a
party could not nominate a candidate."'14
In 1972, section 2 3/4 was deleted from the constitution and re-
placed by section 5. The intention to retain the guarantee of the non-
partisanship nature of the offices listed was expressed in the Revision
Committee's notes and in the ballot pamphlet distributed to voters.
No change in meaning was intended, "except that city offices were
added to the list of nonpartisan offices, in recognition of existing
611, 613 & n.4 (1980) (declarations filed by chairpersons of the local central committees
state that their committees had endorsed and/or supported candidates for judicial and
other nonpartisan positions for many years), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1131 (1981).
11. Section 11702 was intended to prevent deception of the public in political cam-
paigns. See 37 Cal. 3d at 617 n.8, 692 P.2d at 241 n.8, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 477 n.8. The
section reads, in pertinent part, "[t]he state convention, state central committee, and
the county central committee in each county shall not endorse, support, or oppose, any
candidate for the nomination by that party for partisan office in the direct primary
election." CAL. ELEC. CODE § 11702 (West 1977).
This section was recently declared unconstitutional by a federal district court in San
Francisco County Democratic Central Committee v. Eu, No. C-83-5599, on the ground
that it denies political parties first amendment rights. See also Weisburd, Candidate-
Making and the Constitution: Constitutional Restraints on and Protections of Party
Nominating Methods, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 213 (1984).
12. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 2 3/4 (repealed in 1972 and replaced by what is now sec-
tion 5). It provided that judicial, school, county, township or other nonpartisan office
candidates were elected by majority vote at the primary. See 37 Cal. 3d at 617, 692 P.2d
at 241, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
13. See supra note 6. See also 37 Cal. 3d at 617 n.9, 692 P.2d at 241 n.9, 209 Cal.
Rptr. at 477 n.9.
14. Id. at 617, 692 P.2d at 242, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 478. The court also noted at this
point that petitioners presented no evidence to the contrary.
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practice."15 In 1976, section 5 was renumbered section 6, without
change.16
From the foregoing analysis, the court concluded that section 6, at
issue in this case, was not meant to impose greater restraints on polit-
ical parties than those which existed prior to the voters' adoption of
it as section 5 in 1972. The Republican Party thus acted within its
rights in its opposition to the confirmation of justices.
C. Rejection of Petitioners' Claims
Petitioners pointed to an earlier court of appeal case, in which Un-
ger was involved, as contrary authority to the conclusion reached by
the supreme court.17 That case, referred to as Unger I by the court,
utilized a broader definition of "nonpartisan" and held that the party
committee was prohibited from supporting or opposing candidates for
the board of a college school district, a nonpartisan office.
The court gave precedence to its analysis in the present case and
disapproved the holding in Unger . The conclusion reached in Unger
I was not the result of a thorough analysis of the legislative intent
and purpose of the constitutional provision and of the historical role
of political parties, as was done by the court here.1 8 The appellate
court had further failed to realize that there was no express limita-
tion in the section, or elsewhere, regarding the type of conduct in-
volved. It simply chose a very broad definition of nonpartisanship in
its decision, which the court here disapproved.19 The court also
found fault with the petitioners' contention that a "poll" of party
member preference is required by section 6 before the governing
15. Id. at 618, 692 P.2d at 242, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 478 (footnote omitted).
16. Id.
17. Unger v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. App. 3d 681, 162 Cal. Rptr. 611 (1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1131 (1981). The real party in interest there was the Matin County
Democratic Central Committee which endorsed and planned to support candidates for
the governing board of the Main Community College District. The petitioner, Unger,
was a candidate who was not endorsed and sought to restrain the committee's action,
claiming it violated section 6. The appellate court agreed with the petitioner.
The definition of "nonpartisan" used in Unger I was taken from WEBSTER's NEW IN-
TERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1965): "not affiliated with or committed to the sup-
port of a particular political party: politically independent . . . viewing matters or
policies without party bias . . . held or organized with all party designations or em-
blems absent from the ballot . . . composed, appointed or elected without regard to
political party affiliations of members. ... 102 Cal. App. 3d at 685, 162 Cal. Rptr. at
613.
18. 37 Cal. 3d at 619, 692 P.2d at 242-43, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 478-79.
19. Id.
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body of a political party can endorse or support a candidate. 20 The
opinion of the Attorney General relied on by petitioners was seen as
being more favorable to the real party in interest because it recog-
nized the principle that the governing bodies of a party have powers
defined by custom and usage of which the law has not deprived
them.21 The argument was rejected on the additional ground that
the section relied on by petitioners, section 11702 of the Elections
Code, has been declared unconstitutional by a federal district court.22
D. Conclusion
The majority thus concluded that article II, section 6 of the Califor-
nia Constitution did not prohibit political parties or their governing
bodies from supporting, endorsing or opposing candidates for nonpar-
tisan office. The writ sought by petitioners was accordingly denied.
III. CONCURRING OPINIONS
Justice Grodin, Acting Chief Justice, agreed with many of the
views expressed in the dissent, but concurred in the majority's opin-
ion due to first amendment considerations.23 Support for these con-
siderations was found in the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Buckley v. Valeo.24 The purpose of the first amendment is to pro-
tect the free discussion of not only ideas but of governmental affairs,
including the discussion of candidates and campaigns.25 Because an
interpretation of section 6 was suggested which would effectively pro-
hibit political expression, it must be demonstrated that a compelling
state interest is being served and that the provision is narrowly
drawn to avoid unnecessary infringement on first amendment
rights.2 6 No such demonstration was made in this case and thus this
restrictive interpretation of section 6 failed. The rationale for reach-
20. Id. The petitioners based their claim of a "poll" requirement on an opinion of
the Attorney General. 23 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 119 (1954). The court distinguished that
opinion from this case. 37 Cal. 3d at 619-20, 692 P.2d at 243, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
21. 37 Cal. 3d at 620, 692 P.2d at 243, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
22. See supra note 11. See also Concerned Democrats of Florida v. Reno, 458 F.
Supp. 60, 64-65 (S.D. Fla. 1978) (Florida statute prohibiting political parties from en-
dorsing candidates for judicial office held unconstitutional).
23. 37 Cal. 3d at 620-21, 692 P.2d at 244, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 480 (Grodin, Acting C.J.,
concurring). This Justice agreed with the dissent that the idea of political parties be-
coming directly involved in the election of judicial officers was unappealing. He felt
that article II, section 6 was even amenable to an interpretation which would prohibit
such conduct. Due to the rule of construction which calls for avoidance of raising
doubts about the constitutionality of a provision, however, Justice Grodin found that
interpretation to be questionable under the first amendment. Id,
24. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
25. Id at 14-15.
26. 37 Cal. 3d at 622, 692 P.2d at 244-45, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 480-81 (Grodin, Acting
C.J., concurring). See also First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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ing this conclusion was brought out under a strict scrutiny analysis of
the exact means employed by the state to further its interests.
One of the state's interests was said to be maintenance of judicial
integrity and impartiality.2 7 This contention was premised on the as-
sumption that judges would, without the prohibition suggested by the
petitioners, be beholden or appear to be beholden to political parties.
The Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Buckley, which
attempted to justify a limitation on campaign expenditures.28 Here
Justice Grodin analogized that "[i]f the state's interest in preventing
corruption or the appearance of corruption cannot justify a limit on
independent campaign expenditures, surely it cannot justify an abso-
lute prohibition on all forms of expression relating to a campaign." 29
A second assumption underlying the judicial integrity argument
was that the people will blindly follow the party's choices. This be-
lief, even if true, was insufficient to justify the prohibition suggested
here to prevent political parties from endorsing candidates for non-
partisan offices. Such a prohibition on this basis would amount only
to a restriction of speech of some elements of society to the benefit of
other elements.3 0
The fundamental problem with the position that a prohibition is
necessary to protect judicial integrity was that the same arguments
can be made with respect to endorsements by groups other than offi-
cial political parties. They would remain free to endorse, support or
oppose candidates for judicial office as they pleased.31 This distinc-
tion raised serious equal protection problems and no state interest
compelling enough to justify the distinction is suggested. 3 2
In conclusion, Justice Grodin found that the risks suggested are in-
herent to a system which elects its judicial officers. Partisan endorse-
27. 37 Cal. 3d at 622, 692 P.2d at 245, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 480 (Grodin, Acting C.J.,
concurring).
28. 424 U.S. at 45. The Court held that the government's interest in this regard
was sufficient to justify a limit on contributions made directly to a candidate, but was
insufficient justification for a limit on contributions made on behalf of a candidate.
29. 37 Cal. 3d at 623, 692 P.2d at 245-46, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 481-82 (Grodin, Acting
C.J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
30. 1i at 623-24, 692 P.2d at 246, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 482. See also Bellotti, 435 U.S. at
791 n.31; Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1977); Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976);
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49.
31. 37 Cal. 3d at 624, 692 P.2d at 246, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 482 (Grodin, Acting C.J.,
concurring). Such other groups might be unofficial political parties or partisan organi-
zations and special interest groups. Id.
32. Id at 624 n.6, 692 P.2d at 246 n.6, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 482 n.6.
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ments, however, do not pose such a threat as to justify limits on the
freedom of expression of political parties. Because article II, section
6 is amenable to a less restrictive interpretation, Justice Grodin con-
curred in the interpretation reached by the majority.33
Justice Lucas wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he
agreed with the majority's interpretation of the scope of the restric-
tions in section 6. Recognition was also expressed, however, of policy
considerations raised by the dissent regarding the preservation of the
nonpartisan nature of judicial offices.3 4 In conclusion, Justice Lucas
made a mild suggestion to the legislature to fashion a permissible
limitation on endorsements by political parties.
IV. THE DISSENT
The dissent reached the conclusion that the people, in adopting ar-
ticle II, section 6 of the constitution, intended a broader meaning of
nonpartisanship than that established by the majority. Upon consid-
eration of the same factors examined by the majority, the back-
ground and purpose of section 6 and the historical role of political
parties in nonpartisan elections, the dissent would prohibit a political
party from lending the authority of its name to a campaign to sup-
port or oppose candidates for nonpartisan office.3 5 The issue thus
raised was whether the first amendment precludes a state from ex-
cluding established partisan interests from elections for nonpartisan
office. Insofar as no individual or voluntary association of such indi-
viduals is restrained, the state has, in the dissent's view, properly
served a compelling interest, that interest being the preservation of
the nonpartisan nature of judicial office, properly protected by means
of limiting the elections in which political parties may participate.3 6
A. The Dissent's View of the Purpose of Section 6 and the Intent of
the Voters
The "plain meaning" of section 6 is laid out in Unger L.37 Presuma-
bly the voters knew that registered voters of each party had the
power to nominate candidates for partisan office in the primary elec-
tion. The dissent contended that the voters, in adopting section 6, did
not intend only to restrict political parties from nominating candi-
dates to nonpartisan office, but intended also to restrain them from
33. Id at 624-25, 692 P.2d at 247, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
34. Id, at 625, 692 P.2d at 247, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 483 (Lucas, J., concurring). These
policy considerations amount to a "strong state interest" according to Justice Lucas,
yet he felt Justice Grodin's first amendment analysis was premature. Id.
35. Id (Sims, J., dissenting).
36. Id at 625-26, 692 P.2d at 247, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
37. See supra note 17.
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endorsing or supporting such candidates as well.38 In selecting non-
partisanship for judicial and other specified offices, the people ex-
pressed their desire to have an independent judiciary. 39
Nonpartisanship serves a number of purposes, all aimed at the
preservation of the integrity of the judicial branch.
It permits the voter to focus on the intelligence, experience and integrity of
the candidates rather than their political affiliations. It frees the candidates
from obligation to a political organization that may later seek to exact favors
for former or future support. It permits the nomination and reelection of
qualified candidates without the necessity of securing a nomination in a parti-
san election.
40
By allowing political parties to endorse and support judicial candi-
dates, the dissent believed the majority had subverted the purposes
behind section 6. Political parties were created to advance the parti-
san views of their members, and by subjecting judicial candidates to
their demands the integrity and independence of the judiciary was
endangered. The voting public "[c]ertainly . .. had these evils in
mind" when section 6 was adopted. 41
The majority opinion was further criticized for adopting the Attor-
ney General's rationale, disapproved in Unger I, which concluded
that no prior statute prohibited party endorsements, therefore, the
present constitutional provision was not intended as such a prohibi-
tion.42 The dissent strenuously argued that the intent of section 6
was to define nonpartisanship by its common meaning. The majority
presented no reason why some other meaning should attach, and, ac-
cording to constitutional provision, the section is mandatory and pro-
hibitory, and thus self-executing as well.43 "The people used plain
language in their organic law to express their intent in language
which cannot be misunderstood, and we must hold that they meant
what they said.""
38. 37 Cal. 3d at 627-28, 692 P.2d at 249, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 485 (Sims, J., dissenting).
39. Id at 628 n.4, 692 P.2d at 249 n.4, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 485 n.4.
40. Id at 628, 692 P.2d at 249, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 485 (footnote omitted).
41. Id. at 628, 692 P.2d at 250, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
42. See 59 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 60, 63 (1976).
43. 37 Cal. 3d at 629-30, 692 P.2d at 250, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 486 (Sims, J., dissenting).
Article I, section 26 states, "[t]he provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise." CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 26.
44. 37 Cal. 3d at 630, 692 P.2d at 251, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 487 (Sims, J., dissenting)
(quoting Oakland Paving Co. v. Hilton, 69 Cal. 479, 512, 11 P. 3, 18 (1886)).
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B. The History of Government Regulation of Political Parties
Two legislative attempts were made to impose a mandatory pri-
mary system, however, both Acts were held unconstitutional. In the
first instance, the court expressed misgivings about the state's power
to regulate political parties. The Act, however, was held unconstitu-
tional on technical grounds.45 The second attempt involved an
amendment to the Political Code which provided for mandatory elec-
tion of delegates to conventions. This was held unconstitutional
also.46
Article II, section 2 1/2 was then adopted by the people in 1900.
This gave the legislature the power to provide for a direct primary.47
The court upheld statutes enacted following the constitutional
amendment in a series of cases. 48 Once the direct primary system
was established, the major role of political parties in California was
to campaign for the success of nominees at the general election. The-
oretically, this task is performed under the direction of each party's
governing body.49
Tracing the steps taken to the establishment of judicial offices as
nonpartisan offices, the dissent found that, in 1911, candidates for ju-
dicial and school offices were defined as nonpartisan.50 In 1913,
county and township officers were added to the list of nonpartisan of-
fices and those were to be listed apart from partisan offices on the
ballot.51
From the foregoing historical analysis, the dissent concluded that
the legislature intended judicial, school, county and township elec-
tions to be free from partisan influence. Although code provisions al-
low a party to perform duties and services "for the benefit of the
party,"52 and according to the majority, such duties and services in-
cluded party endorsements for nonpartisan offices, the dissent
stressed that such acts must be limited to acts not prohibited by the
constitution. The people, in adopting section 6, intended for candi-
45. See Spier v. Baker, 120 Cal. 370, 52 P. 659 (1898).
46. See Britton v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 129 Cal. 337, 61 P. 1115 (1900).
47. Article II, section 2 1/2 is now section 5. For a history of its revisions and re-
numbering, see 37 Cal. 3d at 631 n.6, 692 P.2d at 252 n.6, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 488 n.6 (Sims,
J., dissenting).
48. Katz v. Fitzgerald, 152 Cal. 433, 93 P. 112 (1907); Schostag v. Cator, 151 Cal.
600, 91 P. 502 (1907); Rebstock v. Superior Court, 146 Cal. 308, 80 P. 65 (1905). In Reb-
stock and Schostag, the court upheld the legislative prescription of tests for voting
rights in primary elections. In Katz, the state's interest in guarding the purity of pri-
mary elections was recognized as was the interest of political parties to reserve to their
members control of their internal affairs. See also supra note 5.
49. 37 Cal. 3d at 632-33, 692 P.2d at 252, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 488. See also Friedman,
Reflections Upon the Law of Political Parties, 44 CAL. L. REV. 65, 69 (1956).
50. 37 Cal. 3d at 633, 692 P.2d at 253, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
51. 1&
52. See CAL. ELEc. CODE §§ 8942, 9443, 9742, and 9852 (West 1977).
1202
[Vol. 12: 1141, 1985] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
dates to nonpartisan offices to be elected without regard to their
political affiliation. Thus, the dissent would not allow a political
party to officially endorse or support a candidate for judicial office.
C First Amendment Considerations
Based on assertions that the guarantees of freedom of speech and
of association are violated by the conclusion that political parties can-
not endorse candidates for nonpartisan office, the dissent examined
the principles underlying the first amendment. As summarized in
Buckley, the discussion of political issues is integral to the operation
of our social and political systems.53 Additionally, the freedom to as-
sociate is also protected by the first and fourteenth amendments, as
recognized in NAACP v. Alabama,54 and this includes, in particular,
the freedom to associate with the political party of one's choice.55
Due to the importance of these freedoms, the state must show a
compelling subordinate interest and employment of narrowly tai-
lored means in order to sufficiently justify a restriction on speech or
association. 56 It was conceded by the Republican Party that mainte-
nance of judicial integrity is a compelling state interest. It argued,
however, that the prohibition of party endorsements is not the least
intrusive means available by which the state can further its interest.
The dissent rebutted this contention by pointing to the intent of the
people to keep judicial offices nonpartisan, as expressed by the adop-
tion of section 6.57 The dissent concluded that while political parties
are prohibited from becoming officially involved in elections for non-
partisan office, this restriction does not infringe on any individual's
right to associate with political parties nor does it infringe on an indi-
vidual's or group's right to free speech.58 "In fact the prohibition of
partisan endorsement merely clears the air for free expression on the
quality of the administration of justice, rather than reducing the se-
53. 424 U.S. at 14-15.
54. 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
55. See Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57 (1973).
56. 37 Cal. 3d at 637, 692 P.2d at 255, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 491 (Sims, J., dissenting).
57. The dissent also distinguished Concerned Democrats of Fla. v. Reno, 458 F.
Supp. 60 (S.D. Fla. 1978), upon which the real party in interest relied. See 37 Cal. 3d at
637-38, 692 P.2d at 256, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 492 (Sims, J., dissenting).
58. 37 Cal. 3d at 639-41, 692 P.2d at 257-59, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 493-95 (Sims, J., dis-
senting). The court also rebuts the claim of a denial of equal protection of the laws.
The nonpolitical groups which are left free to endorse nonpartisan elections are not
state recognized entities, as are the political parties, and thus the impropriety of parti-
san influence on nonpartisan candidates is absent. The classification is therefore rea-
sonable. Id. at 642, 692 P.2d at 259, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 495 (Sims, J., dissenting).
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lection of candidates to a litmus test of endorsement by a given quali-
fied political party."59
VIII. EVIDENCE
Trial court erred in admitting letters written by
murder victim concerning the defendant; also erred in
allowing experts who had viewed the letters to be
questioned concerning their contents: People v.
Coleman.
In People v. Coleman, 38 Cal. 3d 69, 695 P.2d 189, 211 Cal. Rptr. 102
(1985), the defendant, in a tragic turn of events, shot and killed his
wife, son, and niece. His daughter was shot at but missed. He was
charged with, and convicted of, two counts of first degree murder,
one count of second degree murder, and assault with intent to com-
mit murder. The defendant's relationship with his wife had not been
blissful for the years prior to her death. Because their marriage was
an interracial one, the defendant began to belive that there were con-
spiracies against him. His wife's infidelity only added to his
problems. He was, however, found to be sane. The questions
presented to the court on the defendant's appeal were whether the
limited admission of letters written by the defendant's wife was
proper and whether use of the letters by experts and by the prosecu-
tion on cross-examination was proper.
The letters in qhestion described the victim's feelings of despair
due to the many personal problems the couple had been having. She
suggested that she was ready to face death, and that the defendant
had twice before tried to hurt her. Most importantly, the letters indi-
cated that the defendant had threatened to kill the family. The con-
tents of the letters were entirely hearsay, but they were admitted by
the trial court to impeach the defendant. Copies of the letters were
made available to the jury.
In its analysis, the court weighed the probative value of the letters,
for impeachment purposes, against the risk of unfair prejudice to the
defendant. These statements from the grave, in hindsight, appeared
truthful. With such inflammatory evidence, a limiting instruction
could not be relied upon to prevent misuse of the letters. There was
a substantial risk that they would be considered for the truth of the
matters asserted therein and therefore should not have been admit-
ted to impeach the defendant during cross-examination. The court
ruled that it was prejudicial misconduct to do so.
Many experts were furnished with copies of the letters, which they
considered in rendering their opinions as to the defendant's mental
59. 1i at 642, 692 P.2d at 260, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 496 (Sims, J., dissenting).
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capacity. Evidence Code section 801 permits experts to use inadmissi-
ble evidence to form an opinion so long as that evidence is of a type
that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opin-
ion. Cross-examination of an expert on the matter upon which his
opinion is based is also permitted by Evidence Code section 721. Dur-
ing cross-examination of the defendant's experts, the prosecution
tenaciously questioned the experts regarding the contents of the let-
ters. The letters were not of major significance in the formation of
the experts' opinions. The court was forced to balance the wide lati-
tude given an advocate in cross-examination with the potential that
the jury may misuse the evidence offered. The court held that the
trial court abused its discretion by permitting the extensive question-
ing of the expert witnesses. The court reasoned that a more sanitized
method of choosing which statements were to be used to attack the
experts could have been fashioned to avoid the unfair prejudice of re-
peated reference to the letters' contents.
As to the propriety of use of the letters at all by the experts, the
court, after a lengthy discussion of California law on the subject, rea-
soned that a case-by-case determination is required, focusing on "rea-
sonable reliability." The trial court has broad discretion in this area.
The court held that it was proper in this case for the experts to con-
sider the letters in the formulation of their opinions.
Ix. FAMILY LAW
A marital community is entitled to reimbursement for
funds expended in the professional education of a
spouse. This repayment is subject to an equal division
between the spouses upon dissolution of marriage: In
re Marriage of Sullivan.
The supreme court in In re Marriage of Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d 762,
691 P.2d 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984), was faced with the question
of whether a spouse, who has made economic sacrifices to enable the
other spouse to obtain an education, is entitled to compensation upon
dissolution of marriage. Although the husband, who had been sup-
ported by his wife while in medical school, pointed to past precedent
holding that a professional education is not community property, the
court, in reliance upon the recently amended Family Law Act held
that the community is entitled to reimbursement for expenses result-
ing from one spouse's professional education.
The Family Law Act's newly added section 4800.3 provides for "re-
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imbursement" to the community upon dissolution "for community
contributions to education or training of a party that substantially en-
hances the earning capacity of the party." CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 4800.3(b)(1) (West Supp. 1985). Community funds which are sub-
ject to reimbursement at dissolution include those expended for edu-
cation and training or for the repayment of a student loan. Id.
§ 4800.3(a).
Since the pending case was remanded to the trial court and would
not be final when section 4800.3 became effective on January 1, 1985,
the court ruled that Janet Sullivan was entitled to reimbursement
for her husband's professional education through her community
property share at dissolution as provided in the statute.
Justice Mosk, both concurring and dissenting, attacked the major-
ity's loose and misleading terminology in referring to a spouse's com-
pensation for contributions to education. Justice Mosk correctly
argued that the legislature intended that the community, and not the
individual spouse, be entitled to reimbursement-that is, repayment
of the community funds expended.
Finally, the court held that the trial court's judgment ordering the
husband to pay the wife's attorney fees was not an abuse of sound ju-
dicial discretion. In considering the incomes and respective needs of
the Sullivans, the court found that the husband, with a successful
medical practice, could more easily shoulder the burden of legal fees.
This case is treated more fully in California Practicum elsewhere in
this issue.
X. JUVENILE LAW
Statements made in juvenile fitness hearing are
inadmissible at trial: Ramona R. v. Superior Court.
I. INTRODUCTION
Should a juvenile's statements to either a probation officer or the
court in a fitness hearing be admissible, substantive evidence at the
minor's trial? The court in Ramona R. v. Superior Court, held that
such statements were privileged and inadmissible.2 Although this is-
sue had been well settled in the past,3 the passage of Proposition 8,
1. 37 Cal. 3d 802, 693 P.2d 789, 210 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1985). Justice Mosk delivered
the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Bird and Justices Kaus, Broussard,
Reynoso and Weil concurred. Justice Grodin submitted a separate concurring opinion.
Justice Weil was sitting by assignment of the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
2. Id. at 809-11, 693 P.2d at 794-95, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 209-10.
3. See Bryan v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 575, 498 P.2d 1079, 102 Cal. Rptr. 831
(1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 944 (1973), which held that a juvenile's statements are
inadmissible at trial as substantive evidence when made at a fitness hearing.
1206
[Vol. 12: 1141, 1985] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
which amended the California Constitution,4 created an ambiguity
that the court had to reconcile in Ramona R.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The case arose out of the brutal murder of the defendant's guard-
ian. He had been shot with a handgun, stabbed repeatedly with a
knife, and chopped with an axe. 5 The minor defendant turned her-
self in when she learned that police wanted her for questioning.
Since the juvenile was only seventeen years of age, she was originally
charged with the murder in juvenile court;6 however, the prosecution
requested a fitness hearing7 to determine if she was unfit for juvenile
proceedings. In this fitness hearing, which was primarily intended to
determine if the minor was mature enough to be tried in superior
court, the minor, under counsel's advice, refused to testify or present
any evidence. This tactic was utilized in response to a denial of im-
munity from use at trial.8 The referee, relying upon Ramona's proba-
tion officer's report, held her to be unfit for juvenile proceedings and
allowed charges of murder to be brought in superior court.9
III. COURT'S ANALYSIS
In order to facilitate complete candor between a juvenile and his
4. In the June, 1982 Primary Election, Proposition 8 added section 28(d) to article
I of the California Constitution. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d). See infra note 13 and
accompanying text for text of section 28(d).
5. 37 Cal. 3d at 805, 693 P.2d at 791, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 206.
6. See CAL..WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West 1984), which requires minors under
the age of eighteen to be within the juvenile court's jurisdiction.
7. Whenever a juvenile is over sixteen years of age at the time the offense is
committed, the prosecutor can move for a fitness hearing to have the minor tried as an
adult. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(a) (West 1984). Factors considered in the fit-
ness hearing include:
(1) The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor. (2) Whether
the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court's
jurisdiction. (3) The minor's previous delinquent history. (4) Success of previ-
ous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor. (5) The circum-
stances and gravity of the offense alleged to have been committed by the
minor.
Id.
8. 37 Cal. 3d at 805-06, 693 P.2d at 791, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 206. Included in this evi-
dence was a psychiatric evaluation of the minor. However, the minor did agree to a lie
detector test.
9. Id. at 806, 693 P.2d at 791, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 206. The probation officer's damag-
ing evidence speculated that the killing was the result of an argument concerning the
minor's involvement in prostitution and drugs. Id.
probation officer,10 any statements made by the minor to his proba-
tion officer or to a court in a fitness hearing are considered privileged
and inadmissible at a criminal trial.i" However, this general rule was
put in jeopardy with the passage of Proposition 8.12 Article I of the
California Constitution was amended by Proposition 8 to hold that all
"relevant evidence shall not be excluded . . . in any trial or hearing
of a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether heard in juvenile or
adult court."1 3 Thus, the court had to decide whether this amend-
ment affected the validity of the common law use immunity.14
The defendant contended that denial of the use immunity at trial
was erroneous, and therefore the court should vacate the order hold-
ing her unfit for juvenile court. Amicus curiae argued that the use
immunity was within an exception of the newly enacted section
28(d), which states "[n]othing in this section shall affect any existing
statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege . "... 15 The "statu-
tory rule" concerning a privilege that the defendant relied upon was
Evidence Code section 940, which provides for the basic privilege
against self-incrimination.' 6 The supreme court, in a state constitu-
tional analysis,i7 advanced three reasons why the use immunity rule
should fall within the section 28(d) exception. First, the court held
that the prosecutor's burden of proof would be inequitably lightened
if allowed to use the juvenile's prior probationary statements.' 8 Sec-
ondly, the court was unwilling "'to subject those suspected of crime
to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt.' "19
10. See In re Wayne H., 24 Cal. 3d 595, 596 P.2d 1, 156 Cal. Rptr. 344 (1979) (en-
couragement of candor in probation interviews is rationale for privilege).
11. 37 Cal. 3d at 806, 693 P.2d at 791, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 206 (citing Bryan v. Superior
Court, 7 Cal. 3d 575, 498 P.2d 1079, 102 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 944
(1973)).
12. 37 Cal. 3d at 807-08, 693 P.2d at 793, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
13. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d).
14. The court stated that if it determined that the amended section preempted the
use immunity rule, it would then have to determine the constitutionality of section
707(c) of the Welfare and Institutions Code, which imposes the burden of proof on the
juvenile if charged with certain felonies. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(c) (West
1984). Since the court determined the use immunity rule to still be in effect, it never
had to pass on this issue. 37 Cal. 3d at 804, 693 P.2d at 790, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 205.
15. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d).
16. CAL. EVID. CODE § 940 (West 1966). This section provides: "To the extent that
such privilege exists under the Constitution of the United States or the State of Cali-
fornia, a person has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter that may tend to in-
criminate him." Id.
17. Because the federal law on the matter of use immunities was so confused, the
court used a state constitutional analysis. 37 Cal. 3d at 808-09, 693 P.2d at 793, 210 Cal.
Rptr. at 208.
18. Id. at 809, 693 P.2d at 794, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 209. See also People v. Coleman, 13
Cal. 3d 867, 533 P.2d 1024, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1975).
19. 37 Cal. 3d at 809-10, 693 P.2d at 794, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 209 (citing People v. Cole-
man, 13 Cal. 3d at 878, 533 P.2d at 1034, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 394, quoting Murphy v. Water-
front Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)).
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That is, the juvenile would be forced to choose between testifying
and incriminating himself, or remaining silent, thereby indicating he
was hiding something.20 Finally, the court stressed that the determi-
nation of unfitness was the most serious punishment a juvenile court
could impose, hence the use immunity should remain in effect.2 1
The court finally determined that the use immunity is applicable
even when a juvenile is found to be fit for juvenile court.22 Its ra-
tionale was that juvenile punishment was not sufficiently less severe
than regular penal incarceration that a distinction should be made.
Since the lower court improperly refused to grant the defendant's
request for immunity, the court vacated the order declaring the de-
fendant to be unfit for juvenile court proceedings. 23 At a new hear-
ing, the defendant would be able to present evidence supporting her
fitness, without fear that the evidence would later be used against
her.
Justice Grodin, in a separate concurring opinion, emphasized that
to enjoy the use immunity under the guise of self-incrimination the
juvenile must be compelled to testify in the fitness hearing.24 Be-
cause the fitness proceeding combines rules of evidence, a lower bur-
den of proof, and a "presumption of unfitness," the Justice concluded
that the risk of an adverse judgment is so great that it constitutes a
compulsive sanction against exercise of the privilege against self-
incrimination. 25
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the addition of Proposition 8 to the California Constitution,
the use immunity in juvenile proceedings was held to stand intact.
Hence, whenever a minor confides in his probation officer or testifies
at a fitness hearing, his statements will be considered privileged and
inadmissible at any subsequent juvenile proceeding or criminal trial.
20. 37 Cal. 3d at 810, 693 P.2d at 794, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 209.
21. Id. at 810, 693 P.2d at 795, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 210. The court referred to a deter-
mination of unfitness as "'the worst punishment the juvenile system is empowered to
inflict.'" Id. (quoting Note, Separating the Criminal From the Delinquent: Due Pro-
cess in Certification Procedure, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 158, 162 (1967)).
22. 37 Cal. 3d at 811, 693 P.2d at 795, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
23. Id.
24. Id. (Grodin, J., concurring). He stated that to reach the majority's conclusion
"we must necessarily find that a juvenile's testimony is compelled by the nature of the
fitness proceeding." Id.
25. Id. at 811-12, 693 P.2d at 795-96, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 210-11.
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XI. LABOR LAW
A. Court upholds finding that grape growers committed
unfair labor practices through surveillance,
interrogation, and discharge of employees involved
with a union: Karahadian Ranches v. Agricultural Labor
Relations Board.
In Karahadian Ranches v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board, 38
Cal. 3d 1, 694 P.2d 770, 210 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1985), the petitioner, an
agricultural employer, appealed four findings of unfair labor prac-
tices as determined by the Agricultural Labor Relations Board
(Board).
First, a worker, while preparing a meal in the camp kitchen for
himself and a union attorney, was spied on by a management em-
ployee. Upon leaving the kitchen, the worker discovered the surveil-
lance. The court held that only surveillance which interferes with,
restrains, or coerces union activities is prohibited. The fact that the
eavesdropping was discovered, and that the employee, a union sympa-
thizer, was asked about his union affiliation immediately after discov-
ery, made the petitioner's activity in this regard an unfair labor
practice.
Second, the same employee was confronted by the farm's owner
the next morning. According to the petitioner, only a casual conver-
sation took place, but in it the owner alluded to the fact that union
leaders may kill their enemies. During the conversation there was
further inquiry into the extent of the employee's union activity. The
court held that there was no implied threat because the statement
could be construed as neutral; however, the court did find an unlaw-
ful interrogation. To establish a violation, an objective standard of
whether the employer engaged in conduct which may reasonably be
said to interfere with the free exercise of employee rights was used.
A determination by the Board that an interrogation occurred will be
sustained on review if supported by substantial evidence. In this
case, the coercive potential of the conversation justified the Board's
finding.
Third, a female employee was discharged after distributing union
leaflets and buttons during work time. She was warned that she
would be terminated if the activity was continued, even though she
conducted her union activity during a time in which no productive
work could be performed because there was no crop ready for pack-
ing. Nevertheless, the employee was first demoted, and then fired
when she pinned a button on a tardy worker. The court held that
solicitation on company time is permissible so long as it is during a
"customary nonworking interval." Despite the warning of possible
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termination, no business justification for the discharge existed and
thus, the termination was improper.
Finally, the Board ordered the petitioner to cease and desist from
interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of
their statutory rights. The petitioner contended that the order's lan-
guage was overly broad because it raised the possibility of contempt
proceedings for future violations and went beyond the particular con-
duct found to be unlawful. The court noted that the Board may re-
strain broad types of conduct where the record reveals numerous
attempts by the employer to abridge its employees' rights. Because
of the numerous violations on the record, the court upheld the rem-
edy prescribed by the Board. Moreover, the court approved a re-
quirement that the petitioner post, mail, and read to employees a
notice which revealed the petitioner's unfair labor practices. Due to
significant illiteracy and semi-literacy among the farm workers, the
reading provision was within the Board's discretion.
B. It was error for a court of appeal to dismiss a timely
filed labor.petition because of clerical defects: United
Farm Workers of America v. Agricultural Labor Relations
Board.
The court in United Farm Workers of America v. Agricultural La-
bor Relations Board, 37 Cal. 3d 912, 694 P.2d 138, 210 Cal. Rptr. 453
(1985), held it was erroneous for a court of appeal to deny an un-
timely petition for review based upon technical defects when it had
originally been filed on time. The Agricultural Labor Relations
Board (ALRB) issued a decision adverse to the United Farm Workers
(UFW) in Admiral Packing Co., 10 ALRB No. 9 (1984). The UFW
filed a petition for a writ of review with the court of appeal on the
last day of the statute of limitations. Although received within Code
of Civil Procedure section 1160.8's thirty-day filing period, a clerk re-
turned the petition because it lacked verification, hence causing the
petition to be late.
On appeal, the ALRB and Admiral contended that the petition was
untimely since it was filed outside the thirty-day period. The peti-
tioner, UFW, argued that such "technical noncompliance" would not
thwart the purpose of the statute of limitations-to prevent delays
caused by caseload backlogs.
Initially, the court acknowledged that a lack of verification was not
a jurisdictional requirement, therefore, amendment could cure the
defect after the statute of limitations had run. Relying primarily on
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Litzmann v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board, 266 Cal. App.
2d 203, 71 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1968), the court held that the public policy
granting a party the right to an appeal on the merits of his case out-
weighed any "technical noncompliance." The court ruled that a fil-
ing, to be within the applicable statute of limitations, only requires
"actual delivery of the petition to the clerk at his place of business
during office hours."
The court found further authority for its holding in Rule 18 of the
California Rules of Court, which allows for a reviewing court to re-
turn a defective brief to the party for correction within some speci-
fied time limit. Finally, the court distinguished and dismissed the
ALRB's cited authority on the grounds that in those particular cases
the petition was never timely filed and a request for an extension of
the statute of limitations had been denied.
XII. LAND USE
City's newly enacted growth control ordinance did not
violate the provisions of a consent judgment entered
into between the parties which insured a right to
develop the property in accordance with its master
plan: Pardee Construction Co. v. Camarillo.
In Pardee Construction Co. v. Camarillo, 37 Cal. 3d 465, 690 P.2d
701, 208 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1984), Pardee Construction sought to enjoin
the City of Camarillo from applying agrowth control ordinance to its
property development plan. The trial court denied the injunction
and the supreme court affirmed, finding no infringement of any of
Pardee's rights under a previous judgment by application of the
growth ordinance.
Pardee had submitted a master plan for the development of a large
tract of land which was approved by the city. The plan described the
proposed development in detail, but contained no time schedule for
the rate of development. The city proposed zoning changes, which
led to the initial suit between the parties. The result was a consent
judgment containing certain stipulations which insured for Pardee
the right to develop the property in accordance with the plan and es-
topped the city from enacting zoning or use regulations inconsistent
with the plan. Upon adoption of an initiative measure by the voters,
the city enacted a growth control ordinance, which Pardee claimed
interfered with its vested right to develop the property, and therefore
should not be applicable.
The supreme court agreed with the city that the ordinance did not
violate any vested rights and affected only the timing or rate of de-
velopment; and, further, that the new ordinance was an exercise of
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the city's police power, which had been specifically reserved in the
earlier judgment.
The court first examined the consent judgment, which, being in the
nature of a contract, was subject to interpretation. Pardee was
granted the right to develop its property, subject to compliance with
the applicable municipal code and ordinances and subject to the zon-
ing ordinance in effect at the time. In examining the new ordinance,
the court found that it was "not in the least inconsistent with the
consent judgment." The growth ordinance did not change the zoning
specifications nor did it affect the provisions of the master plan. It
was essentially a regulation of the rate of development, which was
not stipulated to by the parties. It therefore did not restrict Pardee
in carrying out its plan of development for the property.
The applicability of the new ordinance was further supported by
the provision in the judgment which expressly reserved to the city
the right to exercise its "police power relative to general subject mat-
ter which may be applicable to all builders and developers alike
throughout the City." There was nothing in the new ordinance
which imposed conditions, limitations or restrictions on Pardee which
were not evenhandedly imposed on all other developers. It was
therefore in accord with the consent judgment as a valid exercise of
the city's police power.
XIII. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
A. The constitutionality of Civil Code sections 3333.1,
modifying the collateral source rule, and 3333.2,
imposing a maximum limit on the recovery of
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases,
was upheld against due process and equal protection
claims: Fein v. Permanente Medical Group.
In Fein v. Permanente Medical Group,1 the supreme court ad-
dressed constitutional due process and equal protection challenges to
Civil Code sections 3333.1 and 3333.2. The case arose out of a claim of
medical malpractice for which the plaintiff received a judgment
awarding him $1 million in damages, from which both parties
1. 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985). Opinion by Kaus, J.,
with Broussard, Grodin, and Lucas, JJ., concurring. Separate dissenting opinion by
Bird, C.J., with Woods, JPT, concurring. Separate dissenting opinion by Mosk, J.,
Woods, JPT, sitting by assignment of the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
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appealed.2
I. FACTS
The plaintiff, a thirty-four year-old attorney, experienced brief
pain in his chest on a number of occasions. He contacted his regular
physician, who was employed by defendant Permanente Medical
Group, an affiliate of the Kaiser Health Foundation. At his appoint-
ment that afternoon, he was examined by a nurse practitioner who,
after consultation with the supervising physician, diagnosed the pain
as a muscle spasm and gave him a prescription.
That evening, the plaintiff experienced severe chest pains and was
taken to the Kaiser Emergency room. The pain was again diagnosed
by a physician as a muscle spasm. The next day, after experiencing
further pain, the plaintiff was examined by yet another doctor who
ran an electrocardiogram (EKG) on the plaintiff. The EKG showed
that the plaintiff was suffering from a heart attack.
After a period of hospitalization and medical treatment, the plain-
tiff returned to his work on a part-time basis and eventually full-
time.3 The plaintiff brought suit alleging that his heart condition
should have been diagnosed earlier and if that had been done, the
heart attack he suffered could have been prevented or at least the
residual effects lessened.
The jury rendered its verdict in favor of the plaintiff, despite
sharply conflicting evidence.4 The jury itemized its award, pursuant
2. The defendant contended that the trial court erred in its selection of the jury,
in its instructions on liability and damages, and in ordering a lump sum rather than a
periodic payment. The plaintiff claimed that the trial court erred in applying the two
provisions of the Civil Code which fixed noneconomic damages and which modified the
collateral source rule. These claims were in the nature of constitutional challenges to
the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA) which was codified at
sections 3333.1 and 3333.2 of the Civil Code. See infra note 77.
3. The first pains experienced by the plaintiff were in February, 1976. He re-
sumed work, part-time, in October, 1976, and full-time in September, 1977. This action
was filed in February, 1977.
4. The principal witness for the plaintiff was Dr. Harold Swan, head of cardiol-
ogy at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center. He testified that, in his opinion, any patient com-
plaining of chest pains should be given an EKG. He further stated that the nurse
practitioner should have recognized the plaintiff's pain as indicative of a possible heart
problem. The doctor who later examined the plaintiff knew that the prescribed medi-
cation had provided no relief and this should have prompted the physician to order an
EKG.
Dr. Swan testified that the plaintiff's life expectancy had been reduced by one-half
as a result of the attack. The doctor acknowledged that the plaintiff's other arteries
suffer from disease but the decrease in life expectancy could have been only 10 to 15
percent if the plaintiff had been properly treated.
The nurse practitioner and doctor who treated the plaintiff initially were witnesses
for the defense, and stated that the plaintiff had not reported the same symptoms to
them which he described at trial. Other expert witnesses gave their opinions that
medical personnel could not reasonably have foreseen the heart attack based on the
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to the court's instruction.5 The defendant requested that the court
modify the award in accordance with section 3333.2, which sets a
limit on the amount of noneconomic damages to be allowed in such
cases,6 and in accordance with section 3333.1, which alters the collat-
eral source rule in medical malpractice cases. 7
The trial court reduced the noneconomic damages to $250,000.00,
and also reduced the award for past lost wages to take into account
disability payments already received by the plaintiff. Future medical
expenses were to be paid as incurred, while the awards for future lost
wages and noneconomic damages were to be paid in a lump sum.8
information reported to and observed by them. Additional evidence indicated that an
EKG would not have shown that an attack was forthcoming; that with the existence of
already diseased arteries, the attack could not have been prevented; and because of the
extent to which the disease had caused deterioration the plaintiff's life expectancy was
not so severely decreased by the heart attack as suggested by Dr. Swan. 38 Cal. 3d at
145, 695 P.2d at 670, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
5. The jury awarded the following: $24,733.00 for lost wages to the time of trial;
$63,000.00 for future medical expenses; $700,000.00 for future lost wages as the result of
the plaintiff's decreased life expectancy; and $500,000.00 for "noneconomic damages" as
compensation for pain and suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment and other in-
tangible damages already sustained and to be sustained to the time of the plaintiff's
death. Id.
6. Section 3333.2 sets the limit at $250,000.00. It reads in pertinent part:
(a) In any action for injury against a health care provider based on profes-
sional negligence, the injured plaintiff shall be entitled to recover
noneconomic losses to compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical
impairment, disfigurement and other nonpecuniary damage.
(b) In no action shall the amount of damages for noneconomic losses exceed
two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000).
CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1985).
7. Section 3333.1 reads in pertinent part:
In the event the defendant so elects, in an action for personal injury against a
health care provider based upon professional negligence, he may introduce ev-
idence of any amount payable as a benefit to the plaintiff as a result of the
personal injury pursuant to the United States Social Security Act, any state or
federal income disability or worker's compensation act, any health, sickness or
income-disability insurance, accident insurance that provides health benefits
or income-disability coverage, and any contract or agreement of any group, or-
ganization, partnership, or corporation to provide, pay for, or reimburse the
cost of medical, hospital, dental, or other health care services.. . . [t]he plain-
tiff may introduce evidence of any amount which the plaintiff has paid or con-
tributed to secure his right to any insurance benefits concerning which the
defendant has introduced evidence.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1 (West Supp. 1985) (footnote omitted).
The defendant also requested modification pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sec-
tion 667.7 relating to periodic payment of damages.
8. The trial court deemed section 667.7 to be discretionary in nature, and further,
determined that the periodic payment of damages in this case would be contrary to the
purposes of section 667.7. 38 Cal. 3d at 146, 695 P.2d at 671, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 374. See
also infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
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Both parties appealed from the judgment.9
II. THE MAJORITY OPINION
A. The Defendant's Contentions
1. Improper Jury Empanelment
The defendant claimed that the trial court's summary discharge of
all Kaiser members from the jury pool was improper and required
reversal. It argued that under the applicable statute, section 602 of
the Code of Civil Procedure,i0 a person's membership in Kaiser did
not provide an adequate basis for a challenge for cause. The trial
court explained the dismissals to the jury panel as being necessary to
avoid an overly long voir dire proceeding requiring the detailed ques-
tioning of each and every juror."1
The question for the court was whether a potential juror's mem-
bership in Kaiser would render that juror subject to a challenge for
cause.1 2 Section 602 does not define the "interest" or connection with
a party to the suit which would subject a juror to successful chal-
lenge. Other state courts have reached conflicting positions in simi-
lar situations.13
The court found no basis for reversal of the judgment because of
the excusals.14 A trial court is afforded broad discretion in its over-
sight of the jury selection process,15 and this discretion was not
9. The defendant claimed reversible error was committed in "(1) excusing all
Kaiser members from the jury, (2) instructing on the duty of care of a nurse practi-
tioner, (3) instructing on causation, (4) permitting plaintiff to recover wages lost be-
cause of his diminished life expectancy, and (5) refusing to order the periodic payment
of all future damages." 38 Cal. 3d at 146, 695 P.2d at 671, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 374. The
plaintiff sought to have the judgment affirmed, but claimed that the court erred in up-
holding the constitutionality of the MICRA provisions at issue here. Id.
10. See id. at 147 n.3, 695 P.2d at 672 n.3, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 375 n.3; CAL. CIv. PROC.
CODE § 602 (West Supp. 1985).
11. The trial court stated to the jury, "I'm not suggesting that ... everyone who
goes to Kaiser could not fairly and with an open mind resolve the issues in this case,
but we may be here for four weeks trying to get a jury under the circumstances." 38
Cal. 3d at 146-47, 695 P.2d at 671, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 374. Twenty-four of the 60 persons
initially called were dismissed due to their membership in Kaiser. Id. at 147, 695 P.2d
at 671, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Weatherbee v. Hutchenson, 114 Ga. App. 761, 152 S.E. 2d 715 (1966)
(error not to excuse policyholder of mutual insurance company); M & A Elec. Power
Coop. v. Georger, 480 S.W.2d 868 (Mo. 1972) (trial court erred in failing to excuse mem-
bers of "consumer" electrical cooperative). Contra McKernan v. Los Angeles Gas &
Elec. Co., 16 Cal. App. 280, 119 P. 677 (1911) (dictum that jurors' excusal not mandated
because they were customers of defendant utility company); Rowley v. Group Health
Coop., 16 Wash. App. 373, 556 P.2d 250 (1976) (no error for failure to excuse member of
health care cooperative).
14. 38 Cal. 3d at 148, 695 P.2d at 672, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
15. See, e.g., Rousseau v. West Coast House Movers, 256 Cal. App. 2d 878, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 655 (1967).
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abused by the court below. The trial court's comments demonstrated
reliance on its experience in similar situations to reach its decision in
this case. The court realized that individual questioning is overly
time-consuming and a substantial number of Kaiser members would
ultimately be subject to challenge.16 It was also reasonable for the
court to foresee possible prejudice to other jurors due to any exten-
sive questioning of Kaiser members.17 There was, therefore, no
abuse of the trial court's discretion in dismissing Kaiser members
from the jury panel.1s
The court recognized further that, even if excusal of the jurors
were considered erroneous, it was insufficient to warrant reversal.19
The general rule that an erroneous exclusion for cause does not re-
quire reversal of the judgment was applicable.2O As long as the jury
finally selected is composed of qualified and competent jurors, a
court may dismiss a juror on its own motion. Such a dismissal would
not warrant reversal because a defendant or party is not entitled to a
jury composed of particular jurors.21
The defendant's argument that Kaiser members constitute a "cog-
nizable class" which was systematically excluded was also rejected by
the court. The jury panel which ultimately decided the present ac-
tion was not unconstitutionally underrepresented,22 nor was it any
less a cross-section of the community with the Kaiser members' ab-
sence. 23 The jury selection process therefore provided no basis for
reversal of the judgment.24
16. 38 Cal. 3d at 148, 695 P.2d at 672, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
17. Id. The court noted that matters inadmissible at trial, such as the recounting
of specific potentially prejudicial incidents occurring between jurors and Kaiser or the
expression of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with Kaiser, might "taint" the entire voir
dire proceeding.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 149, 695 P.2d at 673, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
20. See Asevado v. Orr, 100 Cal. 293, 300-01, 34 P. 777, 779-80 (1893); Dragovich v.
Slosson, 110 Cal. App. 2d 370, 371, 242 P.2d 945, 946 (1952); McKernan, 16 Cal. App. at
283, 116 P. at 678-79.
21. See Dragovich, 110 Cal. App. 2d at 371, 242 P.2d at 946.
22. See, e.g., Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946) (exclusion of daily
wage earners resulted in a nonrepresentative jury panel); People v. Fields, 35 Cal. 3d
329, 673 P.2d 680, 197 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1983) (plurality opinion) (cognizable class requires
shared experiences, ideology, or background of its members); People v. White, 43 Cal.
2d 740, 278 P.2d 9 (1954) (use of organization and club rosters results in disproportion-
ate inclusion of business and professional people and an exclusion of ordinary working
people).
23. 38 Cal. 3d at 149, 695 P.2d at 673, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
24. Id,
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2. Erroneous Jury Instruction on Standard of Care of Nurse
Practitioner
The court agreed with the defendant's contention that the trial
court erroneously instructed the jury on the standard of care to be
exercised by a nurse practitioner. The trial judge told the jury that
when the nurse practitioner was examining a patient or making a di-
agnosis, the standard required was that of a physician or surgeon.2 5
This instruction was contrary to recent legislation which expressed
an intent to recognize the overlap between the functions of physi-
cians and nurses.26 The responsibility of diagnosing a patient is not
reserved exclusively to physicians. 27 Although the plaintiff was enti-
tled to have the jury determine whether or not the use of a nurse
practitioner in this situation was negligent, and whether the particu-
lar nurse exercised the appropriate standard of care, the court should
not have instructed that-as a matter of law-the nurse's conduct
was to be measured against the standard applied to a physician or
surgeon.28
Although the instruction was erroneous, it did not warrant rever-
sal. The court deemed it improbable that the error affected the ulti-
mate judgment.29 Since a doctor examined the plaintiff and rendered
the same diagnosis as previously given by the nurse, the jury could
not reasonably have determined the nurse to have been negligent
without also finding the doctor to have been negligent.3 0
3. Misinstructions on Causation
The defendant made several objections to instructions given on
causation. The first involved the court's instruction on concurrent
causation which the defendant felt was inappropriate because
Permanente was the only defendant. The court explained, however,
that the evidence suggested that the negligence of several non-de-
fendant Kaiser employees could have been a proximate cause of the
injury suffered by the plaintiff. The instruction was not required,
but no error was committed in giving it.31
25. Id. This instruction was given in addition to the general instruction on the
duty of care of a graduate nurse. See id, at 149 n.4, 695 P.2d at 673 n.4, 211 Cal. Rptr. at
376 n.4.
26. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2725 (West 1974) ("It is the legislative intent
also to recognize the existence of overlapping functions between physicians and regis-
tered nurses .... ").
27. 38 Cal. 3d at 150, 695 P.2d at 674, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
28. Id. See also Fraijo v. Hartland Hosp., 99 Cal. App. 3d 331, 340-44, 160 Cal. Rptr.
246, 251-53 (1979); Note, A Revolution in White-New Approaches in Treating Nurses
as Professionals, 30 VAND. L. REV. 839, 871-79 (1977).
29. 38 Cal. 3d at 151, 695 P.2d at 675, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 151-52, 695 P.2d at 675, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
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The defendant also objected to the court's instructions on proxi-
mate cause, which set forth the general rule that the defendant's con-
duct is no less a proximate cause of the injury because of the
unforeseeability of the extent of the injury.32 Such an instruction is
applicable regardless of the number of tortfeasors involved. The in-
struction, contended the defendant, could have been taken as impos-
ing strict liability. This argument, however, ignored the context in
which the instruction was given, especially when combined with the
other instructions regarding causation and liability.33 There was no
error committed in the reading of this instruction.
4. "Lost Years" Award
The defendant next alleged that the trial court erroneously al-
lowed the jury to compensate the plaintiff for lost earnings due to
the "lost years" 34 of the plaintiff's life expectancy. Although the is-
sue had not been previously decided in California, the United States
Supreme Court ruled on the lost years issue in Sea-Land Services v.
Gaudet.3 5 The general rule the Court enunciated was that a tort vic-
tim is allowed to recover the loss of prospective earnings for the bal-
ance of his life expectancy "'undiminished by any shortening of that
life expectancy as a result of the injury.' "36 This rule is consistent
with the rule in California permitting a plaintiff to recover future
earnings "'for as long a period of time in the future as he could have
done had he not sustained the accident.' "37
The availability of a set-off in any future wrongful death action
overcame the defendant's contention of a possible "double pay-
ment." 38 In Blackwell v. American Film Co.,3 9 the supreme court
held that the jury was properly told to consider amounts the dece-
32. Id. at 152, 695 P.2d at 675, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 378. See also Bigbee v. Pacific Tel.
& Tel. Co., 34 Cal. 3d 49, 665 P.2d 947, 197 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1983); 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY
OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 629, 2911-12 (8th ed. 1974).
33. 38 Cal. 3d at 152, 695 P.2d at 675, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
34. See generally Fleming, The Lost Years: A Problem in the Computation and
Distribution of Damages, 50 CAL. L. REV. 598 (1962).
35. 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
36. Id. at 594 (quoting 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTs § 24.6 (1956))
(emphasis in original).
37. 38 Cal. 3d at 153, 695 P.2d at 676, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 379 (quoting Robison v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 211 Cal. App. 2d 280, 288, 27 Cal. Rptr. 260, 264
(1962)) (emphasis added).
38. 38 Cal. 3d at 153, 695 P.2d at 676, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 379; see also 414 U.S. at 592-
94 & n.30.
39. 189 Cal. 689, 209 P. 999 (1922).
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dent previously received from the defendant for impairment of earn-
ing capacity.40 Thus, no "double" recovery would be had under this
scheme.
5. Periodic versus Lump Sum Payment of Damages
The defendant's request for periodic payment of future damages
was denied by the trial court because it deemed the governing stat-
ute, section 667.7 of the Civil Procedure Code, to be discretionary,
rather than mandatory.41 The defendant contended that the statute
was misinterpreted by the trial court. The court agreed that the trial
court erred in deeming the statute to be a discretionary provision.42
A literal reading of the statute combined with its legislative history
demonstrated that it was intended to impose a mandatory duty on
courts to order the periodic payment of damages in cases within the
scope of the section.43
For several reasons, however, the court concluded that the judg-
ment below should not be reversed on the basis of this error.44 First,
the trial court did order periodic payment of the damages designated
for future medical expenses, even though it rejected the defendant's
request for the periodic payment of all future damages. 45
Secondly, the defendant was in no position to complain since no
motion for periodic payment was made until after the jury returned
its special verdicts.46 Consequently, the plaintiff was denied the op-
portunity to seek a special verdict designating the amount of future
noneconomic damage, which was awarded in a lump sum by the jury.
40. Id. at 700-02, 209 P. at 1004.
41. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. The trial court also rejected the de-
fendant's constitutional challenges to the provision. The court here held that that pro-
vision was consistent with its holding in American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community
Hosp., 36 Cal. 3d 359, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984).
42. 38 Cal. 3d at 154, 695 P.2d at 677, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
43. Id. The court quoted the appropriate and relevant language of section 667.7 as
follows:
In any [medical malpractice action], a superior court shall, at the request of
either party, enter a judgment ordering that money damages or its equivalent
for future damages of the judgment creditor be paid in whole or in part by
periodic payments rather than by a lump-sum payment if the award equals or
exceeds fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) ....
38 Cal. 3d at 154-55, 695 P.2d at 677, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 380 (quoting CAL. CIv. PROC.
CODE § 667.7 (West 1980)) (emphasis in court's opinion).
The bill which eventually became section 667.7 originally stated that a trial court
"may" and upon the request of a party "shall" order periodic payment. The "shall"
was removed in the bill's first amendment, and, as finally adopted, "shall" was rein-
serted and "may" deleted, thus leaving the bill mandatory in nature. 38 Cal. 3d at 155
n.12, 695 P.2d at 678 n.12, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 381 n.12.
44. 38 Cal. 3d at 156, 695 P.2d at 678, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
45. Id. The defendant was to pay medical expenses as they were incurred. See
supra note 5 and text accompanying note 8.
46. 38 Cal. 3d at 156, 695 P.2d at 678, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
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The amount awarded was reduced to $250,000.00, in accordance with
section 3333.2 of the Civil Code, and that amount could reasonably be
deemed to reflect plaintiff's noneconomic damage at that time. In
the interests of justice, the lump sum award was affirmed.47
Finally, the court examined the portion of the lump sum award
designated for future lost earnings. Because the lost earnings here
were attributable to the plaintiff's lost years, any amounts paid peri-
odically over the period of time when the loss was expected to be in-
curred would be paid after the plaintiff's death.48 It was incumbent
on the defendant to present evidence from which the jury could ap-
portion the award between the amount necessary to support the
plaintiff and the amount which should go to his surviving depen-
dents, arguing additionally that the dependents' share was to be peri-
odically paid.49 Because the defendant failed to raise the issue in a
timely manner, no apportionment was made and the trial court cor-
rectly held that periodic payment was not required.
The court hereby addressed all of the defendant's contentions.
Although errors had occurred, none warranted reversal of the trial
court's decision. The, supreme court next turned to the plaintiff's
contentions.
B. The Plaintiffs Contentions
1. Alleged Unconstitutionality of Section 3333.2
The plaintiff first challenged the validity of section 3333.2 of the
Civil Code, under which the trial court reduced the noneconomic
damages award from $500,000.00 to $250,000.00.50 The plaintiff al-
leged that the MICRA provision violated both due process and equal
protection.
a. Due Process.
The plaintiff alleged the denial of due process because medical
47. Id.
48. Id. The court acknowledged that lost future earnings are generally well suited
to periodic payment. This case presents an unusual situation due to the lost years as-
pect of the award. Id.
49. Id. at 157, 695 P.2d at 679, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
50. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. The court noted that these same
constitutional challenges were rejected in its earlier decisions of Roa v. Lodi Medical
Group, 37 Cal. 3d 920, 695 P.2d 164, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1985); Barme v. Wood, 37 Cal. 3d
174, 684 P.2d 446, 207 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1984); and American Bank & Trust Co. v. Com-
munity Hosp., 36 Cal. 3d 359, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984).
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malpractice claimants' potential recovery is limited without an ade-
quate quid pro quo.5 1 This argument was rejected by the court in
American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital, based on the
legislature's broad power to modify the scope and nature of such
damages, and on the fact that a plaintiff has no vested property right
in a particular measure of damages.52 The constitutionality of a mea-
sure which affects economic rights does not depend on the court's as-
sessment of the measure's justification, i.e., the adequacy of the quid
pro quo, but rather depends on whether or not it is rationally related
to a legitimate state interest.53 As it did in previous cases involving
MICRA, the court determined that the statute satisfied this standard.
The legislature, in enacting MICRA, was responding to a perceived
medical malpractice insurance "crisis," where the cost of such insur-
ance was posing serious problems for health care providers in Cali-
fornia. MICRA was therefore enacted as a means of reducing rising
costs. 54 Section 3333.2, which places a cap of $250,000.00 on
noneconomic damages, is rationally related to the legislature's objec-
tive of reducing the costs of malpractice litigation for defendants and
their insurers. The legislature did not place a limit on a plaintiff's
right to recover all of the economic, pecuniary damages sustained.
Only noneconomic damages were effected and these were not elimi-
nated, only capped.55 No state or federal principle prevents the Cali-
fornia legislature from limiting the recovery of damages in order to
further a legitimate state interest. Hence, section 3333.2 does not vio-
late due process.56
51. 38 Cal. 3d at 157, 695 P.2d at 679, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
52. Id. (relying on American Bank, 36 Cal. 3d at 368-69, 683 P.2d at 675, 204 Cal.
Rptr. at 676). See also Werner v. Southern Cal. Assoc. Newspapers, 35 Cal. 2d 121, 129,
216 P.2d 825, 828 (1950); Feckensher v. Gamble, 12 Cal. 2d 482, 499-500, 85 P.2d 885, 893
(1938); Tulley v. Tranor, 53 Cal. 274, 280 (1878).
53. American Bank, 36 Cal. 3d at 368-69, 683 P.2d at 675, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 676. The
court recognized the difference between the MICRA provisions challenged in Ameri-
can Bank and in Fein. The periodic payment provision simply postpones a plaintiff's
recovery of damages whereas section 3333.2 sets a dollar limit on the amount of
noneconomic damages a plaintiff may receive. 38 Cal. 3d at 158, 695 P.2d at 679-80, 211
Cal. Rptr. at 382-83. This distinction, however, did not change the applicable standard
of review for due process challenges. Id.
54. 38 Cal. 3d at 158, 695 P.2d at 680, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 383. The court further
explained,
the Legislature retains broad control over the measure, as well as the timing,
of damages that a defendant is obligated to pay and a plaintiff is entitled to
receive, and ... the Legislature may expand or limit recoverable damages so
long as its action is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
Id (emphasis in original).
55. Id. The court noted the inherent difficulties in placing a dollar value on pain
and suffering. Such damages are, however, deeply imbedded in our legal system. Id. at
159 & n.16, 695 P.2d at 680-81 & n.16, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 383-84 & n.16.
56. Id. at 161, 695 P.2d at 682, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 385. Some courts have invalidated
statutory limitations on recoverable medical malpractice damages. See, e.g., Wright v.
Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976); Carson v. Maurer,
1222
[Vol. 12: 1141, 1985] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
b. Equal Protection.
The plaintiff alleged that section 3333.2 violated the equal protec-
tion clause because it discriminated between medical malpractice vic-
tims arid other tort victims and because it discriminated within the
class of medical malpractice victims, denying a "complete" recovery
to only those whose damages exceed the $250,000.00 limit.57 The
plaintiff's first contention was nonmeritorious because the statute
was held to bear a rational relation to the stated purpose of solving
the malpractice insurance problem. Furthermore, the legislature
limited the applicability of the statute to medical malpractice cases
specifically to curb the ill effects of that "crisis."5 8
The argument that equal protection was violated because of une-
qual treatment of members within the class of potential plaintiffs
was also refuted by the court. First, the legislature, as explained, had
reasonable grounds for making a distinction.59 Second, the legisla-
ture permissibly chose to obtain cost savings through the limit as op-
posed to abolishing noneconomic damages altogether.60 Finally, the
fact that other alternatives existed did not make the method which
the legislature chose-a dollar limit-any less reasonable. 61
Having found a sufficient rationale, the court made an additional
120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); Bap-
tist Hosp. v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). Contra Johnson v. St. Vincent
Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256
N.W.2d 657 (1977) (plurality opinion).
57. 38 Cal. 3d at 161-62, 695 P.2d at 682, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
58. Id. at 162, 695 P.2d at 683, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
59. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
60. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that a limit on damages is more in-
vidious, in terms of equal protection, than complete elimination of damages. The ra-
tionale behind the argument is that those who suffer greater injuries are most severely
affected by the limit. However, the same analysis would hold true of the abolition of
damages because it too would impose greater losses on plaintiffs with larger damages.
"Just as the complete elimination of a cause of action has never been viewed as invidi-
ously discriminating within the class of victims who have lost the right to sue, the
$250,000 limit-which applies to all malpractice victims-does not amount to an uncon-
stitutional discrimination." 38 Cal. 3d at 162, 695 P.2d at 683, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
61. This choice is one left to the legislature, and the court identified a number of
reasons supporting the choice made here. One reason was that the legislature could
reasonably have decided that an across-the-board limit would result in more easily pre-
dictable and calculable damage awards. Another was that the limit would promote set-
tlement. The final reason suggested was that the legislature preferred, and thought it
more fair, to reduce greater damage awards rather than smaller recoveries in the
greater number of cases. Id. at 163, 695 P.2d at 683, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
Amici contended the limit was unconstitutional because the legislature could have
used a fixed-percentage reduction of all noneconomic damage awards as opposed to the
cost savings hoped for with the imposition of the $250,000.00 limit. As explained in the
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observation in response to some of the comments made by the dis-
sent.62 The majority's application of the equal protection principles
developed in the series of cases construing the various MICRA provi-
sions63 was not inconsistent with the principles enunciated by the
court in Cooper v. Bray64 and Brown v. Merlo.65
Under Cooper, "a serious and genuine judicial inquiry" is to be
made into the relationship between the classification and the legisla-
tive goals propounded. 66 This was done here and in all the MICRA
cases, and the findings were that the statutory classifications are ra-
tionally related to the objectives of the legislature. It was not for the
court to adjudicate the wisdom or lack thereof in adopting the chal-
lenged provisions;6 7 "[t]he forum for the correction of ill-considered
legislation is a responsive legislature."68 Based on its conclusion that
section 3333.2 was constitutional, the court ruled that the trial court
made no error in reducing the noneconomic damage award in accord-
ance with the statute's terms.69
2. Alleged Unconstitutionality of Section 3333.1
The plaintiff's contentions as to the unconstitutionality of section
3333.1, which modifies the collateral source rule,70 were equally lack-
ing in merit as those discussed above, and for similar reasons. The
section allows the use of evidence of payments by collateral sources
but does not explain how the jury is to apply it. Presumably, the jury
would award lower damages with the knowledge of the plaintiff's net
benefits.71
Although the court addressed a constitutional challenge to section
text and in footnote 60, supra, the legislature's choice was reasonable and well
supported.
62. See infra notes 75-76, 78-79, 82, 89 and accompanying text.
63. Those cases are American Bank, Barme and Roa; see supra note 50.
64. 21 Cal. 3d 841, 582 P.2d 604, 148 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1978).
65. 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
66. 21 Cal. 3d at 848, 582 P.2d at 608, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 152 (quoting Newland v.
Board of Governors, 19 Cal. 3d 705, 711, 566 P.2d 254, 257, 139 Cal. Rptr. 620, 623
(1977)).
67. 38 Cal. 3d at 163, 695 P.2d at 684, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 387. See also id. at 160 n.17,
695 P.2d at 681 n.17, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 384 n.17.
68. Id. at 164, 695 P.2d at 684, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 387 (quoting Justice Traynor in
Werner, 35 Cal. 2d at 129, 216 P.2d at 828).
69. 38 Cal. 3d at 165, 695 P.2d at 684, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
70. Under the traditional collateral source rule, a jury, in calculating a plain-
tiff's damages in a tort action, does not take into consideration benefits-such
as medical insurance or disability payments-which the plaintiff has received
from sources other than the defendant-i.e., "collateral sources"-to cover
losses resulting from the injury.
38 Cal. 3d at 164, 695 P.2d at 684, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 387. See generally Schwartz, The
Collateral-Source Rule, 41 B.U.L. REV. 348 (1961).
71. 38 Cal. 3d at 164-65, 695 P.2d at 684-85, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 387-88. See also id. at
165 n.21, 695 P.2d at 685 n.21, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 388 n.21.
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3333.1 in Barme v. Wood, that case was not controlling here.7 2 With
respect to the plaintiff's due process contention, the same principles
discussed with regard to section 3333.2 were applicable. A plaintiff
has no vested right in a particular measure of damages. Thus, the
fact that a statutory provision results in a reduction in damages does
not render it violative of the due process clause. The only condition
necessary for validity is that the section rationally relate to a legiti-
mate state interest.73 Because it is likely that section 3333.1 will pro-
duce lower malpractice awards, it is rationally related to the
objectives of MICRA and therefore not violative of due process.74
The plaintiff's equal protection challenge to section 3333.1 was also
without merit. As with all the challenged MICRA provisions, it was
appropriate for the legislature to restrict the application of section
3333.1 to medical malpractice cases because the act was intended to
be a solution to the malpractice crisis.75 There was no error by the
trial court in applying section 3333.1.
III. THE DISSENTING OPINIONS
Chief Justice Bird's dissenting opinion strongly criticized the ma-
jority's decision to uphold the MICRA provisions challenged here.
The dissent contended that the provisions afford relief to negligent
health care providers and their insurers, and arbitrarily removes pro-
tections for injured patients.7 6 The majority was further criticized
for departing from established principles of constitutional analysis
which require the court to invalidate irrational and invidious
classifications.77
The dissent noted that MICRA was adopted in response to the
72. In Barne, the action was brought by a collateral source whose subrogation
rights had been eliminated by the section. Here the plaintiff brought suit because his
rights as a malpractice victim were at issue. Id at 166, 695 P.2d at 685, 211 Cal. Rptr. at
388.
73. Id. at 167, 695 P.2d at 686, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
74. Rationale to support the reasonable relationship are: the reduction of insur-
ance costs would serve the public interest by preserving the availability of medical care
and by assuring insurance coverage; modification of the rule prevents "double recov-
ery" for plaintiffs, see, e.g., Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 1,
465 P.2d 61, 84 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1970); and many jurisdictions have already gone so far as
to repeal the rule altogether, see, e.g., id. at 6-7 & nn.4-6, 465 P.2d at 63-64 & nn.4-6, 84
Cal. Rptr. at 175.76 & nn.4-6; 38 Cal. 3d at 167 n.22, 695 P.2d at 686 n.22, 211 Cal. Rptr.
at 389 n.22.
75. 38 Cal. 3d at 167, 695 P.2d at 686, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
76. Id. at 168, 695 P.2d at 687, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 390 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
77. Id, See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text for the majority's view.
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medical malpractice insurance crisis,78 but that the crisis is fading
into the past. Courts are now taking a closer look at such provisions,
and the number of courts which have invalidated them has doubled
since MICRA was enacted.79 The majority declined, however, to fol-
low this growing trend and chose instead to give deferential treat-
ment to the legislature's solution to the crisis. In the Chief Justice's
opinion, this deference served only to "perpetuate a fundamentally
unjust stautory scheme."80
A. The Issue
This case presented the first MICRA challenge involving a provi-
sion which directly prohibits plaintiffs from receiving complete com-
pensation. Unlike the other challenged provisions, the limit on
noneconomic damages does not affect only windfalls, protect plaintiff
awards, or discourage nonmeritorious suits.8 1 "The statute plainly
and simply denies severely injured malpractice victims compensation
for negligently inflicted harm."8 2
This case also presented the rare situation where the weight of au-
thority supported the constitutional challenge. A substantial major-
ity of state courts have invalidated the same or similar provisions in
their own statutory schemes.8 3 None of these like provisions were
78. In May, 1975, the governor convened the state legislature in extraordinary ses-
sion to consider remedies to the rising cost of malpractice insurance and the inability
of doctors to obtain such insurance, which threatened the stability of the health care
industry in California. MICRA was enacted in response to this crisis.
In broad outline, the act (1) attempted to reduce the incidence and severity of
medical malpractice injuries by strengthening governmental oversight of the
education, licensing and discipline of physicians and health care providers, (2)
sought to curtail unwarranted insurance premium increases by authorizing al-
ternative insurance coverage programs and by establishing new procedures to
review substantial rate increases, and (3) attempted to reduce the costs and
increase the efficiency of medical malpractice litigation by revising a number
of legal rules applicable to such litigation.
American Bank, 36 Cal. 3d at 363-64, 683 P.2d at 674, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 673.
79. See id. at 370 n.10, 683 P.2d at 679 n.10, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 678 n.10.
80. 38 Cal. 3d at 169, 695 P.2d at 688, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 391 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
The problems identified by the Chief Justice were characterized as the "human conse-
quences" of the MICRA provisions. These include the American Bank decision up-
holding section 666.7, the periodic payment provision, for which the court mandated
additional special procedures to offset the worst effects of the section. See American
Bank, 36 Cal. 3d at 377 n.14, 683 P.2d at 684 n.14, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 683 n.14. The section
was held inapplicable to the case at bar. Id. at 378, 683 P.2d at 684, 204 Cal. Rptr. at
683. Here the majority approved the trial court's refusal to apply the rule to all but a
small portion of the plaintiff's judgment. The dissent viewed this ad hoc application of
the rule as a less desirable result than complete invalidation of the provision followed
by legislative revision. 38 Cal. 3d at 169, 695 P.2d at 688, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
81. 38 Cal. 3d at 169-70, 695 P.2d at 688, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
82. Id. at 170, 695 P.2d at 688, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 391. But see also supra note 61 for
a discussion of the possible rationale the legislature could have relied on in enacting
the provision.
83. See, e.g., Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736
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substantially more severe or more oppressive than the provisions
challenged here.8 4 The majority cited only to Johnson v. St. Vincent
HospitalS5 as a decision upholding a limit on damages. That decision
rested, however, on the finding of a strong public interest which was
absent in this case. There is no requirement imposed on physicians
or insurers to reduce insurance costs due to savings purportedly re-
sulting from the MICRA provisions.86
B. The Proper Analysis
The court was urged to apply the strictest level of scrutiny in its
equal protection analysis. The dissent found, however, that the limit
on damages did not survive even the minimal level of scrutiny requir-
ing "serious and genuine judicial inquiry into the correspondence be-
tween the classification and the legislative goals."87
MICRA's goal of preserving medical malpractice insurance so
plaintiffs could collect something was deemed legitimate. Moreover,
the legislature could have reasonably decided that protecting medical
practitioners and their insurers would effectuate that goal.s8 But,
each statutory classification must be rational, nonarbitrary and bear a
(1976); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980); Arneson v. Olson, 270
N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); Baptist Hosp. v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
In Carson, the New Hampshire court invalidated a damage limit identical to the
limit at issue in this case. The majority cited this case as the single exception to its
conclusion, distinguishing the other state court decisions holding such provisions un-
constitutional. See 38 Cal. 3d at 161 & n.19, 695 P.2d at 682 & n.19, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 385
& n.19. See also supra note 56.
84. 38 Cal. 3d at 170, 695 P.2d at 688, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 391 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
The dissent goes further to note that simply because noneconomic damages are limited
and economic damages are not, the burden on victims is no less.
For a child who has been paralyzed from the neck down, the only compensa-
tion for a lifetime without play comes from noneconomic damages. Similarly,
a person who has been hideously disfigured receives only noneconomic dam-
ages to ameliorate the resulting humiliation and embarrassment.
Pain and suffering are afflictions shared by all human beings, regardless of
economic status. For poor plaintiffs, noneconomic damages can provide the
principal source of compensation for reduced lifespan or loss of physicial ca-
pacity. Unlike the attorney in the present case, these plaintiffs may be unable
to prove substantial loss of future earnings or other economic damages.
Id. at 171, 695 P.2d at 689, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
85. 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980). See also 38 Cal. 3d at 172 n.3, 695 P.2d at
689-90 n.3, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 392-93 n.3.
86. 38 Cal. 3d at 172, 695 P.2d at 690, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
87. See Cooper, 21 Cal. 3d at 848, 582 P.2d at 608, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 152 (quoting
Newland, 19 Cal. 3d at 711, 566 P.2d at 257, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 623). See also supra notes
66-68 and accompanying text for the majority's application of the Cooper test.
88. 38 Cal. 3d at 172-73, 695 P.2d at 690, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
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substantial relation to the legislative objective.8 9
The statute here placed the greatest costs on the most seriously in-
jured victims. This is not at all reasonably or logically related to the
goal of protecting physicians and their insurers. Thus, the statute
was a fundamentally arbitrary classification which was not justifiable
considering the stated purpose of MICRA.90 The rationale used by
the majority to support its finding of constitutionality were so broad
and speculative that they could support any enactment.
A two-tier system of analysis was adopted by the court in Ameri-
can Bank. The test which resulted requires that the statute serve
some conceivable legislative purpose and that each classification bear
a fair and substantial relationship to a legitimate purpose.91 If ap-
plied here, the $250,000.00 limit would have to be invalidated. There
was no rational relationship between singling out severely injured
malpractice victims and the reduction of insurance costs to physi-
cians. The damage limit of section 3333.2 therefore fails, in the dis-
sent's analysis, to survive any meaningful level of judicial scrutiny.92
Section 3333.1 was also, in the dissent's opinion, not rationally re-
lated to any legitimate state purpose and thus unconstitutional.
Moreover, the effect of the collateral source rule, prior to section
3333.1's enactment, was to prevent tortfeasors and insurers from ben-
efitting from collateral source funds received by the plaintiff.93 The
validity of the elimination of the rule required a rational relationship
between the classification and a legitimate state interest.
Two purposes were put forward by advocates of section 3333.1 and
both were rejected by the dissent. The first was the prevention of a
double recovery by the plaintiff. There was no reason, however, why
a section adopted for that purpose should be limited to medical mal-
89. Id. at 173, 695 P.2d at 690, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 393 (relying on Brown v. Merlo, 8
Cal. 3d at 861, 506 P.2d at 222, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 392).
90. An example was given to demonstrate the arbitrariness of the classification: a
person who suffers severe injuries late in life may recover up to $250,000.00 for the
resulting loss while an infant who suffers identical injuries must depend on the same
amount of recovery for what is probably a longer lifetime.
The dissent provides alternatives which the legislature could have implemented to
reach the same goal. These include special relief to physicians and insurers without
imposing such heavy burdens on arbitrarily selected victims; spreading the cost to con-
sumers and taxpayers generally; or reducing all noneconomic damages by a pro rata
amount. 38 Cal. 3d at 173, 695 P.2d at 691, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
The suggested rationale given by the majority, see supra note 61, were criticized be-
cause they ignored the nature of the classification, that is a classification among tort
victims. Id. at 174, 695 P.2d at 691, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
91. Id. See also Brown, 8 Cal. 3d at 861, 506 P.2d at 222, 706 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
92. 38 Cal. 3d at 175, 695 P.2d at 692, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 395. The statute is also un-
derinclusive. Id.
93. Id. at 175-76, 695 P.2d at 692, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 395. See also supra notes 69-70
and accompanying text.
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practice victims. 94 The second purported purpose was to reduce the
cost of insurance. The relationship between section 3333.1 and that
goal is purely speculative. There was no requirement that insurers
reduce their rates; they could keep any windfalls. Furthermore, the
section was only a rule of evidence which did not mandate that a jury
offset collateral source funds.95 Thus, the provision was arbitrary
and allowed negligent physicians and their insurers to reap the bene-
fits of the plaintiff's collateral source funds.96
Justice Mosk, in his separate dissenting opinion,9 7 agreed with
Chief Justice Bird's conclusions but would have employed an inter-
mediate level of scrutiny due to the impracticality of either the strict
scrutiny or rational relationship test in this situation. This middle
level test, cited with approval in many jurisdictions,98 was used by
the New Hampshire court in Carson v. Maurer,99 where provisions
similar to those of MICRA were successfully challenged. The test re-
quires a fair and substantial relationship between the legislation and
the purpose of the legislation.10 0 In the case of malpractice provi-
sions, a balancing between the measure's benefits to the general pub-
lic and the restriction of the private right involved is required.101
Applying this test, Justice Mosk would invalidate both sections.
B. Limitation of plaintiffs attorney's fees in medical
malpractice actions upheld: Roa v. Lodi Medical Group.
I. INTRODUCTION
Roa v. Lodi Medical Group' involved a challenge to the Medical In-
94. 38 Cal. 3d at 176, 695 P.2d at 693, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 396. See also Helfend, 2 Cal.
2d at 12, 465 P.2d at 68, 84 Cal. Rptr." at 180 (tort victims not fully compensated by
judgments alone because attorney's fees and costs account for a substantial portion of
the recovery amount).
95. 38 Cal. 3d at 177, 695 P.2d at 693, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
96. Id. For other state cases in accord, see Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424
A.2d 825 (1980); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978). Contra Eastin v.
Bloomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977); Pinillos v. Cedars of Lebanon Hosp.
Corp., 403 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1981); Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, 293
N.W.2d 550 (Iowa 1980).
97. 38 Cal. 3d at 178, 695 P.2d at 694, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 397 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
98. See Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 595-603, 586 P.2d 916, 932-38, 150
Cal. Rptr. 435, 442-47 (1978) (Mosk, J. concurring).
99. 120 N.H. at 932-33, 424 A.2d at 831.
100. Id.
101. Id. The provision in Carson was struck down as imposing too great a cost on
the general public and on individual malpractice plaintiffs. Id. at 940-41, 424 A.2d at
837.
1. 37 Cal. 3d 920, 695 P.2d 164, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1985). Opinion by Kaus, J., with
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jury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA). Though not the
first challenge the court had heard regarding MICRA,2 this challenge
was the first to address significantly Business and Professions Code
section 6146 which limits the plaintiff's attorney's fees in an action
for medical malpractice to forty percent of the first $50,000.00, thirty-
three and one-third percent of the next $50,000.00, twenty-five per-
cent of the next $100,000.00 recovered, and ten percent of any recov-
ery over $200,000.00.3
II. FACTS
The plaintiffs negotiated a $500,000.00 settlement with the defend-
ants for injuries caused by negligent treatment of the plaintiffs' child
during birth. The amount was approved by the court as required
under the Probate Code. 4 The maximum fee the plaintiffs' attorneys
could be awarded under section 6146 was $90,800.00, however, the ar-
rangement between the plaintiffs and their attorneys was for the
plaintiffs' attorneys to receive twenty-five percent of the settle-
ment-about $122,800.00.5 The plaintiffs' attorneys asked the trial
court to award the higher amount, arguing that section 6146 was un-
constitutional. While the trial court stated that $122,800.00 was a
"fair and reasonable amount for attorney's fees" in this case, the con-
stitutional challenge to section 6146 was rejected, and the $90,800.00
fee was approved.6
III. MAJORITY OPINION
The plaintiffs, and amici curiae on their behalf, contended that sec-
tion 6146 was unconstitutional on due process, equal protection, and
separation of powers grounds. The court, in evaluating the due pro-
cess and equal protection challenges, applied the rational basis test.
The due process argument was that section 6146 impermissibly in-
fringed on the rights of victims of medical malpractice to retain coun-
sel. The court, however, interpreted section 6146 as merely a
limitation on compensation and not an infringement on the right to
Broussard, Grodin, and Lucas, JJ., concurring. Separate dissenting opinion by Bird,
C.J., with Mosk and McCloskey, JJ., concurring. McCloskey, J., sitting under assign-
ment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
2. In 1984, the court decided Barme v. Wood, 37 Cal. 3d 174, 689 P.2d 446, 207 Cal.
Rptr. 816 (1984) (MICRA provision which bars a "collateral source" from obtaining re-
imbursement from a medical malpractice defendant upheld); and American Bank &
Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 36 Cal. 3d 359, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984)
(MICRA provision which requires the periodic payment of damages over $50,000.00 in
medical malpractice actions upheld).
3. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West Supp. 1985).
4. CAL. PROBATE CODE § 3500 (West 1981).
5. 37 Cal. 3d at 924, 695 P.2d at 164-65, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 78-79.
6. Id. at 924-25, 695 P.2d at 166, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
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counsel. Moreover, the court noted that statutory limits on attor-
ney's fees are neither uncommon nor impermissible on the state and
federal levels.7 Therefore, "legislative ceilings on attorney fees are in
no respect 'constitutionally suspect' or subject to 'strict' judicial
scrutiny."8
The "sliding scale" fee schedule was also challenged by the plain-
tiffs as creating a conflict of interest between attorney and client.
Under this schedule, the plaintiffs argued, an attorney would be
more likely to settle a big claim than go to trial because only ten per-
cent of any amount over two hundred thousand dollars could be stat-
utorily awarded to the attorney. The court determined that the
legislature could rationally have determined that the sliding scale
would promote fairness and therefore rejected the challenge. The
court cited reports from the American Bar Association, and the
United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare which
recommended such a scale and which could reasonably have been
considered by the legislature.9 Applying the rational basis test, the
court upheld section 6146 on the due process challenge.
The plaintiffs also contended that the legislature acted arbitrarily
in imposing section 6146's attorney fee limits only in medical mal-
practice actions. However, the court found that "the Legislature
could reasonably have determined that the provision would serve to
reduce malpractice insurance costs"'10 and therefore the provision
bore a rational relation to the purposes of MICRA.
The plaintiffs also contended that because section 6146 limits plain-
tiffs attorney's fees to a percentage of the plaintiff's judgment, no ef-
fect on malpractice premiums will result as a jury may not properly
consider attorney fees in assessing damages." Had the legislature
7. The court analogized the section 6146 regulation of fees to workers' compensa-
tion, probate, and federal tort claims fee regulation as well as similar statutes enacted
in New York, New Jersey, Indiana, Nebraska and Delaware. I& at 926-27, 695 P.2d at
166-67, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 79-80.
8. Id. at 927, 695 P.2d at 167, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 80 (footnote omitted). The court
also stated that the amount of fees permitted under section 6146 did not render the
statute unconstitutional on its face, thus rejecting the plaintiff's argument that section
6146 so severely limits attorney fees that injured persons would find it impossible to
obtain competent representation. Id at 928, 695 P.2d at 168, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
9. Id. at 929, 695 P.2d at 169, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 82 (citing Report of Committee on
Medical Professional Liability, 102 ABA Annual Report 786, 851 (1977); Department of
HEW, Report of Secretary's Committee on Medical Malpractice 34-35 (1973); Kohlman,
An Equitable Contingency Fee Contract, 50 STATE BAR. J., 268, 295-98 n.42 (1975)).
10. 37 Cal. 3d at 930-31, 695 P.2d at 170, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
11. Id. at 930, 695 P.2d at 170, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 83 (citing Krouse v. Graham, 19
Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977)).
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wanted to reduce malpractice premiums, it should have placed limits
on defense attorney's fees instead. The court, in applying the ra-
tional basis test, held that limits on plaintiffs' attorney's recoveries
will reduce the cost of malpractice insurance by encouraging settle-
ment, thus saving trial costs and preparation. Money will be saved
because "a plaintiff will be more likely to agree to a lower settlement
since he will obtain the same net recovery from the lower settle-
ment."' 2 Moreover, frivolous suits and unrealistically high demands
for settlement will be discouraged.i3 Alternative arguments that sec-
tion 6146 unreasonably limits plaintiffs' attorney's fees and not de-
fense attorney's fees, and that more seriously injured plaintiffs are
limited while less seriously injured plaintiffs are not, were also found
to be without merit when viewed under the rational basis test.
Finally, the plaintiffs' separation of powers argument was quickly
disposed of. The area of imposing limits on attorney fees is not ex-
clusive to the judicial branch, and therefore the legislature has power
to act in this setting.14 As a result, the majority affirmed the order of
the lower court and rejected the plaintiff's challenges.
IV. DISSENTING OPINION
Chief Justice Bird, in her dissent, pursued a tack which the major-
ity left to a footnote' 5-whether section 6146 infringed upon the
plaintiff's right to petition the government for redress of grievances.
This right, which is protected by the first and fourteenth amend-
ments to the United States Constitution and article I, section 3 of the
California Constitution, may be restricted "only where necessary to
serve a compelling governmental interest."16 The dissent analogized
the limits on the expenditure of money for attorney fees to limits im-
posed on political campaigns,17 and because
meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protection
12. 37 Cal. 3d at 931, 695 P.2d at 170, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
13. Id.
14. See Brydonjack v. State Bar, 208 Cal. 439, 281 P. 1018 (1929); Estate of Good-
rich, 6 Cal. App. 730, 93 P. 121 (1907).
15. See 37 Cal. 3d at 927 n.5, 695 P.2d at 167 n.5, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 80 n.5.
16. Id. at 937, 695 P.2d at 175, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 88 (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis
omitted). The majority said of this claim, "[a]lthough the argument is creative, its logic
clearly proves too much, for it would preclude a state from imposing any limitation on
attorney fees, no matter how unconscionably high such fees might be, a position even
amicus does not embrace." 37 Cal. 3d at 927 n.5, 695 P.2d at 167 n.5, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 80
n.5 (emphasis in original).
17. 37 Cal. 3d at 937-38, 695 P.2d at 175, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 88 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
The majority, however, cited Government Code section 86205(f) which prohibits lobby-
ists from accepting any employment on a contingency basis as analogous and equally as
persuasive. 37 Cal. 3d at 927 n.5, 695 P.2d at 168 n.5, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 81 n.5. The dis-
sent quoted extensively from National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Walters, 589 F.
Supp. 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1984), probable jurisdiction noted, 105 S. Ct. 588 (1984), stay
granted, 105 S. Ct. 11, request to vacate stay denied, 105 S. Ct. 238 (1984). In Walters, a
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of the First Amendment... [i]t is evident that the First Amendment protects
individuals' rights to obtain the adequate legal representation necessary to en-
sure their rights of petition, access to the courts, and association, just as it pro-
tects organizations' rights to such representation. 1 8
No compelling governmental interest was found by the dissent to jus-
tify section 6146 against this first amendment challenge.19
The dissent also addressed the due process and equal protection is-
sues. Chief Justice Bird stated that "section 6146 does significantly
interfere with the right of certain victims of medical malpractice to
retain counsel . . .[and] it exacerbates the conflict of interest be-
tween plaintiffs and their attorneys inherent in the contingent fee ar-
rangement." 20 The fee restrictions in other areas of the law and in
other states noted by the majority were distinguished and the dissent
concluded that section 6146 "does not bear a reasonable relationship
to the legislative purposes of protecting plaintiffs' recoveries and low-
ering malpractice premiums. '2 1 Therefore, section 6146 failed the
dissent's application of the rational basis test and should be struck
down on due process grounds.
The dissent found that plaintiffs' arguments that heightened scru-
tiny should be used in the an equal protection analysis due to a classi-
fication based on wealth had merit, but since the statute could not
withstand any level of judicial scrutiny, such an argument need not
be considered to find section 6146 unconstitutional.22 The statute was
"grossly underinclusive" and there was "no rational basis to single
out medical malpractice contingent fees for special treatment. '2 3 The
dissent concluded that section 6146 works a grave injustice and
should be declared unconstitutional.
federal district court issued a preliminary injuction barring enforcement of a fee con-
straint applied in death and disability cases brought by veterans.
18. 37 Cal. 3d at 938-39, 695 P.2d at 176, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 89 (Bird, C.J., dissenting)
(emphasis omitted).
19. Id. at 942, 695 P.2d at 178, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 91. The dissent also argued that
section 6146 violated the constitutional bar against content discrimination. Id.
20. Id. (emphasis in original).
21. Id. at 948, 695 P.2d at 183, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 96 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 949, 695 P.2d at 183, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 96 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 950-51, 695 P.2d at 184-85, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 97-98 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
Many alternatives are presented by the dissent, among them the restriction of defend-
ants' attorney's fees.
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C. A minor with a medical malpractice claim has three
years from the date of the wrongful act within which to
bring an action, regardless of when the minor reaches
the age of majority or when the injury is discovered:
Steketee v. Lintz, Williams & Rothberg.
In Steketee v. Lintz, Williams & Rothberg, 38 Cal. 3d 46, 694 P.2d
1153, 210 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1985), the supreme court was asked to deter-
mine whether a minor victim of medical malpractice is subject to the
three year statute of limitations set out in section 340.5 of the Civil
Procedure Code, regardless of when he reaches the age of majority.
The question arose in a legal malpractice action brought by the plain-
tiff. It was alleged that the defendants, who were previously retained
as counsel for the plaintiff's medical malpractice claim, had failed to
file the action within the statute of limitations period. The trial court
held that the plaintiff was subject to the separate statute of limita-
tions for minors, because at the time of the wrongful act the plaintiff
was a minor. Under this limitation period, the defendants were not
guilty of malpractice.
The plaintiff contended on appeal that upon his reaching eighteen
years of age, the adult statute of limitations, which provided for a
three year limit from the date of the injury, or a one year limit from
the date of discovery of the malpractice, applied to him. The defend-
ants contended that the statute of limitations applicable to minors
was appropriate. Under that theory, three years from the date of the
wrongful act, rather than from the date of the injury, fell several
months after the attorney-client relationship had been terminated.
Thus, the defendants were under no duty to file an action because
they did not represent the plaintiff when the statutory period ran
out.
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in
favor of the defendants. The decision was based on the rule of statu-
tory construction requiring that a word or phrase be given the same
meaning wherever it appears in the entire enactment. Thus, the
phrase "actions by a minor" as used in section 340.5 refers to the
plaintiff's age at the time of the alleged wrongful act, not, as the
plaintiff had contended, his age at the time the action is filed.
Further rationale was offered in support of this construction. First,
bizarre and arbitrary results would occur if the statute of limitations
were to suddenly switch at the time a malpractice victim reaches ma-
jority age. Second, it was the intent of the legislature to curtail mal-
practice litigation costs, but not limit the right of an injured minor to
bring suit by imposing additional restrictions intended for adults. Fi-
nally, public policy protects minors against loss of their rights caused
by the running of statutes of limitations.
1234
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In conclusion, the literal meaning of section 340.5, its statutory con-
struction, and public policy all favor the trial court's interpretation of
the provision. A minor negligently injured by a health care provider
must be afforded a three year period within which to file a malprac-
tice action, regardless of when the minor reaches majority or when
the injury is discovered.
Here, the statute of limitations did not run until September, 1979.
The attorney-client relationship between the defendants and the
plaintiff expired in January, 1979. Therefore the defendants were
not liable for failing to file an action because they did not represent
the plaintiff throughout the entire statutory period, but were re-
placed by other counsel before the statute of limitations had expired.
XIV. PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
Court preliminarily enjoins county assistance program
which requires single, employable welfare recipients to
reside in a poorhouse: Robbins v. Superior Court.
In Robbins v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 3d 199, 695 P.2d 695, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 398 (1985), the supreme court preliminarily enjoined the
County of Sacramento from administering a program which required
single, employable welfare recipients to live in a county facility
rather than receive the usual cash benefits. Twenty residents of the
county attacked the validity of the ordinance, and its take-it-or-leave-
it offer of "in-kind benefits." The residents at the county's Bannon
Street facility were forced to sleep in open dormitory style rooms,
use communal bathrooms, and be in the facility after the daily nine
o'clock bedcheck. The plaintiffs, unsuccessful in the lower court, re-
quested a writ of mandamus compelling the court below to grant a
preliminary injunction against operating the "poorhouse."
The court had to determine whether the lower court abused its dis-
cretion in not granting the injunction. Initially, the court questioned
whether the petitioners were "likely to suffer greater injury from a
denial of the injunction than the defendants [were] likely to suffer
from its grant." The court noted that while only two percent of the
county-assisted citizens would be affected by the injunction, the
plaintiffs were forced to surrender fundamental rights of privacy.
This tipped the scales in the petitioners' favor.
Having decided the first prong of the test, the court next deter-
mined whether the petitioners had a reasonable likelihood of prevail-
ing on the merits. The court emphasized that the state legislature
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intended county assistance programs to promote self-respect and self-
reliance. The court found the regimented county facility in direct
conflict with this purpose, since the individuals were forced to give
up fundamental privacy rights.
In addition, the petitioners contended that their constitutional
right to privacy had been violated. The court noted that the right to
privacy--one's right to be left alone-extends to choosing whom to
live with. Here, the defendants denied the residents their personal
privacy, while refusing to seek reasonable adequate alternatives to
the poorhouse resident requirement. The court concluded that the
petitioners were likely to be successful on the merits of their privacy
claim. The writ of mandamus ordering the preliminary injunction
was therefore granted.
XV. PUBLIC UTILITIES
Amendment of Public Utilities Code rendered utility's
challenge to participation costs moot: Southern
California Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Commission.
The supreme court in Southern California Gas Co. v. Public Utili-
ties Commission, 38 Cal. 3d 64, 695 P.2d 186, 211 Cal. Rptr. 99 (1985),
held moot the question whether intervenors in commission proceed-
ings were entitled to "public participation costs." It had been argued
by the utilities that these fees, which included the cost of attorneys
and expert witnesses, were beyond the power of the Public Utilities
Commission after the decision of Consumers Lobby Against Monopo-
lies v. Public Utilities Commission, 25 Cal. 3d 891, 603 P.2d 41, 160
Cal. Rptr. 124 (1979).
However, the court determined that a recent amendment to the
Public Utilities Code rendered the issue moot. See CAL. PUB. UTIL.
CODE §§ 1801-1808 (West Supp. 1985). These new sections allow the
commission to award reasonable participation costs to consumer
groups who are involved in commission decisions. Id. § 1801. In ref-
erence to the retroactivity of the new sections, the court held that it
was the legislature's intent to validate existing commission rules that
had awarded such costs. The court held that even in the absence of
such legislative intent, the retroactivity question was academic, since
no awards by the commission had been granted before the January 1,
1985, date of effectiveness. Hence, the court determined the utilities'
challenge to the commission's award of participation costs to be moot.
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XVI. RENT CONTROL
Municipal rent control ordinance survives challenges
under the Sherman Antitrust Act and the due process
clause: Fisher v. City of Berkeley.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Fisher v. City of Berkeley,' the court upheld the City of Berke-
ley's rent control ordinance under antitrust and constitutional at-
tacks. 2 The plaintiffs, a group of landlords from Berkeley,
challenged the legality of the ordinance under the Sherman Anti-
trust Act,3 arguing it unreasonably restrained interstate commerce 4
and amounted to monopolization of the rental field.5 The supreme
court dismissed the landlords' antitrust attacks, holding that the
Berkeley ordinance serves a proper local purpose that is rationally
related to a legitimate exercise of the police power.6 The plaintiffs'
inability to allege any reasonable adequate alternatives to such an or-
dinance was a decisive factor in the court's decision to uphold the or-
dinance against antitrust attacks.7
The landlords also challeged the validity of the rent control ordi-
nance on due process grounds. The court, in upholding the ordinance
in the face of federal and state constitutional due process attacks, em-
phasized that a landlord is only entitled to a fair return on his invest-
ment, not a fair return on the value of his property.8 However, the
court did hold a "severable" portion 9 of the ordinance invalid, which
1. 37 Cal. 3d 644, 693 P.2d 261, 209 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1984). Justice Mosk delivered
the majority opinion in which Justices Reynoso, Grodin, Cooperman, and Mills con-
curred. Chief Justice Bird filed a separate concurring opinion, and Justice Lucas a dis-
senting opinion. Justices Cooperman and Mills were sitting under assignment by the
Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
2. Id. at 709, 693 P.2d at 312, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
3. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982). The Act is primarily intended to prevent the prac-
tice of anticompetitive activities by private business. 37 Cal. 3d at 656, 693 P.2d at 272,
209 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
4. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982), which holds all unreasonable
restraints on interstate commerce through contracts, combinations or conspiracies to
be illegal.
5. See id. § 2, which provides that monopolization or any attempt to monopolize
interstate commerce is illegal.
6. 37 Cal. 3d at 652, 693 P.2d at 269, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
7. Id. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
8. 37 Cal. 3d at 652, 693 P.2d at 269, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 690. See U.S. CONST. amend
V. See also infra notes 60-77 and accompanying text.
9. By "severable," the court means the invalid portion of the ordinance is ex-
tractable, leaving the valid remainder of the ordinance in effect. 37 Cal. 3d at 652, 693
P.2d at 269, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
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provided for an evidentiary presumption concerning the burden of
proof in retaliatory evictions.10
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The plaintiffs, a group of landlords from the City of Berkeley, filed
this action in the Alameda County Superior Court seeking injunctive
and declaratory relief against the enforcement of the Berkeley rent
control ordinance." In June of 1980, the City of Berkeley had passed
by initiative the "Rent Stabilization and Eviction for Good Cause Or-
dinance,"'12 which applied to some 23,000 rental units. The ordi-
nance's purpose was to prohibit unwarranted rent increases and
retaliatory evictions.1 3
The ordinance required landlords to register with a Board of Com-
missioners 14 and to follow base rent ceilings,' 5 while allowing the
Board to adjust rents according to a landlord's expenses.16 In order
to evict a tenant, a landlord would have to show certain types of
"good cause."'17 Furthermore, there was a presumption that an evic-
tion was retaliatory if it occurred within six months of a tenants' as-
sertion of his rights under the ordinance.' 8
While the case was on appeal, the United States Supreme Court de-
10. 1I See infra notes 89-101 and accompanying text.
11. 37 Cal. 3d at 653, 693 P.2d at 270, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 691. This original challenge
to the ordinance was based only on due process grounds.
12. See Berkeley, Cal., Rent Stabilization and Eviction for Good Cause Ordinance
(June 1980).
13. Id § 3. The purpose of the rent control ordinance was:
to regulate residential rent increases in the City of Berkeley and to protect
tenants from unwarranted rent increases and arbitrary, discriminatory, or re-
taliatory evictions, in order to help maintain the diversity of the Berkeley
community and to ensure compliance with legal obligations relating to the
rental of housing. This legislation is designed to address the City of Berke-
ley's housing crisis, preserve the public peace, health and safety, and advance
the housing policies of this City with regard to low and fixed income persons,
minorities, students, handicapped, and the aged.
37 Cal. 3d at 652, 693 P.2d at 269-70, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 690-91 (quoting Berkeley, Cal.,
Rent Stabilization and Eviction for Good Cause Ordinance, § 3 (June 1980)).
14. Berkeley, Cal., Rent Stabilization and Eviction for Good Cause Ordinance,
§§ 6, 8 (June 1980).
15. Id. § 10. The base rent ceiling was the rental charged as of May 31, 1980. If
there was no rental arrangement in effect at that time, an estimate was made from
comparable units in the city. 37 Cal. 3d at 653 n.1, 693 P.2d at 270 n.1., 209 Cal. Rptr. at
691 n.1.
16. Berkeley, Cal., Rent Stabilization and Eviction for Good Cause Ordinance, § 11
(June 1980).. Where a landlord is not satisfied by this adjustment, he may ask for an
individual increase based upon his increased utilities, taxes, and other expenses. Id.
§ 12.
17. Id. § 13.
18. Id. § 14. This section of the ordinance was the only one held invalid by the
court. 37 Cal. 3d at 698, 693 P.2d at 304, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 725. See infra notes 89-101
and accompanying text.
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cided in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder19 that a
municipality can be in violation of federal antitrust law. Since this
new development could have affected the outcome of the decision,
the court allowed amici curiae to introduce the antitrust issue on
appeal.20
III. ANTITRUST
A. Federal Antitrust Law and Municipal Action
The court initially discussed whether the Sherman Antitrust Act2 '
was applicable to a municipality. Relying on Parker v. Brown,22 the
court held that a state in its sovereign capacity was free to legislate
anticompetitive laws, while escaping the scrutiny of federal antitrust
law.23 However, this exemption, based on state sovereignty, has, as a
result of the Supreme Court's decision in Community Communica-
tions Co. v. City of Boulder,24 been held applicable to municipalities
only in very limited circumstances. That is, where the municipal or-
dinance is premised on the action of the state itself, or where it is in
accordance with recognized state policy. 25 The Parker exception is
based on state sovereignty, 26 but the antitrust laws are formulated to
protect against more than private business abuses.27 The court held
that it was unnecessary to determine the applicability of the Boulder
exception,28 however, until a conflict between the Sherman Antitrust
Act and the ordinance was found.29
19. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
20. 37 Cal. 3d at 654, 693 P.2d at 270-71, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 691-92. The parties and
amici curiae were granted leave to file supplemental briefs on the antitrust issue. Id.
21. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
22. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
23. The Court in Parker stated, "We find nothing in the language of the Sherman
Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its of-
ficers or agents from activities directed by its legislature." Id. at 350-51. See also Bates
v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
24. 455 U.S. 40 (1982) (municipal regulation of cable television susceptible to anti-
trust attack).
25. Id. at 52.
26. Id. at 50-51.
27. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978),
which held that municipally owned utilities are subject to the Sherman Act.
28. A city ordinance "cannot be exempt from antitrust scrutiny unless it consti-
tutes the action of the State ... in its sovereign capacity, or unless it constitutes mu-
nicipal action in furtherance or implementation of clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed state policy." Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S.
at 52 (citation omitted).
29. 37 Cal. 3d at 660, 693 P.2d at 275, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 696. Because the plaintiffs
failed to prove any conflict with the Sherman Antitrust Act, the court did not address
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B. Ordinance's Validity Under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act
The plaintiffs' initial contention was that Berkeley's rent control
ordinance unreasonably restrained trade in violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Antitrust Act.30 This section provides: "Every contract,
combination .. .or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States . .. is declared to be illegal ... ,"31 The
court enumerated the following three factors which must be proven
to find a section 1 violation: "(a) that two or more 'persons' acted in
concert, (b) that the activities complained of affect interstate com-
merce, and (c) that the action constitutes an unreasonable restraint
on commerce."32 In placing particular emphasis on whether there
was an unreasonable restraint of trade, the court considered three
standards: the rule of per se illegality, the rule of reason, and a modi-
fied rational relation standard.
1. The Rule of Per Se Illegality
The rule of per se illegality is defined as an irrebuttable presump-
tion that conduct is illegal where it involves the concerted action of
price fixing, regardless of economic benefits to consumers. 33 Hence,
any concerted stabilization, lowering, or raising of prices is automati-
cally deemed illegal. 34 However, two principal justifications must be
present before the rule of per se illegality can be applied. These jus-
tifications include economic reliability and ease of administration. 35
The court first addressed the economic reliability justification,
which holds that price fixing usually has anticompetitive effects and
rarely produces positive effects of a "redeeming virtue." 36 The court
stressed the fear of "predatory" activities, which may be absent in the
original scheme, but which may later appear and utilize the price fix-
the exemption of Boulder. Id. at 662-63, 693 P.2d at 277, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 697-98. See
Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 662 n.9 (1982).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). The court in dictum dismissed the defendant's contention
that a city ordinance to further the health, safety, and welfare of the public is exempt
from antitrust scrutiny. 37 Cal. 3d at 661, 693 P.2d at 276, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 696-97.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
32. 37 Cal. 3d at 662, 693 P.2d at 276, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 697. The court only dealt
with the unreasonable restraint of trade question.
33. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). The early
application of this rule centered on the prohibition of cartels. See United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
34. Socony, 310 U.S. at 223. The court in Fisher stated, "The per se rule reflects an
irrebuttable presumption that, if the court were to subject the conduct in question to a
full-blown inquiry, a violation would be found under the traditional rule of reason." 37
Cal. 3d at 666, 693 P.2d at 280, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (citation omitted).
35. 37 Cal. 3d at 667, 693 P.2d at 280-81, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 701-02.
36. Id. at 668, 693 P.2d at 281, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 702. See also Monsanto Co. v.
Spray-Rite Service Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984).
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ing power to set unreasonable prices. 37 The court, recognizing that a
municipality is to serve the public welfare, held that neither price
fixing's anticompetitive nature nor the apprehension of predatory ac-
tivity called for application of the economic reliability justification in
this situation.38
The ease of judicial administration is another justification for the
rule of per se illegality. The argument under the per se rule is that
any inquiry into the validity of price fixing "would necessitate, con-
stant detailed supervision and analysis by the government to assure
that reasonable prices remain reasonable as economic conditions
vary."3 9 The court also found this justification absent in the Berke-
ley ordinance. The reasons advanced by the court centered on the or-
dinance's own administrative safeguards, which included: the Board's
duty to review rents; a landlord's guarantee of a "fair return" on his
investment; procedures for administrative readjustment of rents; and
the administrative costs being paid by the City.40 Hence, since the
justifications of economic reliability and ease of judicial administra-
tion were absent, the court refused to apply the rule of per se
illegality.
2. The Rule of Reason
If a restraint on trade is not illegal per se, it should be scrutinized
to determine its effects on the market.41 Under the rule of reason, a
restraint will be valid if determined to be reasonable; that is, the re-
straint only regulates and facilitates competition rather than having
an anticompetitive effect.42 The question is whether the restraint fa-
cilitates or suppresses competition. 43 The court, in contrasting the
competitiveness of private business and the police power aspect of a
37. 37 Cal. 3d at 668-69, 693 P.2d at 281, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 702-03. The court stated
that, "[t]he court's fear of facilitating such 'predatory' activity is grounded on assump-
tions about how unrestrained business competitors will act if given the opportunity."
Id.
38. Id. at 669, 693 P.2d at 281-82, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 702-03. See also United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries
Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927).
39. 37 Cal. 3d at 670, 693 P.2d at 282, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 703.
40. Id. The court stated, "In our view, maximum rents price fixing, implemented
by local government, is simply not of the same character as price fixing among private
business defendants." Id. at 670, 693 P.2d at 283, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 704 (footnote
omitted).
41. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
42. 37 Cal. 3d at 665, 693 P.2d at 279, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
43. National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691
(1978) (rule of reason directly related to effect on market competitiveness).
1241
municipality, held that the judiciary must create and recognize a
"public welfare 'defense'" to antitrust attacks against municipal reg-
ulation.44 Hence, the rule of reason was held inapplicable as well.
3. The Modified Rational Relation Standard
The court's decision not to apply either the rule of per se illegality
or the rule of reason to Berkeley's ordinance led it to create a modi-
fied standard by which to judge alleged municipal violations of fed-
eral antitrust law.45 The court, in borrowing from the United States
Supreme Court's commerce clause analysis,46 stated:
[W]e conclude that if a municipal regulation has a proper local purpose, is ra-
tionally related to the municipality's legitimate exercise of its police power,
and operates in an even handed manner, it must be upheld against a claim
that it conflicts with section 1 of the Sherman Act unless the plaintiff demon-
strates that the city's purposes could be achieved as effectively by means that
would have a less instrusive impact on federal antitrust policies.
4 7
In applying this standard to the Berkeley ordinance, the court first
held that it served a legitimate purpose of serving the health, safety
and welfare of the community. 48
Furthermore, the court affirmed that rent control is rationally re-
lated to a valid exercise of the police power.49 In determining
whether the ordinance was even-handed, the court had to deal with
an exception in the ordinance concerning rental properties of four or
less units where one of the units was occupied by the landlord5o The
challenge here was primarily based on the exception's applicability
only to landlords who were in this position before December 31,
44. 37 Cal. 3d at 673, 693 P.2d at 284-85, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 705. The court stated:
"To prevent unwarranted interference with a municipal government's legitimate exer-
cise of its police power, and to accommodate the motives that underlie local govern-
ment regulation, courts must develop tests that recognize a public welfare 'defense' to
alleged violation of the antitrust laws by municipalities." Id. (citation omitted).
45. Id. at 674, 693 P.2d at 285-86, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 706-07.
46. The Supreme Court has held that state or local regulation will hold up against
commerce clause attack if: it does not discriminate against interstate commerce; it
bears a rational relation to legitimate state ends; and no reasonably adequate alterna-
tives are available. Then a balancing test is applied to determine if the local benefits
outweigh the burdens on interstate commerce. Id. at 674, 693 P.2d at 286, 209 Cal.
Rptr. at 707. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); Minnesota v. Clover
Leaf Creamery Co.,' 449 U.S. 456 (1981); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970);
and Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). The court chose not to
include the "standardless" cost benefit analysis in its test. 37 Cal. 3d at 675, 693 P.2d at
286, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
47. 37 Cal. 3d at 675, 693 P.2d at 286-87, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 707-08 (footnotes
omitted).
48. Id. at 676, 693 P.2d at 287, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 708. See Birkenfeld v. City of
Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 160, 550 P.2d 1001, 1023, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465, 487 (1976).
49. See Birkenfeld, 17 Cal. 3d at 153-64, 550 P.2d at 1018-27, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 482-91
(rent control rational exercise of police power).
50. Berkeley, Cal., Rent Stabilization and Eviction for Good Cause Ordinance,
§ 5(f) (June 1980).
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1979.51 However, the court held that this disparate treatment bore a
rational relationship to the purpose of the ordinance. 52 Finally, the
court determined that no less intrusive alternatives to the rent con-
trol ordinance had been advanced by the plaintiffs.53
C. Ordinance's Validity Under Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act
The plaintiffs had also contended that the City was in violation of
section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, which prohibits monopoliza-
tion.54 The court reviewed factors which constitute private monopoli-
zation, including: the possession of monopoly power-the "power to
control prices or exclude competition;"5 5 and the purposeful acquisi-
tion of monopoly power.56 The court again refused to apply essen-
tially private business tests, and applied its commerce-based, rational
relation test.5 7 Going through exactly the same analysis as under sec-
tion 1,58 the court found that no violation of section 2 had occurred.59
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY
A. Ordinance's Fair Return Standard
One of the main challenges to the rent control ordinance was
whether it was unconstitutional to guarantee a landlord a fair return
only on his investment, instead of a return on the value of his prop-
erty.60 Since the court recognized that a state is not bound by any
particular formula in administering rent control,6' it found the sole
51. 37 Cal. 3d at 677, 693 P.2d at 287-88, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
52. Id. at 677, 693 P.2d at 288, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 708. See Clover Leaf Creamery, 449
U.S. at 464.
53. 37 Cal. 3d at 677, 693 P.2d at 288, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
54. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). This section provides: "Every
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among
the several States ... shall be deemed guilty of a felony ...." Id.
55. 37 Cal. 3d at 678, 693 P.2d at 288, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 709 (quoting United States v.
du Pont Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956)). See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384
U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
56. 37 Cal. 3d at 678, 693 P.2d at 288, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 709. See, e.g., United States
v. du Pont Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
57. 37 Cal. 3d at 678, 693 P.2d at 288, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 709. The court said it would
"not mechanically apply to municipal defendants rules of law fashioned exclusively in
the context of private business regulation." Id.
58. See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
59. 37 Cal. 3d at 678, 693 P.2d at 289, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 710.
60. Id. at 679, 693 P.2d at 289, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 710.
61. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575 (1942);
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question to be whether this "fair return on investment" standard
would allow the City to avoid confiscatory results.6 2
The plaintiffs' major challenge to this standard was that it limits
landlords to the profit they earned several years ago63 while inflation
continually devalues their return.64 The court tended to agree with
the plaintiffs' contention, recognizing that the risk to such businesses
in inflationary periods calls for more than the maintenance of a sta-
tus quo profit.65 Furthermore, any type of "freeze" concerning prof-
its inevitably leads to prohibitive, confiscatory results.66 The court,
reserving judgment on this matter until a real claim was made, stated
that the ordinance possessed anti-inflationary provisions to guard
against confiscatory results.67
The court then summarily disposed of the plaintiffs' contention
that the return on investment standard violates equal protection, as
there would be different rent ceilings for essentiallly similar rental
units. It held that the standard was rationally related to the legiti-
mate public end of providing stabilized rents in times of inflation.68
Furthermore, the plaintiffs challenged the ordinance's determina-
tion of "investment."69 They argued that inequitable results would
occur as between landlords who had invested capital in the rental
units, and those who had only put in time and labor. 70 The court
quickly dismissed this attack, holding that the Board could consider a
landlord's time and labor in improving his property, as well as subse-
quent monetary investments like mortgage payments.7 1 The ordi-
nance itself provides for individual rent adjustment to ensure a fair
Carson Mobilehome Park Owner's Ass'n v. City of Carson, 35 Cal. 3d 184, 672 P.2d
1297, 197 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1983).
62. 37 Cal. 3d at 679, 693 P.2d at 290, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 710. See also Cotati Alliance
for Better Housing v. City of Cotati, 148 Cal. App. 3d 280, 287, 195 Cal. Rptr. 825, 829
(1983) (regulation is invalid on its face if it causes confiscatory results).
63. See Berkeley, Cal., Rent Stabilization and Eviction for Good Cause Ordinance,
§ 10 (June 1980). Section 10 fixes profits at those earned as of May, 1980.
64. 37 Cal. 3d at 682, 693 P.2d at 291-92, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 712-13.
65. Id. at 683, 693 P.2d at 292, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 713. The court held: "we must
agree with plaintiffs that investment in rental units contemplates a higher risk and
hence, in times of high inflation. . . demands more than mere maintenance of an ex-
isting profit amount." Id.
66. Id. See, e.g., Cotati Alliance, 148 Cal. App. 3d at 293, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 834 (in-
flationary diminution in value is confiscatory).
67. 37 Cal. 3d at 684, 693 P.2d at 293, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
68. Id See Cotati Alliance, 148 Cal. App. 3d at 292, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
69. "Investment" in this context means any outlay of assets to secure some return
through revenue.
70. 37 Cal. 3d at 685, 693 P.2d at 294, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 714-15.
71. Id. The court stated, "[t]hose who purchased with no down payment, improved
property years ago with 'preinflation dollars,' or who obtained property through gift or
inheritance, need not be deprived of a fair return simply because they made no initial
monetary investment." Id.
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return on investment.
7 2
Finally, the plaintiffs argued that the fair return on investment
standard was unconstitutional under the due process clause, because
it prevented landlords from realizing the full long-term appreciation
of their property. 73 The court, in dismissing this challenge, held re-
straint on appreciation to be a necessary evil of any rent control
law.7 4 A mere diminution in the property's value does not render a
regulation unconstitutional. 75 The court's ultimate conclusion was
that a rent control ordinance need not guarantee a fair return on the
value of the property to be valid.7 6 Thus, the court held the fair in-
vestment standard to be constitutional, and capable of avoiding con-
fiscatory results.77
B. Ordinance's Rent Adjustment Procedures
The court next considered whether the ordinance's rent adjust-
ment procedures satisfy the requirements of due process. The court
first recognized that some rent adjustment procedure is required to
ensure landlords a fair return on their investment.78 Furthermore,
any inordinate delays-"those . . . longer than practically necessary
to achieve the legitimate purposes of the legislation" 7 9-in the adjust-
ment procedure--can also defeat the validity of the ordinance.8 0 The
court held that Berkeley's ordinance avoids the inequities of a unit by
unit approach,S1 as citywide increases and comprehensive adjustment
72. See Berkeley, Cal., Rent Stabilization and Eviction for Good Cause Ordinance,
§ 12(i) (June 1980).
73. 37 Cal. 3d at 685, 693 P.2d at 294, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
74. Id. See Cotati Alliance, 148 Cal. App. 3d at 290, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 832, which
held, "[s]ome lessening of appreciation is a necessary consequence of any rent control,
since future appreciation is to a significant extent a function of increased rental in-
come." Id. (citation omitted).
75. 37 Cal. 3d at 686, 693 P.2d at 294, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 715. See, e.g., Agins v. City
of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), affd, 447 U.S. 255
(1980) (total diminution in property value required before a fifth amendment taking is
found).
76. 37 Cal. 3d at 686, 693 P.2d at 295, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 687, 693 P.2d at 295, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 716. See Birkenfeld, 17 Cal. 3d at
169, 550 P.2d at 1030, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 494 (continued delay in adjustment procedure is
confiscatory).
79. Carson, 35 Cal. 3d at 192, 672 P.2d at 1301, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
80. 37 Cal. 3d at 687, 693 P.2d at 295, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 716. See Carson, 35 Cal. 3d
at 192, 672 P.2d at 1301, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 288; Birkenfeld, 17 Cal. 3d at 169, 550 P.2d at
1030, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 464.
81. See Birkenfeld, 17 Cal. 3d at 170-72, 550 P.2d at 1030-32, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 494-96
(previous Berkeley ordinance held invalid because of excessive procedural delays).
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procedures eliminate any undue delays.8 2
C. Unreasonable Restraint on Alienation
The plaintiffs also argued that certain "antispeculation" clauses8 3
of the ordinance unreasonably restrained alienation of rental prop-
erty in violation of California Civil Code section 711.84 These clauses
are intended to prevent speculation on mortgages acquired after the
ordinance is put into effect.8 5 The court summarily dismissed this
contention, holding that the "fair return on investment clause"86 pro-
hibits any unreasonable restraint on alienation.87 Furthermore, the
court held that section 711 does not apply to governmental regulation
in any event.88
D. The Retaliatory Eviction Presumption
The Berkeley rent control ordinance provides,8 9 as does case law,90
that retaliatory eviction is a defense to eviction. However, the ordi-
nance creates a presumption that an eviction is retaliatory if a tenant
has exercised his rights under the ordinance in the last six months.9 1
The plaintiffs contended that such a presumption affecting the bur-
den of proof was preempted by state law.92
82. 37 Cal. 3d at 687-88, 693 P.2d at 296-97, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 717-18. Procedures
which decrease the possibility of delay include: the ability to consolidate landlord's pe-
titions from the same building, Berkeley, Cal., Rent Stabilization and Eviction for
Good Cause Ordinance, § 12(b)(9) (June 1980); procedure to appoint additional hearing
officers, id. § 12(b)(1)(11); and a time limit of 120 days on landlord petitions, id.
§ 12(b)(12).
83. See Berkeley, Cal., Rent Stabilization and Eviction for Good Cause Ordinance,
§ 12(d), (e) (June 1980). These subsections deny a landlord rent increases as a result of
the sale or refinancing of rental units, after adoption of the ordinance, where it is fore-
seeable that the existing rental ceiling would not have covered the expense. Id.
84. Civil Code section 711 provides: "[c]onditions restraining alienation, when re-
pugnant to the interests created, are void." CAL. CIV. CODE § 711 (West 1982).
85. See Berkeley, Cal., Rent Stabilization and Eviction for Good Cause Ordinance,
§ 12(d), (e) (June 1980).
86. Id. § 12(i). This provision overrides all others by stating: "[n]o provision of
this Ordinance shall be applied so as to prohibit the Board from granting an individual
rent adjustment that is demonstrated necessary by the landlord to provide the land-
lord with a fair return on investment." Id.
87. 37 Cal. 3d at 692, 693 P.2d at 299-300, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
88. Id. at 692-93, 693 P.2d at 300, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
89. See Berkeley, Cal., Rent Stabilization and Eviction for Good Cause Ordinance,
§ 14 (June 1980).
90. See Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 476 P.2d 97, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729
(1970) (landlord retaliation against tenant a defense to eviction).
91. Berkeley, Cal., Rent Stabilization and Eviction for Good Cause Ordinance, § 14
(June 1980). It provides: "evidence of the assertion or exercise by the tenant of rights
under this Ordinance within six months prior to the alleged act of retaliation shall cre-
ate a presumption that the landlord's act was retaliatory."
92. 37 Cal. 3d at 694, 693 P.2d at 301, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 721-22. The plaintiffs con-
tended that the section would be preempted by Evidence Code section 500.
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The court initially had to determine if the retaliatory eviction pre-
sumption affected the burden of producing evidence or the burden of
proof. The burden of producing evidence is merely a party's obliga-
tion to prove a prima facie case,93 while the burden of proof refers to
a sufficient amount of evidence to influence the trier of fact concern-
ing an issue of the party's case.94 Hence, if the court found an effect
on the burden of proof, the landlord would be unfairly saddled with
the burden of persuasion. The court, citing the recent amendment of
the presumption section, held it created a presumption concerning
the burden of proof.95
Finally, the court was faced with the question of whether such a
presumption, affecting the burden of proof, should be preempted by
the state's Evidence Code.96 The City referred to Evidence Code sec-
tion 500,97 which provides: "Except as otherwise provided by law, a
party has the burden of proof as to each fact the existence or nonex-
istence of which is essential to the claim for relief or defense that he
is asserting."98 Therefore, the City defended the ordinance's pre-
sumption, arguing that the phrase "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by
law" granted them legislative license to change the burden of proof.99
The City also referred to Evidence Code section 160,100 which defines
"law" to include "constitutional, statutory, and decisional law." The
court, however, refused to accept the argument that the legislature
intended a municipal ordinance to be within the exception of section
500, and declared the retaliatory eviction presumption invalid.101
93. 37 Cal. 3d at 694, 693 P.2d at 301, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 722.
94. Id. at 695, 693 P.2d at 301, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 722.
95. Id. at 696, 693 P.2d at 302, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 723. The amendment changed the
definition of "presumption." Initially, the ordinance stated that the "Court must find
the existence of the fact presumed unless and until evidence is introduced which
would support a finding of its nonexistence." Berkeley, Cal., Rent Stabilization and
Eviction for Good Cause Ordinance, § 14 (June 1980). It was amended to hold that,
"'[p]resumption' means that the Court must find the existence of the fact presumed
unless and until its nonexistence is proven by the preponderance of the evidence." Id.
(as amended in 1982).
96. 37 Cal. 3d at 697, 693 P.2d at 303, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 724. See Birkenfeld 17 Cal.
3d at 152, 550 P.2d at 1018, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 482. See also CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7.
97. CAL. EVID. CODE § 500 (West 1966).
98. Id-
99. 37 Cal. 3d at 697, 693 P.2d at 303, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
100. CAL. EVID. CODE § 160 (West 1966).
101. 37 Cal. 3d at 698, 693 P.2d at 304, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 725. The court, in citing
several cases holding ordinances to be preempted by the state evidence code, stated:
"we cannot believe that the Legislature, when it enacted Evidence Code sections 500
and 160 in 1965, ever intended municipal ordinances to come within the exception
clause of Evidence Code section 500." Id.
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E. Ordinance's Rent-Withholding Provisions
The Berkeley ordinance provides for a rent-withholding remedy
when the landlord has failed to register with the Board or if he is
charging rents above those provided in the ordinance.0 2 The land-
lord plaintiffs challenged the validity of these sections, claiming that
they were preempted by applicable state law and were in violation of
due process.10 3
1. Due Process
Initially, the plaintiffs contended that these rent-withholding rem-
edies were not reasonably related to the ordinance's purpose, as the
remedy was applicable in two different situations: when the landlord
failed to register and when he charged rent above that provided in
the ordinance. 0 4 The court, however, in relying on the inexpensive-
ness of this remedy and the registration fee's primary funding of the
Board's activities, 0 5 held that the rent-withholding section was rea-
sonably related to the legitimate purpose of the rent control
ordinance.106
The court next considered the plaintiffs' challenge that these pro-
visions were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. I0 7 To overcome
a vagueness attack, the court stated that the section must give fair
notice of the prohibited conduct and allow for adequate enforcement
standards. 0 8 The requirement of fair notice is met when a law's
terms are of a "reasonable degree of certainty so that an ordinary
landlord can understand what conduct is proscribed on his part, and
under what conditions his rent-withholding tenant will be afforded a
defense to an unlawful detainer action."109 The court summarily dis-
missed the plaintiffs' arguments that the provisions in the act were
unclear,110 and held fair notice was given.
The plaintiffs also contended that the standards for enforcement
were violative of due process, as the tenant can arbitrarily enforce
102. See Berkeley, Cal., Rent Stabilization and Eviction for Good Cause Ordinance,
§ 15(a)(1)-(2). Subsection (1) permits a tenant to withhold rent with the Board's per-
mission, while subsection (2) allows the tenant to withhold rent without any permis-
sion if he has a good faith belief that the landlord has violated the ordinance. Id
103. 37 Cal. 3d at 700, 693 P.2d at 305, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
104. Id,
105. MdL at 700-01, 693 P.2d at 305-06, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 726-27. The court stated: "all
other enforcement remedies . . . except for subdivision (a), subsection (2) [rent with-
holding provision], suffer the same serious weakness: to invoke them can cost substan-
tial amounts of money, either to the tenant or to the Board." Id. at 700, 693 P.2d at
305, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
106. Id at 702, 693 P.2d at 306, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
107. Id See Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
108. 37 Cal. 3d at 702-03, 693 P.2d at 306-07, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 727-28.
109. Id at 702, 693 P.2d at 306, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
110. Id
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the rent-withholding provisions, as long as they claim they possess a
good faith belief a violation has occurred.ll However, the court held
it was a question for the trial court to determine if the tenant had a
good faith belief, and hence a defense to a landlord's eviction suit.112
Finally, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' challenge that the ordi-
nance denies them due process by confiscating rents without any
safeguards.11 3 The landlord was said to always have the power to re-
cover in unlawful detainer and sue for his back rent lost if withhold-
ing was not in good faith.114
2. Preemption by State Law
The plaintiffs next contended that the rent-withholding provisions
of the Berkeley ordinance either directly or impliedly conflict with
state law and therefore are preempted.115 They referred to state pro-
visions which: provide for the payment of rent;11 6 describe when a
tenant is guilty of unlawful detainer;11 7 and allow a repair and deduct
remedy.11s
Since none of these sections deal with rent-withholding, the court
held that they did not directly preempt Berkeley's rent-withholding
provision." 9 Hence, the court still had to decide whether the provi-
sion was preempted by implication.120 The court used the Hubbard
test, which holds there is an intent to preempt an area only if:
(1) the subject matter has been so fully and completely covered by general
law as to clearly indicate that it has become exclusively a matter of state con-
cern; (2) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law couched
in such terms as to indicate clearly that a paramount state concern will not
tolerate further or additional local action; or (3) the subject matter has been
111. Id. at 703, 693 P.2d at 307, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 728. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S.
566 (1974) (personal belief of tenant is not dispositive).
112. 37 Cal. 3d at 703, 693 P.2d at 307, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 704, 693 P.2d at 308, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 728-29. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.
115. See CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7. Every city has the authority to "make and en-
force within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations
not in conflict with general laws." Id
116. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1947 (West 1954).
117. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161 (West 1982).
118. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942 (West Supp. 1985).
119. 37 Cal. 3d at 707, 693 P.2d at 310, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 731. See Birkenfeld, 17 Cal.
3d at 149, 550 P.2d at 1016, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 480 ("statutory remedies for recovery of
possession and of unpaid rent do not preclude a defense based on municipal rent con-
trol legislation.") (citations omitted).
120. 37 Cal. 3d at 707, 693 P.2d at 310, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 731. The court stressed that
it would hesitate to "preempt a field covered by municipal regulation when there is a
significant local interest to be served that may differ from one locality to another." Id.
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partially covered by general law, and the subject is of such a nature that the
adverse effect of a local ordinance on the transient citizens of the state out-
weighs the possible benefit to the municipality.1 2
1
The court, in applying these tests, held: there was no full state cover-
age of the field; that rent-withholding can tolerate local action; and
the ordinance would rarely affect transient citizens. 122 Therefore,
the court found no direct conflict nor conflict by implication necessi-
tating preemption.
V. SEPARATE OPINIONS
Chief Justice Bird, agreeing with the majority's analysis, concurred
to voice her disapproval of the court's hearing the antitrust issue.
She emphasized the fact that amici curiae had raised this issue on ap-
peal, while the plaintiffs neglected to mention the recent develop-
ment of Boulder 23 in their petition to the supreme court. She
reiterated that an appellate court should not consider matters not
raised by the appealing parties.124
Justice Lucas filed a dissenting opinion to argue that the Berkeley
ordinance's price fixing is in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act
and therefore preempted by the supremacy clause. 125 He pointed to
the rule of per se illegality as applied to price-fixing in the private
sector.128  He contended that the justifications for the per se rule-
anticompetitive effects and no overriding virtues-were present in
the Berkeley ordinances.127 Finally, he found fault in the majority's
rational relation test by suggesting reasonable alternatives to rent
control, including: rent subsidies; public housing; and municipally ac-
quired property by purchase or condemnation. 128
VI. CONCLUSION
The court articulated a new test to determine a municipality's sus-
ceptibility to federal antitrust law. The challenged municipal regula-
tion will be upheld if it serves a proper local purpose, is rationally
121. In re Hubbard, 62 Cal. 2d 119, 128, 396 P.2d 809, 815, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393, 399
(1965).
122. 37 Cal. 3d at 709-10, 693 P.2d at 311, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
123. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
124. 37 Cal. 3d at 710-11, 693 P.2d at 312-13, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 733-34 (Bird, C.J., con-
curring). See also Younger v. State, 137 Cal. App. 3d 806, 187 Cal. Rptr. 310 (1982) (ad-
ditional propositions presented by amici curiae not considered).
125. 37 Cal. 3d at 713-14, 693 P.2d at 315, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 735-36 (Lucas, J., dissent-
ing). See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1982). See also U.S. CONST. Art. VI,
§ 2.
126. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
127. 37 Cal. 3d at 715-18, 693 P.2d at 315-17, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 736-38 (Lucas, J., dis-
senting). See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
128. 37 Cal. 3d at 718, 693 P.2d at 318, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 739.
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related to a valid exercise of the municipality's police power, and op-
erates in an even handed way. However, if a plaintiff can present
reasonable alternative means to achieve the regulation's purpose, the
ordinance may be held invalid.
The court also held that due process does not necessitate a fair re-
turn on the value of a landlord's property, rather it only guarantees a
fair return on his investment. Rent-withholding procedures were
held to not be violative of due process, nor preempted by state law.
However, the ordinance's provision relating to a presumption of re-
taliatory eviction was held invalid.
XVII. TAXATION
A. Sales tax imposed by redevelopment agency held to be
valid. Huntington Park Redevelopment Agency v. Martin.
A writ of mandate compelling the Secretary of the Huntington
Park Redevelopment Agency to publish a sales tax ordinance was
granted in Huntington Park Redevelopment Agency v. Martin, 38
Cal. 3d 100, 695 P.2d 220, 211 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1985). The action arose
when Martin, the agency's Secretary, refused to publish an ordinance
enabling the agency to impose sales and use taxes. Redevelopment
agencies, which serve to eliminate "blighted" areas, are able to levy a
use or sales tax of one percent or less. The agency may only levy the
tax if the city in which it operates applies a credit against the city's
sales taxes, allowing the taxpayer's burden to remain the same. See
CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE §§ 7202.5-.6 (West Supp. 1985). When the
City of Huntington Park agreed to such an arrangement, the Hunt-
ington Park Redevelopment Agency adopted a sales tax ordinance,
which Martin subsequently refused to publish.
Martin challenged the ordinance's validity under the California
Constitution. Initially, he cited section four of article XIII A of the
constitution to argue that the tax was a "special tax" requiring a two-
thirds approval by the electorate. The court recognized that this sec-
tion only applies to "Cities, Counties and special districts." Since the
agency was neither a city nor a county, it would have to be a special
district for the section to apply. The court held that the agency's in-
ability to levy property taxes was sufficient to establish that it was
not a special district. Such agencies receive their revenue from other
taxing agencies. Therefore, the ordinance survived this constitutional
attack.
The ordinance was also challenged under a California constitu-
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tional provision which limits a governmental agency's expenditures
to that expended in the prior year. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII B, § 1.
Since the agency admittedly had no proper appropriations limit, Mar-
tin contended the new ordinance's revenues from the taxes would be
in violation of article XIII B. However, the court applied section 3(a)
of article XIII B which allows a governmental transferee to apply the
appropriation limit of its transferor. The court determined that the
City of Huntington Park, which held the responsibility to eliminate
urban blight, validly transferred this duty to the agency, thereby sat-
isfying section 3(a). Therefore, the writ of mandamus was granted
requiring Martin to publish the ordinance.
B. The "valuation rollback" provision of Proposition 13
does not apply to unit taxation of a public utility: ITT
World Communications v. City and County of San Francisco.
In ITT World Communications v. City and County of San Fran-
cisco, 37 Cal. 3d 859, 693 P.2d 811, 210 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1985), the
supreme court held that article XIII A, section 2(a) of the California
Constitution (Proposition 13) does not apply to unit taxation of public
utility property. One of the primary objectives of unit taxation is to
ascertain and reach with the taxing power the entire real value of all
public utility property. Because the value of public utility property
depends upon the "interrelation and operation" of the entire utility,
unit taxation allows for fair valuation, preventing real but intangible
value from escaping assessment. The plaintiff argued that Proposi-
tion 13's one percent ceiling on ad valorem taxes on real property, as-
sessed on the property's 1975-1976 value, is applicable to unit taxation
of public utility property.
In rejecting the argument, the court ruled that unit taxation is not
taxation of real property, personal property, or even a combination of
both. Construing unit taxation as real or personal property taxation
and therefore subject to valuation rollback ignored the fact that unit
taxation is a taxation of property as a going concern. To find public
utility property eligible for rollback would violate this proposition as
well as statutory rules of construction.
Moreover, public utility property is state-assessed, while article
XIII A applies only to locally-assessed property. Although the court
indicated that the plain meaning of the statute justifies this conclu-
sion, the court tested this interpretation against various extrinsic
aids. Of particular significance was the Legislative Analyst's lack of
reference to state-assessed property in the context of a valuation
rollback. Also, the State Board of Equalization concluded that the
rollback provision did not apply to state-assessed property. This con-
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clusion was left untouched by the legislature during its succeeding
sessions.
The court also rejected the argument that article XIII, section 19
mandated an equal valuation of public utility property with other
property. Section 19, said the court, applies only to the rate of taxa-
tion and not the valuation, and to read it otherwise would go against
the legislature's understanding and the intent of the public who
adopted Proposition 13.
VXIII. TORTS
A. Common law damages may be awarded to heirs of
victims of an airplane crash even though the FAA
exclusively regulates civil aviation. A negligence per se
instruction which allows the jury to consider whether
FAA regulations were complied with is proper:
Elsworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp.
I. INTRODUCTION
The case of Elsworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp.' arose out of a plane
crash. Edward 0. Miro took three prospective buyers for a demon-
stration flight in a Travel Air twin engine airplane manufactured by
Beech Aircraft Corporation (defendant). After takeoff, the plane
climbed to 800 feet. While maneuvering in the traffic pattern, the
plane suddenly made a sharp left turn, fell over, and began spinning.
After a brief recovery the plane entered a final flat spin and crashed,
killing all aboard. An examination of the wreckage showed that the
left engine had been shut down by Miro, probably in response to the
loss of indicated oil pressure. Miro had also shut off the fuel to the
left engine and feathered the left propeller in his unsuccessful at-
tempt to land the Travel Air safely.
Suit was brought against the manufacturer of the airplane. Con-
flicting evidence and theories were presented by the respective par-
ties as to the cause of the crash. The plaintiffs,2 through expert
testimony, contended that the crash was caused by the failure of the
left engine due to the broken valve. It was surmised that Miro acted
quickly to prevent engine break up and fire by feathering the left en-
1. 37 Cal. 3d 540, 691 P.2d 630, 208 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1984). Opinion by Mosk, J.,
expressing the unanimous view of the court.
2. Those parties bringing the action were the three passengers' heirs. Miro's in-
surer had settled with the heirs of the passengers, and thus Miro's heir cross-com-
plained against Beech.
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gine propeller.3 However, due to an inadequate stall warning system
and an undue tendency for the Travel Air to spin, the Travel Air
stalled and spun into the ground. Conversely, the defendant attrib-
uted the crash to pilot error, claiming that Miro did not maintain suf-
ficient air speed to keep the Travel Air from stalling.
The plaintiffs sought recovery on several theories, including negli-
gence per se, by alleging that the Travel Air "did not comply with
various safty regulations adopted by the FAA."4 The Travel Air's de-
sign was certified by the FAA in 1957 as complying with all safety
regulations. The inspections and tests required by statute to receive
certification were conducted by Beech employees.5 However, tests to
determine the spinning characteristics of the Travel Air were never
performed. These important tests were omitted because an FAA offi-
cial incorrectly construed the safety regulations as not requiring
them.6 They were performed, however, after a Travel Air crashed in
1958. Certification of the aircraft was continued after these tests on
the recommendation of an FAA test pilot. The Travel Air remained
certified as complying with all applicable safety regulations at the
time of the ensuing crash. Nevertheless, a negligence per se instruc-
tion was read to the jury.7
The defendant Beech appealed from a judgment for the plaintiffs.
Three claims were asserted by Beech. The first was that an instruc-
tion of negligence per se to the jury regarding whether Beech com-
plied with existing FAA regulations was improper. Beech argued
that "the effect of the instruction was to allow the jury to second-
guess the FAA decision that the Travel Air complied with the regula-
3. A broken valve caused the instrument in the cockpit that measured oil pres-
sure to register a low reading and thus made Miro's actions reasonable, according to
the plaintiffs' experts.
4. Id. at 546, 691 P.2d at 633, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 877. Other theories advanced by
the plaintiffs were negligence and strict liability for design defects. See id. at 546 n.4,
691 P.2d at 633 n.4, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 877 n.4.
5. 49 U.S.C. § 1421(a)(1) (1982) provides that:
The Administrator is empowered and it shall be his duty to promote safety of
flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing and revising from time
to time:
(1) Such minimum standards governing the design, .. and performance of
aircraft, aircraft engines ... as may be required in the interest of safety.
Id. This procedure of allowing private parties to conduct tests to receive certification is
permissible under 49 U.S.C. § 1355(a) (1982) which states: "the Administrator may...
delegate to any properly qualified private person . . . any work . . . respecting (1) the
examination, inspection, and testing necessary to the issuance of certificates . . .and
(2) the issuance of such certificates." Id.
6. According to Harold Hermes, then regional chief of the FAA flight test
branch, the regulations did not require "spin testing for twin engine aircraft." 37 Cal.
3d at 546, 691 P.2d at 633, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
7. Id at 547, 691 P.2d at 633, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 877 (citing BAJI No. 3.45 (6th ed.
1977)).
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tions, thereby intruding into an area pre-empted by federal law."8
The second was the improper admission of various items of evidence,
among them an FAA report and evidence of twenty other crashes of
the Travel Air or a similar aircraft. The third was that a new trial
should be granted because two jurors watched a 60 Minutes television
broadcast bearing on the case. The supreme court rejected the de-
fendant's claims and affirmed the verdict.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Preemption
The law to be followed in preemption cases was stated in the re-
cent United States Supreme Court case of Pacific Gas and Electric
Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development
Commission.9
[Flederal law prevails over state law if Congress has expressed an intent to
occupy a given field in which federal law is supreme. But even if there is no
such intent, state law is preempted if it conflicts with federal law so that it is
impossible to comply with both, or if the state regulations stand as an obstacle
to the accomplishment of the full purposes that Congress sought to achieve. 10
The court first addressed the issue of whether a state court may
grant damages in cases where the federal legislature or administra-
tive agency has entirely occupied the field in question by regulating it
exclusively. In applying the test of Pacific Gas & Electric, a court
must first determine if there was an express intent by the federal
government to forbid states from awarding damages for violation of
such regulations.
The United States Supreme Court was faced with a similar issue in
the recent and well known case of Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.11
While the Court acknowledged the tension between the minimum
regulatory standards set forth by the federal government and the
state law remedy of damages in Silkwood, the Court held that "Con-
gress intended to stand by both concepts and to tolerate whatever
tension there was between them."12 Therefore, even though the nu-
clear power industry is exclusively regulated by the federal govern-
8. Id. at 547, 691 P.2d at 634, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
9. 461 U.S. 190 (1984).
10. 37 Cal. 3d at 548, 691 P.2d at 634, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 878 (quoting Pacific Gas &
Elec., 461 U.S. at 203).
11. 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984).
12. 37 Cal. 3d at 549, 691 P.2d at 653, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 879 (quoting Silkwood, 104 S.
Ct. at 625).
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ment, the Court allowed the award of common law damages.13
The area of nuclear regulation is not unlike the area of aviation
regulation, as serious consequences can result from an accident in
either area. Thus, by analogy to Silkwood, the court stated that
"there can be no question as to the intent of Congress to allow the
states to apply their own laws in tort actions against aircraft manu-
facturers for the defective design of airplanes." 14 Moreover, the
court cited the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 which declares that the
provisions of the Act "are not intended to abridge remedies that a
party may have under state law."15
The critical issue before the court was whether the second part of
the Pacific Gas and Electric test was satisfied. That is, was it impos-
sible to comply with both federal and state standards, or would the
imposition of a state standard (i.e., an award of damages) frustrate
the objectives of the federal law?
The court could not discern any irreconcilable conflict between the
federal government issuing certificates and the state court awarding
damages against a defendant for a defective design. While Beech ar-
gued that deference should be accorded the FAA in its determination
that the Travel Air was not defective, the court responded that the
plaintiffs did not wish to challenge either the certification of the
Travel Air or the power of the FAA to do so. 16 Allowing a jury to
determine whether the Travel Air had a defective design "would
have no effect on the FAA's power to certify aircraft, or on the valid-
ity of its certification decisions."17 As for a negligence per se instruc-
tion, it "affects only the jury's reason for finding a design defect,
rather than its power to find such a defect in the face of FAA certifi-
cation."18 Therefore, as it was not physically impossible for Beech to
pay state-imposed damages and face fines from the federal govern-
ment, negligence per se was not an improper instruction.19
The final aspect of the preemption issue was whether state law
13. In Silkwood, the evidence showed that "Kerr-McGee complied with most fed-
eral regulations," 104 S. Ct. at 619, just as Beech did in the case at hand.
14. 37 Cal. 3d at 549, 691 P.2d at 635, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
15. Id.; see 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1982).
16. See 37 Cal. 3d at 549-50, 691 P.2d at 635, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 879. The FAA does
provide for those wishing an opportunity to be heard regarding the certification pro-
cess. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1482(a), 1486(a) (1982).
17. 37 Cal. 3d at 550, 691 P.2d at 635, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 879. Moreover, Beech con-
ceded that a manufacturer may be held liable even if the airplane complied with FAA
regulations. Id. at 550, 691 P.2d at 636, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
18. Id.
19. In order to find the negligence per se instruction invalid, Beech needed to
show that "a significant risk of prohibition of protected conduct" was created. Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 207 (1978). Because failure to comply with
FAA regulations is not protected conduct, as construed in Sears, Roebuck & Co., this
argument failed,
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posed an obstacle to the federal regulatory scheme. 20 The purpose of
the regulations is to "protect those who fly in airplanes or are af-
fected by their flight."21 The defendant's contention that the reme-
dies in the regulations 22 were the plaintiff's exclusive remedies was
dismissed by the court. Furthermore, the court stated that "an action
for damages promotes the safety of the travelling public by revealing
violations or defects which may not have come to the attention of the
FAA."23 As a result, the overall policy of protecting those who fly in
airplanes "would be enhanced rather than defeated by allowing a
jury to consider whether the design of an aircraft complies with
safety regulations" 24 despite agency certification. As the foregoing
analysis indicates, no obstacle was found by the court; therefore, the
court affirmed the lower court's ruling of no preemption.
B. Evidentiary Rulings
Beech alleged error in the admission of a report written by an un-
identified employee of the General Accounting Office. The lower
court admitted the report as relevant and admissible under the offi-
cial records exception to the hearsay rule.25 Once admitted, the re-
port was read aloud by the plaintiff's attorney. The same report was
20. See 37 Cal. 3d at 550, 691 P.2d at 636, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
21. 1& at 551, 691 P.2d at 636, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 880. See Rauch v. United Instru-
ments, 548 F.2d 452, 457 (3d Cir. 1976); Arney v. United States, 479 F.2d 653, 658 (9th
Cir. 1973).
22. See supra note 16. These remedies, however, provide no relief in the form of
damages; rather, they are provided for those who wish to challenge certification. As
the public has no expertise in aircraft safety, these remedies were held inadequate by
the court.
23. 37 Cal. 3d at 551, 691 P.2d at 637, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
24. Id. at 551, 691 P.2d at 636, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 880. The court cited the case of
McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 139 Cal. App. 3d 179, 188 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1983), which
held that a "Federal Aviation Regulation is entitled to as much weight as a statute,
ordinance, or regulation of a public entity." Id. at 186-87, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 547. There-
fore, if the jury found a violation, negligence per se under California Evidence Code
section 669 could apply if the other requirements of the doctrine were satisfied by a
preponderance of the evidence.
25. California Evidence Code section 1280 provides:
Evidence of a writing made as a record of an act, condition, or event is not
made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered to prove the act, condi-
tion, or event if:
(a) The writing was made by and within the scope of duty of a public em-
ployee;
(b) The writing was made at or near the time of the act, condition, or event;
and
(c) The sources of information and method and time of preparation were
such as to indicate its trustworthiness.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1280 (West 1966).
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excluded as hearsay in Baker v. Beech Aircraft Corp.26 Beech con-
tended that the report was irrelevant because it was made thirteen
years after the Travel Air was certified and seven years after the wit-
ness to whom the plaintiff's attorney read the report, left his position
with Beech. The court held that the report should have been ex-
cluded as hearsay as the official reports exception criteria was not
satisfied.27 The trustworthiness and relevance of the report were
questionable. First, the author of the study and the identity of key
FAA officials were unknown, and second, the report was made "sev-
eral years after [the witness'] contact with Beech in the FAA central
region had terminated."28 However, the error of admitting the report
was not prejudicial because there was ample evidence to support a
determination by the jury in the plaintiff's favor,29 coupled with the
decreased relevance of the report due to the passage of years between
the certification and the date of the report. The references to the re-
port at trial were harmless because it was not "reasonably probable
that a result more favorable to Beech would have been reached ab-
sent the references to the report at trial."30
Beech also alleged error in the admission of other accidents of air-
craft built by Beech. The evidence in question was twenty stall/spin
accidents, five involving the Travel Air, and fifteen involving another
aircraft built by Beech, the Baron. The court held the accidents of
the Baron admissible because the plaintiff introduced expert testi-
mony at trial that showed the Baron and the Travel Air shared the
same alleged design defect in the wings. This similarity of design
made the trial court's conclusion of admissibility allowable. All of
the accidents themselves were admissible to show Beech had notice
of a possible design defect even if there was no evidence presented to
show that each accident happened in the same manner.31 The court
26. 96 Cal. App. 3d 321, 157 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1979). In Baker, the court stated: "no
evidence at the trial was presented as to the identity and qualifications of the individu-
als who prepared said report, the facts upon which they based the report, or the cir-
cumstances under which it was prepared." Id. at 339, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 790.
27. 37 Cal. 3d at 554, 691 P.2d at 638, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 882. See also supra note 25
and accompanying text.
28. Id.
29. The court cited as evidence "voluminous testimony regarding the testing of the
Travel Air, Beech's relationship to the FAA during the certification process, the re-
quirements of the safety regulations, and the respects in which Beech failed to comply
with them. Id. at 554, 691 P.2d at 639, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
30. Id. (citing CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 13; People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 299 P.2d
243 (1956)).
31. To satisfy the notice requirement, the court quoted Hasson v. Ford Motor Co.,
32 Cal. 3d 388, 650 P.2d 1171, 185 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1982), cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 1190
(1983), which indicated that "all that is required... is that the previous injury should
be such as to attract the defendant's attention to the dangerous situation. " 37 Cal. 3d
at 555, 691 P.2d at 639, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 883 (quoting Hasson, 32 Cal. 3d at 404, 650 P.2d
at 1181, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 664).
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stated that "[t]here can be no question that the prior accidents should
have alerted Beech to the faulty spinning characteristics of the
Travel Air."32 Therefore, the notice requirement was satisfied and
the evidence of the crashes was admissible.
C. Jury Misconduct
During the trial's Christmas recess, 60 Minutes broadcasted a seg-
ment criticizing the safety record of light aircraft. Three days later,
the jury began deliberations in the case at hand. Outside of the jury
room, two jurors indicated that they had viewed the program; an-
other juror, who voted in Beech's favor, came forward with a declara-
tion stating that two jurors had indicated that they had seen the
program. Beech sought a new trial due to juror misconduct.33 Beech
contended that the two jurors who viewed the program were guilty
of misconduct, and that such misconduct raises a presumption of
prejudice. People v. Pierce34 was cited by Beech. In Pierce, the fore-
man of the jury, contrary to the judge's admonition, approached a po-
lice officer who testified for the prosecution (and who also was a good
friend and neighbor of the juror) and discussed the case. The court
in Pierce held that the refusal to grant a new trial was error due to
the serious prejudice to the defendant. 35 This case was distinguished
from Pierce because "the jurors in question did not deliberately set
out to discover information regarding the issues at the trial; they sim-
ply watched a popular television program that happened to discuss
the subject matter of the trial in a general way." 36 The court drew a
parallel to the case of Hasson v. Ford Motor Co.,37 in which a juror
who attended nighttime paralegal classes heard a lecturer discuss the
possibility of punitive damages. The court found no misconduct in
Hasson because the information was unsolicited and mentioned in
32. 37 Cal. 3d at 555, 691 P.2d at 639-40, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 883-84.
33. The court that heard the motion for a new trial reviewed a videotape of the
broadcast in question and concluded that the broadcast did not harm one party any
more than the other. Id. at 556, 691 P.2d at 640, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
34. 24 Cal. 3d 199, 595 P.2d 91, 155 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1979).
35. The court in Pierce stated that "[blecause a defendant charged with crime has
a right to the unanimous verdict of 12 impartial jurors, it is settled that a conviction
cannot stand if even a single juror has been improperly influenced." 24 Cal. 3d at 208,
595 P.2d at 96, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 662 (citations omitted). See People v. Honeycutt, 20
Cal. 3d 150, 570 P.2d 1050, 141 Cal. Rptr. 698 (1977); Anderson v. Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 276, 32 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1963); Kritzen v. Citroen, 101 Cal. App. 2d
33, 224 P.2d 808 (1950).
36. 37 Cal. 3d at 559, 691 P.2d at 640-41, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 884-85.
37. 32 Cal. 3d 388, 650 P.2d 1171, 185 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1982).
1259
passing.3 8 Though 60 Minutes did more than mention the subject of
this litigation in passing, no misconduct was found because the jurors'
acquisition of the information was inadvertent.
Even if misconduct was found, the court would have found the
presumpton of prejudice rebutted by the plaintiffs.3 9 The program
made no mention of the Travel Air, and the court was "unable to
conclude whether [the program] favored plaintiffs' theory of a design
defect in the Travel Air or Beech's claim of pilot error." 40 Therefore,
the court was unable to find that any misconduct was "of such a char-
acter as is likely to have influenced the verdict improperly"41 so
Beech's request for a new trial on the ground of juror misconduct
was denied.
III. CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs were not to be denied a remedy in this case. The is-
sue of preemption was viewed by the court with an unyeilding eye.
As the policy of the aviation regulations is to protect the public, so
too are the damage awards to make those injured whole. Awarding
damages does nothing to obstruct manufacturers from complying
with federal regulations; on the contrary, it gives manufacturers ad-
ded incentive to comply. Manufacturers have no safe harbor by mere
certification by the FAA.
No prejudicial error was found by the court on the evidentiary
questions presented. In addition, inadvertent viewing by jurors of an
impartial television broadcast regarding the topic of the litigation did
not amount to misconduct as no improper influence on the verdict
could be found.
B. Foreseeability of criminal acts by third parties can be
established by evidence other than prior similar events:
Issacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital.
I. INTRODUCTION
The court in Issacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital' held that a
plaintiff in a suit against a landowner for the criminal acts of third
38. Id. at 409, 650 P.2d at 1184, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
39. The Hasson case set out the test to be applied to determine whether jury mis-
conduct results in prejudice. The reviewing court must examine "the entire record to
determine whether there is a reasonable probability of actual harm to the complaining
party resulting from the misconduct." Id at 417, 650 P.2d at 1189, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 672
(citations omitted).
40. 37 Cal. 3d at 558, 691 P.2d at 641, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
41. Id. (quoting CAL. EVID. CODE § 1150(a) (West 1966)).
1. 38 Cal. 3d 112, 695 P.2d 653, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1985). Chief Justice Bird au-
thored the majority opinion in which Justices Mosk, Kaus, Broussard, Reynoso, Grodin
and Lucas concurred. No separate opinions were filed.
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parties may show foreseeability by evidence other than prior similar
events. Thus, to impose a duty of care on the landowner based upon
foreseeability, a plaintiff need only show that under the totality of
the circumstances the third party criminal conduct was reasonably
foreseeable. Furthermore, the plaintiff's evidence can be limited to
evidence other than prior similar incidents.2
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The plaintiff, Mervyn Issacs, brought an action against the Hunt-
ington Memorial Hospital and its insurer, Truck Insurance Exchange,
for injuries he received at the hand of a third party criminal while on
the defendant's premises. The plaintiff, an anesthesiologist, had fin-
ished seeing some patients at the hospital and returned to his car
with his wife and a family friend. While opening the trunk, the
plaintiff was accosted and shot in the chest by an unknown assailant.3
Issacs survived and brought an action against the defendants, alleging
the hospital had breached its duty of care to protect persons on its
premises from third party criminal attack.4
The plaintiff argued that the hospital was in a "high crime area,"
as several assaults had occurred on the premises in the last few years.
He also urged that the security provided by the hospital was ineffec-
tive: hospital guards were unarmed and were not in the parking lot;
lights were not on; television cameras neglected the parking lot; and
an escort service was not utilized by hospital staff. A summary judg-
ment for the defendants was granted in the trial court, and the plain-
tiff appealed.5
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
The court limited its inquiry to "whether foreseeability, for the
purposes of establishing a landowner's liability for the criminal acts
of third persons on the landowner's property, may be established
other than by evidence of prior similar incidents on those premises."6
2. Id at 133, 695 P.2d at 663, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
3. Id. at 120, 695 P.2d at 655, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 358. Dr. Issacs suffered severe in-
juries from the gunshot wound, which included loss of a kidney. The gunman was
never apprehended.
4. Id. The plaintiff based the insurer's liability on their participation in deter-
mining to disarm the hospital guards.
5. Id. at 123, 695 P.2d at 657, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 360. The trial court determined
that the plaintiff failed to establish foreseeability via proof of prior similar incidents on
the premises.
6. Id at 123, 695 P.2d at 657, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
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The court acknowledged that a landowner has a duty to anticipate
reasonably foreseeable criminal acts of third parties on its premises
and to protect invitees from such a threat.7 The degree of foresee-
ability required to impose liability determined on a case-by-case basis,
is dependent upon the burden of preventing the harm.8 Where the
possible harm is easily guarded against, a low degree of foreseeability
is necessary. The court quickly disposed of an earlier rule which
based foreseeability, and thus liability, on the existence of prior simi-
lar incidents. 9 The court noted that such a rule discouraged precau-
tion, led to arbitrariness, and deprived the jury of its function to
determine a case on its merits.10
Instead, the court held that foreseeability need not be based on
similar prior incidents.'1 A totality of the circumstances determines
whether a landowner should have forseen the criminal acts of third
parties. Here, the owners neglected to provide proper lighting and
adequate security so the court reversed the lower court's determina-
tion that the attack was not foreseeable.12
The court also reviewed several evidentiary challenges by the
plaintiff. First, the court determined that the lower court's holding,
that a separate hearing be held on each prior incident before admis-
sion, was proper.13 Furthermore, the court held that there is no set
rule as to when a prior incident is too remote in time to indicate fore-
seeability.14 This is qualified by the court's discretion to exclude
prior events when probative value is outweighed by the prejudicial
effect.15
Finally, the court determined that the summary judgment in favor
of the hospital's insurer was proper.16 The court based this affirma-
tion upon the insurance company's lack of ownership, possession or
7. See Taylor v. Centennial Bowl, 65 Cal. 2d 114, 416 P.2d 793, 32 Cal. Rptr. 561
.(1966).
8. 38 Cal. 3d at 128-30, 695 P.2d at 60-61, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 363-64 (citing Gomez v.
Ticor, 145 Cal. App. 3d 622, 193 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1983)).
9. The court stated the earlier rule as follows: " 'in the absence of prior similar
incidents, an owner of land is not bound to anticipate the criminal activities of third
persons .... ' 38 Cal. 3d at 125, 695 P.2d at 658, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 361 (quoting Win-
gard v. Safeway Stores, 123 Cal. App. 3d 37, 43, 176 Cal. Rptr. 320, 324 (1981)).
10. The court held that "[a] rule that limits evidence of foreseeability to prior sim-
ilar incidents deprives the jury of its role in determining that question." 38 Cal. 3d at
127, 695 P.2d at 659, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
11. Id. See Kwaitkowski v. Superior Trading Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d 324, 176 Cal.
Rptr. 494 (1981).
12. 38 Cal. 3d at 130-35, 695 P.2d at 661-64, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 364-67.
13. The court held this hearing, outside of the presence of the jury, was reason-
able. Id.
14. Id. at 133, 695 P.2d at 663, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
15. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966) (remoteness in time only one factor in
the determination).
16. 37 Cal. 3d at 134-35, 695 P.2d at 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
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control of the premises.17
IV. CONCLUSION
A plaintiff in an action against a landowner for injuries received
from a criminal third party is able to prove the requisite foreseeabil-
ity by proof of facts other than prior similar incidents. Now a land-
owner, based on the totality of the circumstances, must anticipate
reasonably foreseeable dangers posed by third parties on his
premises.
C. One who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to an
unintoxicated minor is immune from civil liability for
injuries to third persons resulting from the minor's
subsequent intoxication: Strang v. Cabrol.
The supreme court in Strang v. Cabrol' affirmed the decision of
the trial court sustaining the defendant's general demurrer and
adopted the opinion of the court of appeal 2 as the majority opinion.
Hearing was granted to resolve a conflict among the appellate courts
concerning whether civil liability for personal injuries to third parties
may be predicated on the sale or furnishing of alcoholic beverages to
a not obviously intoxicated minor. The court found that no liability
exists in such a situation.3
I. FACTS
Cabrol and four other individuals, members of a partnership doing
business as a liquor store, were named as defendants in a personal in-
jury suit brought by Strang. Plaintiff Strang alleged that the defend-
ants sold alcoholic beverages to Shawn Patterson, who was under
twenty-one, in violation of section 25658 of the Business and Profes-
sions Code.4 Patterson then provided the alcohol to Donald Baas,
17. Id. See also Whitneys at the Beach v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. App. 3d 258, 83
Cal. Rptr. 237 (1970).
1. 37 Cal. 3d 720, 691 P.2d 1013, 209 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1984). Opinion by the court.
Separate dissenting opinion by Kaus, J., with Bird, C.J., and Reynoso, J., concurring.
2. Opinion by Puglia, J., for the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District. The
supreme court made minor modifications and deletions in its adoption of the appellate
court's decision.
3. 37 Cal. 3d at 721, 691 P.2d at 1014, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
4. Section 25658 states in pertinent part, "Every person who sells, furnishes,
gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given away, any alcoholic beverage to any per-
son under the age of 21 years is guilty of a misdemeanor." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 25658(a) (West Supp. 1985).
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also under twenty-one, who drank the liquor and became intoxicated.
The plaintiff sustained her injuries as a passenger in a vehicle
driven by Baas, such injuries being proximately caused by the
driver's intoxication. The plaintiff alleged that at the time of the sale
of liquor, the defendants knew the under-age purchasers would give
the liquor to others, also under-age, who would become intoxicated
and drive while intoxicated. The trial court dismissed the claim and
the appellate court affirmed.
I. THE MAJORITY OPINION
A. The 1978 Amendments
The defendants were deemed immune from liability under the 1978
amendments to Civil Code section 17145 and Business and Profes-
sions Code section 25602.6 Both sections contain, as part of their
amendment, an express declaration by the legislature of its intent to
reinstate prior judicial interpretation.
Section 1714 retains its imposition of responsibility for one's willful
or negligent acts but is qualified in subsections (b) and (c), added in
1978. Subsdivision (b) evidences the legislative intent to restore the
prior judicial interpretation of proximate cause. Specifically, the sec-
tion abrogates certain case holdings and declares that the furnishing
of alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person is not the proximate
cause of resultant injuries, but instead the consumption of the bever-
ages is the proximate cause of any injuries inflicted on a third person
by an intoxicated person.7 A similar provision was added to section
5. Section 1714, prior to the 1978 amendments, read:
Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for
an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the
management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, will-
fully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself ....
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 1973). The 1978 amendments added two subsections to
the existing provision. See infra note 7 and accompanying text.
6. Section 25602, prior to amendment, read, "[e]very person who sells, furnishes,
gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given away, any alcoholic beverage to any ha-
bitual or common drunkard or to any obviously intoxicated person is guilty of a misde-
meanor." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West 1964).
7. Subsection (b) states in full:
It is the intent of the Legislature to abrogate the holdings in cases such as
Vesely v. Sager (5 Cal. 3d 153), Bernhard v. Harrah's Club (16 Cal. 3d 313),
and Coulter v. Superior Court ([21] Cal. 3d [144]) and to reinstate the prior
judicial interpretation of this section as it relates to proximate cause for inju-
ries incurred as a result of furnishing alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated
person, namely that the furnishing of alcoholic beverages is not the proximate
cause of injuries resulting from intoxication, but rather the consumption of al-
coholic beverages is the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by
an intoxicated person.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714(b) (West Supp. 1985).
Section 1714 was also amended to include subsection (c), which states,
. No social host who furnishes alcoholic beverages to any person shall be held
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25602 of the Business and Professions Code as subdivision (c).8 Sub-
division (b) of that section is straightforward in removing civil liabil-
ity from anyone who sells or furnishes liquor to a habitual drunkard
or an intoxicated person who then inflicts injury on a third person as
a result of intoxication.9
Taken together, the 1978 amendments created broad civil immu-
nity. Only one exception was instituted, which is found in Business
and Professions Code section 25602.1, also added in 1978. That sec-
tion provides that a cause of action may be brought against a licensed
liquor store operator who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to
"any obviously intoxicated minor" who causes injury or death to
another.10
The plaintiff based her claim here on the absence of express civil
immunity in section 25658,11 rather than section 25602.1, because the
minor who purchased the beverages was not obviously intoxicated.
She claimed that the defendants remained subject to common law
tort liability for selling liquor to someone under twenty-one years of
age.
legally accountable for damages suffered by such person, or for injury to the
person or property of, or death of, any third person, resulting from the con-
sumption of such beverages.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714(c) (West Supp. 1985).
8. That amendment reads:
The Legislature hereby declares that this section shall be interpreted so that
the holdings in cases such as [Vesely, Bernhard and Coulter] be abrogated in
favor of prior judicial interpretation finding the consumption of alcoholic bev-
erages rather than the serving of alcoholic beverages as the proximate cause
of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602(c) (West Supp. 1985).
9. Subsection (b) states in full:
No person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given
away, any alcoholic beverage pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section shall
be civilly liable to any injured person or the estate of such person for injuries
inflicted on that person as a result of intoxication by the consumer of such
alcoholic beverage.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602(b) (West Supp. 1985).
10. Section 25602.1 states in full:
Notwithstanding subdivision (b) of Section 25602, a cause of action may be
brought by or on behalf of any person who has suffered injury or death
against any person licensed pursuant to Section 23300 who sells, furnishes,
gives or causes to be sold, furnished or given away any alcoholic beverage to
any obviously intoxicated minor where the furnishing, sale, or giving of such
beverage to the minor is the proximate cause of the personal injury or death
sustained by such person.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602.1 (West Supp. 1985).
11. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25658(a) (West Supp. 1985). See supra note 4.
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B. Abrogation of Vesely, Bernhard and Coulter
The 1978 amendments expressly abrogated the holdings of three
cases. The court analyzed each as part of a phase in the development
of the law of proximate cause. It then analyzed the effect of the
amendments on that phase.
In Vesely v. Sager,'2 the supreme court rejected the common law
rule of nonliability for furnishing liquor to an already intoxicated
person in violation of law. The commercial vendor in the case was
held liable for the plaintiff's injuries because the sale of liquor proxi-
mately caused those injuries.' 3 It was further reasoned that the sale
was within the class of conduct sought to be prevented by the statute
restricting sales to obviously intoxicated persons and the plaintiff was
within the class of persons whose safety the statute was designed to
protect. i 4 Thus, the court in Vesely relied on a violation of the stat-
ute to make out a breach of a duty of care owed by the defendant to
the plaintiff.'5
The Bernhard v. Harrah's Club case16 involved a choice of laws
conflict as well as a liability for injuries issue. The court held that
the California rule of civil liability, imposed on tavern keepers who
furnish alcoholic beverages to an obviously intoxicated person who
then inflicts injury on a third person, should prevail over the Nevada
rule of nonliability.i 7 This was true despite the absence of a statute
upon which to base liability. The court relied on its holding in Vesely
that the sale of alcoholic beverages may be the proximate cause of in-
juries rather than merely the consumption of alcoholic beverages and
stated that there was "no bar to civil liability under modern negli-
gence law."18
In Coulter v. Superior Court,'9 the Vesely holding was further ap-
plied to noncommercial suppliers of alcoholic beverages. 20 The court
12. Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
13. Id. at 163-64, 486 P.2d at 158-59, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 630-31. Furnishing of alcoholic
beverages is the proximate cause of the injuries because of the foreseeability of the in-
jury-producing conduct. Id.
14. Id. at 165, 486 P.2d at 159-60, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 631-32.
15. Id. at 164-65, 486 P.2d at 159, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 631. See also CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 669 (West Supp. 1985), which codifies the presumption of a breach of duty upon a
showing by the plaintiff that the statutory violation proximately caused the injuries.
16. Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976).
17. Id. at 323, 546 P.2d at 725-26, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 221-22. The court elaborated
that California and Nevada both had interests to protect, but California's was the
stronger. Id. at 322, 546 P.2d at 725, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 221. The law encompassed the
out-of-state defendant because it advertises and solicits in California for the business of
California residents. Id.
18. Id. at 325, 546 P.2d at 726, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
19. Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534
(1978).
20. This holding was reached in reliance on section 25602 and on traditional corn-
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reasoned that providing an already intoxicated person with liquor,
knowing that the person intends to drive, creates a reasonably fore-
seeable risk of injury to others on the highways. "Simply put, one
who serves alcoholic beverages under such circumstances fails to ex-
ercise reasonable care.".21
The court concluded here that the intended import of the 1978
amendments was to "supersede evolving common law negligence
principles which would otherwise permit a finding of liability under
the circumstances here pled."22
C. Statutory Construction
The court cited the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius23
as applicable to the situation here. Under this rule of construction,
''an express exclusion from the operation of a statute indicates the
Legislature intended no other exceptions are to be implied."24 The
only exception to the immunity provided by the 1978 amendments in-
volves the sale of liquor by a licensee to an obviously intoxicated mi-
nor.25 Therefore, had the legislature intended to extend liability to
include sales to sober, under-age persons, it could have done so by
simply amending section 25658 to reflect that intent.
Although the Vesely, Bernhard and Coulter cases involved obvi-
ously intoxicated persons, the court found no intent of the legislature
to restrict immunity only to that narrow factual situation. The stat-
ute uses the language "in cases such as" to refer to these holdings
generally as reflective of the evolving common law on this type of
mon law negligence principles. I&L at 149-53, 577 P.2d at 672-74, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 537-
39.
21. Id. at 152-53, 577 P.2d at 675, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 539. See also Cory v. Shierloh, 29
Cal. 3d 430, 435, 629 P.2d 8, 10, 174 Cal. Rptr. 500, 502 (1981) (section 25602(b) bars suit
by the intoxicated consumer as well as by third parties injured by him).
22. 37 Cal. 3d at 725, 691 P.2d at 1016, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 350. The court reached this
conclusion by applying "settled principles of statutory construction" and referred spe-
cifically to Civil Code section 22.2 which names the common law of England as the
rule of decision in all courts of this state, unless repugnant to the constitution. See
generally 58 CAL. JUR. 3D, Statutes, §§ 4, 5.
23. A maxim of statutory interpretation meaning that the expression of one
thing is the exclusion of another. Mention of one thing implies exclusion of
another. . . . Under this maxim, if statute specifies one exception to a general
rule or assumes to specify the effects of a certain provision, other exceptions
or effects are excluded.
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 521 (5th. ed. 1979) (citations omitted).
24. 37 Cal. 3d at 725, 691 P.2d at 1016, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
25. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602.1 (West Supp. 1985); See also supra note
10 and accompanying text.
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liability.26
The amendments further serve to reinstate the judicial interpreta-
tion of liquor liability which existed prior to Vesely. The court refers
to Cole v. Rush27 as being typical of that prior common law doctrine.
In Cole, the plaintiffs sought to recover damages from the defend-
ants in a wrongful death action. The defendants had furnished the
decedent with liquor, knowing he became belligerent when drunk,
and decedent was subsequently killed in a fist fight. The court held
that no cause of action had been pled and that it is the voluntary con-
sumption of intoxicating liquor, not the sale or furnishing, which is
the proximate cause of injury from its use.28
Although the Cole court spoke in terms of an "ordinary man" who
voluntarily consumes alcoholic beverages, the definition of such a
person would include a minor.29 Indeed, the civil code provides that
a minor is responsible for his torts, just as an adult is.3o The court
further cited Fleckner v. Dionne3 l with approval, a case which exem-
plifies "prior judicial interpretation" of the proximate cause issue
arising in this case.
In Fleckner, a presumptive negligence argument based on statutory
violation was rejected and a common law rule was applied which
found no proximate relationship between the sale of liquor and the
injury.3 2 The case involved a tavern owner who knowingly sold li-
quor to a minor who was already intoxicated. The owner knew also
that the minor had a car parked nearby that he would drive after he
left. The minor did, in fact, drive while intoxicated, causing an acci-
dent and injuring the plaintiff. No recovery was awarded.
The Feckner case was similar to the facts in Strang in that both
involved under-age consumers with resulting third-party injuries.
The cases differ in that the minor in Fleckner was already intoxi-
26. 37 Cal. 3d at 725, 691 P.2d at 1016, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
Were the reference interpreted as limiting, then the 1978 amendments (except
as provided by § 25602.1) would bar suit only against a person supplying alco-
holic beverages to an obviously intoxicated consumer, yet permit tort recovery
against one who supplies to a sober individual who later becomes intoxicated
.... We do not believe the Legislature intended such a whimsical anomaly.
Id.
27. 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955).
28. Id, at 356, 289 P.2d at 457.
29. 37 Cal. 3d at 726, 691 P.2d at 1017, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 351. The rule applies to
minors as long as no additional showing is made as to the minor's incompetence, inca-
pacity of voluntary action or the suffering of some peculiar mental disability. Id. See
also Cantor v. Anderson, 126 Cal. App. 3d 124, 178 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1981) (cause of ac-
tion was to be amended to show defendants, as social hosts, had knowledge of guest's
developmental disability and provided him with alcoholic beverages despite such
knowledge).
30. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 41 (West 1982).
31. 94 Cal. App. 2d 246, 210 P.2d 530 (1949).
32. Id. at 251, 210 P.2d at 534.
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cated when he made the purchase and he was also the driver who
caused the accident. The rule of Fleckner, however, has been "crys-
tallized" in the law and should, as a matter of stare decisis, be
followed. 33
D. Section 25658 as a Basis for Liability
The court next addressed the case of Cory v. Shierloh34 as support
for the conclusion that the defendants here were not liable for plain-
tiff's injuries by reason of violating section 25658.35 Cory involved a
minor plaintiff who was served alcoholic beverages at a party. He
was injured on his way home after losing control of his car. The
court concluded that the "sweeping immunity" of the 1978 amend-
ments barred a suit against the social host. This rule barred recovery
by intoxicated consumers as well as by injured third parties.36
E. Conclusion
Recognizing that Burke v. Superior Court37 stood as contrary au-
thority, the court distinguished that case and disapproved those por-
tions of it which were inconsistent with the court's holding in this
case. Burke held that a liquor licensee who sold intoxicating bever-
ages to a sober minor may be liable for injury to third persons from
the drunk driving of the minor.3 8 The appellate court used foresee-
ability as the test.3 9 Vesely, Bernhard and Coulter similarly em-
ployed the foreseeability test and were expressly abrogated by the
1978 amendments. Thus, the test used in Burke has been rejected by
the amendments.40
Tort liability was abolished by the legislature in all but one situa-
tion, where alcohol is sold to an obviously intoxicated minor. Be-
cause no other exceptions exist, no civil liability may be imposed on
one who provides alcoholic beverages to an unintoxicated minor. The
judgment granting the defendants' demurrer was affirmed.41
33. See Fuller v. Standard Stations, Inc., 250 Cal. App. 2d 687, 692-93, 58 Cal. Rptr.
792, 795 (1967) (the court followed the Fleckner rule, in reliance on Cole).
34. 29 Cal. 3d 430, 629 P.2d 8, 174 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1981).
35. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
36. 29 Cal. 3d at 436-37, 629 P.2d at 11-12, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 503 (1981).
37. 129 Cal. App. 3d 570, 181 Cal. Rptr. 149 (1982).
38. Id. at 571-72, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
39. Id. at 577, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 152-53.
40. 37 Cal. 3d at 728, 691 P.2d at 1018-19, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 352-53.
41. Id.
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III. THE DISSENT
The dissent interpreted the majority's opinion as "grant[ing] abso-
lution by an unnecessarily generous interpretation" of the 1978
amendments.42 The defendants were actually in a situation where no
law condones their conduct, and yet the majority ignored this void.
The 1978 amendments were viewed by the dissenters as efforts to
"bury" Vesely.43 The amendments were classified into three groups:
(1) those creating immunities from liability;44 (2) those which rein-
state pre-Vesely law, called "anti-Vesely" provisions;45 and (3) one
which recognizes furnishing alcohol as a proximate cause when an
obviously intoxicated minor is involved.46
The anti-Vesely provisions purport to reinstate the rule that the
consumption, not the furnishing, of alcoholic beverages is the proxi-
mate cause of resultant injury to third parties. However, this directly
contradicts the rule involving intoxicated minors, where furnishing is
the proximate cause.
The dissent suggested that the two anti-Vesely provisions are more
"modest" and more "sensible" in that they are merely explanatory
with respect to the immunities they create.4 7
In sum, the dissenting justices felt the sections reviving pre-Vesely
law should be limited to the situations in which the two specific im-
munities apply, that is, the social host and the person who serves
common drunkards and obviously intoxicated persons. In all other
situations, the Vesely rule, which was based on an attempt to harmo-
nize this area of negligence law, would remain in force, untouched by
the 1978 amendments.48
42. Id. at 729, 691 P.2d at 1019, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 353 (Kaus, J., dissenting).
43. Id The dissent characterizes the Vesely opinion as one which "simply brought
this area of the law into conformity with modem notions of proximate cause." Id.
44. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714(c) (West Supp. 1985) and CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 25602(b) (West Supp. 1985). Neither of these provisions apply to the case law.
45. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25602(c) (West Supp. 1985) and CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 1714(b) (West Supp. 1985).
46. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602.1 (West Supp. 1985).
47. 37 Cal. 3d at 730, 691 P.2d at 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 354 (Kaus, J., dissenting).
48. Id.
1270
[Vol. 12: 1141, 1985] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
XIX. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
The "going and coming rule," which normally bars an
award of workers' compensation benefits to an
employee injured enroute to or from his place of
employment, should not be construed to preclude such
an award where the employee has arrived at his place
of employment and, while awaiting its opening, is
injured: Price v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Price v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board,1 the court was
faced with the question of whether an employee, who was injured
while waiting for his place of employment to open, would be denied
an award of workers' compensation benefits under the "going and
coming rule."2 The court answered this question of first impression
for California in the negative.
The "going and coming rule" prohibits the awarding of workers'
compensation benefits to an employee who is injured while enroute
to or from his place of business.3 This rule was successfully used by
the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board to bar the plaintiff's re-
covery of workers' benefits.4 The suit arose when the plaintiff, An-
drew Leo Price, arrived early for work on June 20, 1980 to discover
he could not yet enter the employment premises. 5 It was Price's cus-
tom to arrive before working hours began and to start his duties
early.6 On this occasion, Price found the doors to the premises
locked, so while waiting he returned to his car to put in a quart of
oil.7 While straddling the front of the car, Price was struck by a pass-
ing car and received serious injuries, which he then sought compen-
1. 37 Cal. 3d 559, 693 P.2d 254, 209 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1984). Chief Justice Bird deliv-
ered the majority opinion, while Justices Mosk, Kaus, Broussard, Reynoso, and Grodin,
concurred. Justice Lucas filed a dissenting opinion.
2. Id. at 563, 693 P.2d at 255, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 676.
3. See Parks v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 33 Cal. 3d 585, 660 P.2d 382,
190 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1983); Hinojosa v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 8 Cal. 3d
150, 501 P.2d 1176, 104 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1972).
4. The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board reversed an award of benefits to
Price, holding that the "going and coming rule" precluded recovery. Since Price was
held not to have completed his journey to his place of employment, he was barred
from collecting any benefits. See Parks, 33 Cal. 3d 585, 660 P.2d 382, 190 Cal. Rptr. 158.
5. 37 Cal. 3d at 564, 693 P.2d at 255, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 678.
6. Id. Furthermore, there was no way to enter the premises until the doors were
unlocked; and no parking lot or working area on the premises was provided for the
employees.
7. Id. It is significant that Price was physically off the premises when he was in-
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sation for.8 Thus, the court was faced with the issue of whether Price
had sufficiently terminated his journey to work to avoid the preclu-
sion of the "going and coming rule."
II. CASE ANALYSIS
A. The Going and Coming Rule
Normally, an employer will be liable under California's Workers'
Compensation Act for injuries to one of its employees "arising out of
and in the course of the employment. . . ."9 However, if the "going
and coming rule" is determined to be applicable, a plaintiff is barred
from receiving any award of workers' benefits.1o The court stated
"that an injury suffered 'during a local commute enroute to a fixed
place of business at fixed hours in absence of special or extraordinary
circumstances' is not within the course of employment ... and is not
compensable."11 Therefore, the Board's contention was that Price,
still enroute to his place of employment, was not yet in the course of
his employment and precluded from recovery by the "going and com-
ing rule."
The issue was whether Price, while awaiting the opening of the
premises, was actually at the end of his journey and close enough to
the premises to be considered within the course of employment.
Under the "premises line" test, the employment relationship, for
purposes of determining workers' benefits, does not begin until the
employee enters the work premises.12 The court held that Price had
arrived at work, therefore the "going and coming rule" was
inapplicable. 13
jured. In other words, it is arguable that Price had yet to finish his journey under the
"going and coning rule."
8. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West Supp. 1985). This section provides that liability
"without regard to negligence, exist[s] against an employer for any injury sustained by
his or her employees arising out of and in the course of the employment and for the
death of any employee if the injury proximately causes the death. ... Id. § 3600(a).
9. See General Ins. Co. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 16 Cal. 3d 595, 546
P.2d 1361, 128 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1976) (widow of employee killed while crossing street to
place of employment barred from recovery under "going and coming rule").
10. 37 Cal. 3d at 565, 693 P.2d at 256, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 677 (quoting Hinojosa v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 8 Cal. 3d 150, 157, 501 P.2d 1176, 1181, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 456, 461 (1972)).
11. I& See General Ins., 16 Cal. 3d at 598, 546 P.2d at 1362, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 418
("prior to entry the going and coming rule ordinarily precludes recovery").
12. 37 Cal. 3d at 567-68, 693 P.2d at 257, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 678. The court stated that
"[t]he going and coming rule governs injuries incurred 'during the course of a local
commute' or 'while traveling to and from work,' However, it does not apply to an em-
ployee who has arrived at his or her workplace." Id, at 565, 693 P.2d at 256, 209 Cal.
Rptr. at 677 (citations omitted).
13. In the event the "going and coming rule" was not applied, the Board had alter-
natively argued that Price was not within the course of his employment when injured
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B. Course of Employment
The court, after holding the "going and coming rule" to be inappli-
cable, was still faced with the question of whether Price was in the
course of his employment when he was injured, and therefore enti-
tled to workers' benefits. 14 Initially, the court considered the applica-
bility of the "special risk" exception, which allows for compensation
outside of the place of employment where the "risk associated with
the employment causes injury just outside the employer's prem-
ises."15 Although the court ruled that Price was in this "zone of em-
ployment,"1 6 wherein he took special risks, they held the exception
inapposite because of the inapplicability of the "going and coming
rule."17
Secondly, the court considered and applied the "personal conven-
ience rule" to hold that Price was in his course of employment. The
court defined acts of "personal convenience" to be "[s]uch acts as are
necessary to the life, comfort, and convenience of the servant while
at work, though strictly personal to himself, and not acts of service,
are incidental to the service, and injury sustained in the performance
thereof is deemed to have arisen out of the employment."is The
court first held that acts of "personal convenience" are not limited to
those performed on the work premises.' 9 Therefore, Price's putting
in a quart of oil was held to be an act of "personal convenience" 20
that could be reasonably expected by the employment. 2 1
Furthermore, the court applied the "dual purpose" rule22 to hold
that Price was in the course of his employment. The "dual purpose"
rule is:
and thus should be denied recovery. 37 Cal. 3d at 566, 693 P.2d at 257, 209 Cal. Rptr. at
677-78.
14. Parks v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 33 Cal. 3d at 592, 660 P.2d at
386, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 162.
15. This "zone of employment" is determined on a case-by-case basis. 37 Cal. 3d at
566, 693 P.2d at 257, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 678.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 567, 693 P.2d at 258, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 679 (quoting Whiting-Mead Co. v.
Industrial Accident Comm'n, 178 Cal. 505, 507, 173 P.2d 1105, 1106 (1918)).
19. The factors considered in determination of an act of "personal convenience"
include: the nature of the act; the type of employment; and the terms of the employ-
ment agreement. North Am. Rockwell Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals
Bd., 9 Cal. App. 3d 154, 158, 87 Cal. Rptr. 774, 776 (1970).
20. 37 Cal. 3d at 570, 693 P.2d at 260, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 680-81.
21. See Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 28 Cal. 2d 756,
172 P.2d 1 (1946).
22. Id. at 758-59, 172 P.2d at 3.
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where the employee is combining his own business with that of his employer,
or attending to both at substantially the same time, no nice inquiry will be
made as to which business he was actually engaged in at the time of injury,
unless it clearly appears that neither directly or indirectly could he have been
serving his employer.
2 3
The court reasoned that Price's act of putting in the oil served a
"dual purpose," that is, a personal one of maintaining his car as well
as serving his employer by waiting near the premises to immediately
enter upon opening. 24 Therefore, Price was held to be in the course
of his employment pursuant to the "dual purpose" rule.
III. CONCLUSION
The importance of the majority decision in Price is twofold. Most
importantly, it delineates a bright line standard to apply the "going
and coming rule." That is, when an employee has arrived at his place
of employment but is unable to enter the premises, he still is consid-
ered to have ended his journey for purposes of the "going and coming
rule."
Secondly, the court did not rest its holding on either the "personal
convenience" or "dual purpose" rules. 25 Instead, the court stressed
the point that an employee's acts should be considered in the course
of employment if they are "'reasonably to be contemplated because
of its general nature as a normal human response in a particular
situation.' "26
GWEN POLLAK
ROBERT TESSIER
TIMOTHY C. WILLIAMS
23. 37 Cal. 3d at 569, 693 P.2d at 259, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 680. The court stated, "as
Price put oil in his car, he provided a benefit to the employer by waiting near the
premises so he could enter and begin work as soon as the doors were unlocked." Id.
24. Only Justice Lucas dissented from the majority opinion. He argued that the
plaintiff's failure to enter the premises connoted he was still in commute. Further-
more, he stated that Price "was injured while engaged in an act of personal conven-
ience of no benefit to his employer, prior to his ordinary working hours." Id. at 571-72,
693 P.2d at 260-61, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 681 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
25. The court stated: "This case involves elements of both rules.... This court
need not determine which of the two rules better fits the facts of this case." Id, at 570,
693 P.2d at 260, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 680-81.
26. Id. (quoting North Am. Rockwell Corp., 9 Cal. App 3d at 159, 87 Cal. Rptr. at
777).
1274
